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Chapter 1
General Introduction
This dissertation consists of three self-containted chapters which contribute to different
strands of the literature in empiricial public economics and experimental economics.
In Chapter 2 (co-authored with Jana Friedrichsen), we investigate the relationship
between macroeconomic conditions and political support for democracy in Western
European countries. In Chapter 3 (co-authored with Paolo Masella and Stephan
Meier), we analyze in a simplified Gift Exchange Game experiment whether and how
group membership influences the effectiveness of control mechanisms and under which
conditions control can have a detrimental effect on agents’ prosocial behavior. Finally,
in Chapter 4 (co-authored with Evguenia Winschel), we test within an experimental
setting whether asymmetric information influences prosocial behavior in a variant of
the Dictator Game.
Additional material for each chapter which is not included in the main text, such
as data descriptions, descriptive statistics, experimental instructions, and additional
results, can be found in the appendix of this dissertation. The bibliography at the end
of this thesis contains references from all three chapters.
1.1 Chapter 2: Political Support in Hard Times: Do
People Care about National Welfare?
Over the last five years, the economies of Southern Europe have experienced a
deep downturn. With rising unemployment rates, negative GDP growth rates, and
1
2government debt crises, governments and other democratic institutions have been under
pressure to cope with the economic problems while sustaining the support among the
population. At the same time, in these countries governments have been voted out
of office. Moreover, peoples’ attitudes towards the way the democratic system works
have worsened substantially in these countries as suggested by survey data from the
Eurobarometer.
In this chapter, we provide evidence that the macroeconomic conditions during the
last years can, to a large extent, explain the observed deterioration of satisfaction with
democracy.
Our analysis uses individual-level survey data on satisfaction with democracy
and country-level data on growth, inflation, and unemployment from 1976 to 2010
for sixteen Western European countries. In contrast to national-level analyses, our
approach of combining individual level and aggregate data has several advantages.
First, both macroeconomic variables and personal controls are simultaneously influ-
ential and reveal important factors at the individual level. In particular, individual
unemployment, education, age, and perceived life satisfaction are significant correlates.
Furthermore, our results provide suggestive evidence against a pure self-interest
explanation of political support: When analyzing the effect of macroeconomic variables
on subgroups of the population (e.g., unemployed versus employed individuals), growth
and unemployment rates exhibit homogeneous effects on satisfaction with democracy
even though their real implications should differ across subgroups of the population.
1.2 Chapter 3: Control and Group Identity
A central element of agency theory are incentives and control mechanisms. They
represent the most important tools for principals to make selfish agents act according
to the principals’ ends. However, there is substantial empirical evidence that incentives
and control can have a detrimental effect, that they “crowd out” agents’ effort (Frey
and Jegen, 2001). So far, it is not well understood under which conditions this effect
can occur.
In this chapter, we analyze whether group identity can potentially influence the
efficacy of control mechanisms. Our main question is whether it affects the extent of
3crowding out.
We test the impact of group identity on the effectiveness of a control mechanism in a
laboratory experiment in which all participants belong to one of two different artificially
created groups. Principals have to decide whether or not they want to control their
agent by setting a minimum transfer level. Agents then decide on tranfers. The results
show that hidden costs of control are as strong in between-group matchings as in
within-group matchings. But while the overall effectiveness of control does not depend
on the social distance between principal and agent through joint group identity, the
mechanisms for how control is perceived are group-specific.
In within-group interactions control has a negative effect because agents expect
the principal not to control. When principals control nevertheless, agents reduce their
transfers significantly as a reaction. If the agent and the principal do not share the
same group identity, however, the mechanism is different: Keeping agents’ beliefs about
the principal’s behavior constant, agents perceive control as more hostile in a between-
group matching. In the end, in both between- and in within-group matchings the
implementation of a control mechanism has costs but for different reasons.
1.3 Chapter 4: Efficiency Concern under Asymmetric
Information
Over the last decades, economic experiments have produced evidence that people
regularly deviate from a purely selfish maximization of their own payoffs (Camerer,
2003). In most experiments, a substantial share of subjects is willing to accept a cost
in order to increase the payoff of other subjects. In light of that, alternatives to the
classical model have been proposed. One prominent example are social preference
theories (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and
Rabin, 2002) which specify preferences as not only including own payoffs but also
payoffs of others.
These theories are relevant for many policy issues. When facing the decision whether
to implement a certain policy proposal, an individual’s support for the proposal may be
influenced by its effect on other individuals. The insights of social preference theories
4can help to understand when proposals are supported and can enhance the design of
reforms that succeed. The empirical evidence for social preferences, however, has been
established within a relatively narrow experimental setting. In particular, in most
of the experiments subjects have complete information about their payoffs and other
subjects’ payoffs.
In this chapter, we relax the assumption of complete information and test whether
asymmetric information affects prosocial behavior in a laboratory experiment when
subjects exhibit social preferences. In our experiment, a dictator decides whether to
make a costly transfer to a recipient; conditional on the transfer the recipient then
obtains a benefit which is larger than the dictator’s costs. As main treatment we vary
the information the dictator has available. Under symmetric information he is perfectly
informed about the benefits whereas under asymmetric information he only knows the
distribution from which the benefit is drawn while the recipient is fully informed.
Furthermore, to test whether the reward leads to crowding out in our setting, we
introduce a monetary reward for prosocial behavior as a second treatment variable.
Under asymmetric information the incentive may interact with the uncertainty.
Subjects may “perceive” the reward level as being related to the unknown benefit
level and interpret the reward as a signal (Bolle and Otto, 2010) and may behave less
prosocially.
Our results indicate that under symmetric information a substantial share of
individuals behaves prosocially. Moreover, individual behavior is consistent with social
preference theories. Most subjects who transfer behave according to efficiency concern
(Charness and Rabin, 2002), but we also observe subjects whose behavior is in line
with inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), respectively maximin preferences
(Charness and Rabin, 2002).
We find that the predictions of social preference theories in the asymmetric
information case describe actual behavior quite accurately. In particular, as predicted
by these theories, subjects do not react negatively to asymmetric information and
do not behave less prosocially. Under asymmetric information, when dictators do
not know the exact value of the benefit, more subjects make a transfer than for any
benefit level under symmetric information. Hence, in our experiment the information
asymmetry improves efficiency. On average, recipients get a higher transfer when the
5dictator decides without knowing the exact benefit level. Lastly, the monetary reward
has a mostly positive though not statistically significant effect and does not result in
crowding out in our setting.
Chapter 2
Political Support in Hard Times: Do
People Care about National Welfare?
2.1 Introduction
During the Great Recession since 2007 European countries such as Spain, Greece,
Portugal, and Ireland have experienced a phase of economic hardship unprecedented
in the last decades. In Spain, for instance, the unemployment rate increased by 11.4
percentage points between 2006 and 2010. Following the economic downturn were the
political repercussions: Mass demonstrations took place in many cities as people wanted
to express their dissatisfaction with the economic situation and how it was dealt with1.
Until late 2011 the five EU member countries which were hit hardest economically,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, had overturned their governments. Political
actors as well as observers noted that democratic institutions themselves could suffer
under adverse economic conditions. For instance, in summer 2010, the president of the
European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, expressed his fear that “democracy might
disappear” (Groves, 2010) in the most heavily affected Southern European countries;
macroeconomic conditions could worsen to an extent that would be impossible to
deal with for governments and would therefore make them susceptible to popular
uprisings (Groves, 2010). Survey data from the Eurobarometer, using ‘satisfaction
with democracy’ (SWD) as a measure of attitudes towards democracy, shows indeed
1Examples of the broad media coverage of the protests are Donadio and Sayare (2011) and Tremlett
and Hooper (2011).
6
7that in the phase of economic downturn peoples’ attitudes have worsened substantially.
In Spain, for instance, satisfaction with democracy decreased by about 20 percentage
points between 2006 and 2010.
In this chapter, we show that the economic harshness during the last years can,
to a large extent, explain the observed deterioration of satisfaction with democracy.
Moreover, growing dissatisfaction reflects a pattern already present before 2007, a
positive relationship between economic performance and satisfaction with democracy.
Combining individual-level survey data on SWD with country-level data on growth,
inflation, and unemployment from 1976 to 2010 for sixteenWestern European countries,
we find that national economic performance does affect individuals’ attitudes towards
democracy and the effects are non-negligible in size. Using estimation results from data
collected before 2007, a drop in the order of 19 to 24 percentage points in satisfaction
with democracy was to be expected for countries which experienced substantially lower
growth and higher unemployment rates than during normal times. These estimates
compare well with the decreases of around 20 percentage points measured for Ireland,
Greece, and Spain. We also correctly predict Portugal to be an outlier; based on
economic data we estimate a decrease of 5.9 percentage points in satisfaction scores
while the observed decrease was 4 percentage points.
While we find both growth and unemployment rates to be significant, the latter are
quantitatively much more important for SWD. When the growth rate decreases by one
standard deviation, SWD is on average 3 percentage points lower; a standard deviation
increase in unemployment, however, comes about with a decrease of 7 percentage
points. This finding illustrates why “jobless growth” as a policy outcome is problematic
and why politicians might want to focus on employment policies even though growth
is also important to ensure citizens’ support.
The contribution to the literature is fourfold. First, the time frame chosen
allows us to show the regularity behind political protest in times of economic crisis:
People get less satisfied with a democratic system during economic slowdown. The
effects on political support were stronger in recent years because the economic
turmoil was more severe than ever before. Secondly, we show that macroeconomic
variables and personal controls are simultaneously influential and we assess their
relative importance. Resorting to individual level data uncovers important drivers
8of satisfaction with democracy, which remain undetected in national-level analyses. In
particular, individual unemployment, education, age, and perceived life satisfaction
are significant correlates. Thirdly, we present evidence against a pure self-interest
explanation of political support: Growth and unemployment rates exhibit homogeneous
effects on SWD even though their real implications differ across subgroups of the
population.2 Finally, since we include several macroeconomic indicators at the same
time, we can also assess the robustness of previous work relying on subsets of these
indicators.
In Section 2.2 we relate our research to the existing literature. In Section 2.3
we summarize our hypotheses (2.3.1), describe the dataset (2.3.2), and introduce our
empirical model (2.3.3). We present our results in Section 2.4 and discuss implications
with respect to a self-interest explanation of political support and a policy trade-
off between inflation and unemployment (Phillips curve) in Section 2.5. We present
robustness checks in Section 2.6 and conclude in Section 2.7.
2.2 Related Literature
Satisfaction with democracy is part of the broader concept of political support. Support
can be simply affectional (acceptance or identification with an entity) or it can derive
from satisfaction with its outputs (Easton, 1957). Norris (1999b) distinguishes the
following five dimensions: political community, regime principles, regime performance,
regime institutions, political actors. Research on political support (see, e.g., Norris
(1999a) for an introduction) often focuses on government popularity as a dependent
variable and thus refers to the most specific dimension: ‘political actors’. However,
during severe economic crises more than the competence of current governments is
called into question. SWD is then a more suitable indicator of political support since
it gives us an evaluation of the ‘system’s performance’.3 SWD has the additional
advantage of being less influenced by personal sympathy for politicians or ideological
attachment to a specific party.
There is some evidence that voters evaluate macroeconomic outcomes retrospec-
2Inflation in contrast exhibits heterogeneous effects but is insignificant for parts of the population.
3See also Dalton (1999) who argues that SWD gives an instrumental evaluation of the performance
of democracy.
9tively and vote accordingly in subsequent elections, but also prospective voting has been
proposed as an explanation and received some empirical support. Since this literature
is very broad, we refer the interested reader to the surveys on vote and popularity
functions by Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and “Voting and the Macroeconomy”
by Hibbs (2006). Revolutionary action or political extremism are likely to indicate
the absence of political support and constitute another facet of the related literature.
Brückner and Grüner (2010) find a negative relationship between growth and right-wing
extremist voting at the aggregate level for 16 Western European countries. Moving to
the micro-level, Lubbers et al. (2002) show how support of extreme right-wing parties
increases with unemployment for the same set of countries. MacCulloch and Pezzini
(2007) employ survey data from 64 countries and provide evidence that the preference
for revolution increases when the economy performs poorly.4
Previous work employing the same indicator as we do, SWD, often uses data
aggregated at the national level or covers relatively short time periods. Results
thereby rely to a large extent on cross-country variation and individual characteristics
are ignored.5 Furthermore, there is hardly any systematic evidence on the role of
macroeconomic factors. Using national-level data, Wagner et al. (2009) find significant
effects of institutional quality on the satisfaction with democracy and Clarke et al.
(1993) document effects of inflation and unemployment. We are aware of only two
studies in SWD employing individual-level data: Halla et al. (2011) investigate the
role of environmental policy for individuals’ satisfaction with democracy, while Wells
and Krieckhaus (2006) study the effect of corruption on democratic satisfaction. The
latter study uses only few points in time and cannot properly take into account changes
in national economic conditions over time.6 To the best of our knowledge only Halla
et al. (2011) use a long time dimension combined with individual level data, but their
4Both Brückner and Grüner (2010) and Lubbers et al. (2002) use data from the Eurobarometer as
we do. While the latter only rely on few data points in time, the former use the Mannheim trend file
covering 1970 to 2002. In contrast, MacCulloch and Pezzini (2007) employ three waves of the World
Value Survey for their analysis.
5Satisfaction with democracy is an individual attitude and depends on individual characteristics,
which are therefore crucial in the analysis of determinants of democratic support. While aggregate-
level analyses can, in principle, incorporate individual characteristics as averages, this is not usually
done, but the individual dimension is left out completely. In contrast, we explicitly take into account
the individual level information which the Eurobarometer provides.
6All of these studies rely on data from the Eurobarometer for Western European countries. Wells
and Krieckhaus (2006) also consider Central and Eastern European countries.
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data ends in 2001 and thus excludes the recent years. Wagner et al. (2009) and Halla
et al. (2011) do include several macro-economic indicators simultaneously but do not
discuss the economic relevance and relation between those.7
In this chapter, we build on these studies and extend them in several dimensions.
We compile a dataset covering 16 Western European countries for the period from
1976 to 2010. We thereby extend the sample used by Halla et al. (2011) by another
decade. We also use variation in country-specific economic conditions over time in
addition to cross-country variation. The use of individual-level data with a long time
dimension allows controlling for important factors at the individual level such as sex,
age, and labor force status; we abstract from cultural differences in political attitudes
by using country-fixed effects. We show how important individual characteristics are
in determining democratic satisfaction and relate our results to findings from aggregate
level studies. Furthermore, we discuss the role of various macroeconomic factors and
show how previous findings depend on the selection of only a subset of them.
2.3 Hypotheses, Data, and Model Specification
2.3.1 Hypotheses
Earlier research posited a link from macroeconomic performance to political support
based on the presumption that “voters hold the government responsible for economic
events” (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000, Responsibility Hypothesis) without detailing
the channels of influence. A plausible mechanism, which we believe also applies to
satisfaction with democracy, is the following: Economic conditions determine future
well-being. Growth increases expected income, inflation reduces the real value of
wealth and income, and higher unemployment implies higher risk of job or income loss.
Therefore, individuals value, e.g., high growth as an indicator of increasing national
welfare and high inflation and high unemployment as signs of decreasing welfare. Going
beyond the theory of pure self-interest, individuals may also care about the well-being
of others. Macroeconomic performance illustrates the democratic system’s capacity to
provide collective well-being. This constitutes another reason for economic performance
7The former study by Wagner et al. (2009) uses the average of the ordinal SWD score as dependent
variable. Due to the ordinality of SWD it is problematic to interpret their results quantitatively.
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to increase individuals’ satisfaction with democracy.
Based on the preceding argument we expect that, ceteris paribus, an individual’s
democratic satisfaction is
• increasing in national growth,
• decreasing in inflation and unemployment.
Furthermore, we expect that individual income and employment status have similar
effects. We hypothesize that an individual’s democratic satisfaction is
• increasing in individual income,
• lower in case of personal unemployment.
Moreover, we expect a strong positive correlation between general life satisfaction
and satisfaction with democracy. We believe individuals do not perfectly discriminate
between their personal lives and their political surroundings when asked for their
subjective evaluations. For instance, individuals who are generally optimistic and very
happy, should on average also be more positive towards democracy. Thus, we expect
an individual’s democratic satisfaction to be
• increasing in general life satisfaction.
More generally, we expect that democratic satisfaction has similar determinants as
has life satisfaction. We therefore adopt hypotheses from the happiness literature.8
We hypothesize that an individual’s democratic satisfaction is higher if he or she is
married, better educated, and out of the labor force and that men are less satisfied.
2.3.2 Data
Our analysis combines survey data with national macroeconomic data in 16 countries
for up to 33 years. Individual level data was obtained from the Eurobarometer and
macroeconomic data from the OECD (2011). Descriptive statistics for all included
national and individual variables are displayed in Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A.1.
8For the macroeconomic variables the happiness literature supports the hypotheses stated above.
See for instance Frey and Stutzer (2002a).
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The tables show variation in the dependent variable ‘SWD’ as well as in the explanatory
variables ‘growth’, inflation’, and ‘unemployment’ within countries over time. Figure
A.1 in Appendix A.1 illustrates that SWD varies over time. Furthermore, it reveals
that there are substantial differences in levels of SWD across countries possibly due
to cultural idiosyncrasies. Exact variable definitions can be found in Table A.1 in
Appendix A.1.
Individual Level Variables: the Eurobarometer
The Eurobarometer data set is a repeated cross section of individuals in the European
Union (EU). It covers five of the six founding EU members in 1970 (France, Belgium,
Netherlands, Germany, Italy) since 1970, Luxembourg is included since 1973, and other
countries were added when they joined the European Union, respectively when official
negotiations for accession began. In every wave, about 1000 respondents per country
complete the questionnaires. We use the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-
2002 (European Commission, Brussels, 2008) and append nine additional waves to
extend the dataset until 2010 (European Commission, Brussels, 2002, 2003, 2004a,b,
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010).
As indicator of support for democracy we used ‘satisfaction with democracy’ or
SWD. This indicator refers to the following question: ‘On the whole, are you very
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy
works in <country>?’.9 This question asks, in line with our research interest, how
people evaluate their democracy’s current performance and not whether they are in
favor of the democratic idea per se.
The variable SWD was collected for the first time in 1973 and then every year
from 1976 to 2010 except for the years 1996 and 2008. Our sample comprises France,
Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany (since 1991 including East Germany), Italy,
Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece (included since 1981),
Spain and Portugal (both included since 1985), Norway (included 1990-1995), Finland
(included since 1993), Sweden and Austria (both included since 1995).
From the Eurobarometer we also obtain standard demographic controls as well as
9<country> is replaced by the name of the country in which the respondent was interviewed.
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information on general life satisfaction. In contrast to the other controls, the latter is
not an objective measure but an attitudinal statement: People were asked how satisfied
they are with their lives.10
National Level Variables
Macroeconomic data was obtained from the OECD. Total GDP (constant prices),
GDP per capita, inflation rates, and unemployment rates were downloaded from the
OECD database OECD.StatExtracts, which is available online. We transform GDP
per head to GDP per head in 1000 US$ (constant prices, constant PPPs), for ease
of interpretation of coefficients. Since the distribution of inflation is very skewed,
we would like to use a log-transformation as, e.g., Wagner et al. (2009) do, but a
log-transformation is only feasible for positive observations. Around 2009 and 2010,
however, Belgium, Ireland, and Portugal experienced negative inflation rates. In order
not to lose these observations, we adopt a hybrid function of inflation as proposed by
Khan and Senhadji (2001):
f(inflationit) = (inflationit − 1)1inflationit≤1 + log(inflationit)1inflationit>1 (2.1)
The function f(inflationit) is linear in inflationit for values of inflation rates below or
equal to one and logarithmic for inflation rates greater than one. The breakpoint one
is chosen such that the transformation is continuous.
For robustness checks we also employed “The Comparative Political Data Set 1960-
2007” by Armingeon et al. (2009). It contains political and institutional variables on a
(mostly) annual basis for 23 democratic countries for the period of 1960 to 2007. From
this dataset we extracted information on national budget deficits, national government
debt, and the share of social transfers.
10Analogously to satisfaction with democracy there are four answer categories: 1=not at all satisfied,
2=not very satisfied, 3=fairly satisfied, 4=very satisfied. We constructed dummies, where ‘not at all
satisfied’ represents category 1, ‘satislife2’ category 2 etc. The omitted category is 3, people indicating
to be fairly satisfied with their life.
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2.3.3 Model Setup and Specification
Our model employs data at the individual level instead of country averages. This allows
us to include individual level characteristics. We estimate a linear probability model
using the following equation:
SWDitc = β0 + macrotcβ1 + individualitcβ2 + fet + fec + uitc (2.2)
where observations are indexed by i for individuals, by c for the country in which
the individual participated in the survey, and by t for the year of the survey. The
dependent variable ‘SWD’ as well as individual controls vary at the individual level
nested in years and countries, indexed by itc. Macro controls only vary at the year-
country level, indexed by tc. All estimations include country fixed effects fec as well
as survey year fixed effects fet, and we correct standard errors for clustering at the
country level.
We estimate different specifications of equation (2.2). All have individual satisfac-
tion with democracy as dependent variable on the left hand side but, on the right hand
side, we varied which variables we included in the vectors ‘macro’ and ‘individual’.
This will be discussed in the context of the results in Section 2.4.
SWD is a dummy derived from the question how satisfied an individual is with
the way democracy works in his or her country. It collapses answers ‘very satisfied’
and ‘fairly satisfied’ into ‘satisfied’ (SWD=1) and answers ‘not very satisfied’ and ‘not
at all satisfied’ into ‘not satisfied’ (SWD=0). We use this binary recode since it is
less susceptible to noise. In our opinion this outweighs the loss in information on the
strength of individuals’ democratic support.
Models with binary dependent variables are often estimated as nonlinear models
such as logit or probit, which explicitly take the domain restriction into account.
Instead we present results from a linear probability model, i.e., from OLS estimation
of equation 2.2 as is suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009). We also estimated a
logit model and expectedly find very similar results; in case of differences we find that
our model choice goes against finding significant effects. Results from the logit model
are available in Appendix A.2 (Tables A.5 and A.6).11
11We also estimated an ordered logit model using the original 4-point scale of SWD, which confirms
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2.4 Results
An advantage of our approach over estimations based on aggregates is that we
analyze the role of both individual and national variables. Individual unemployment,
education, income, and age are likely to be relevant for SWD and are not captured
in aggregates. Neglecting individual variables therefore means neglecting potentially
important driving factors of SWD and their interaction with aggregate factors. We
also discuss whether, in addition to their personal economic situation, people also take
the national performance into account when evaluating the political system.12 We first
address the impact of the macroeconomic variables (Section 2.4.1) and then the effects
of individual level variables (Section 2.4.2). We also elaborate on the role of personal
life satisfaction. Thereafter, we present estimations at the aggregate level.
2.4.1 Macroeconomic Variables
We included different macroeconomic indicators successively in addition to individual
characteristics to shed light on the relative importance of each of them. Since a large
literature on the relationship between democracy and economy focusses on GDP (e.g
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Przeworski, ed, 2000), we use GDP per head as starting
point. Our main interest, however, lies in growth, inflation, and unemployment which
vary substantially over time and have been proved influential in previous studies on
SWD (Wagner et al., 2009) and right-wing extremism (Knigge, 1998; Brückner and
Grüner, 2010). Furthermore, these variables are more responsive to economic policy
in the short to medium run and are more likely to be targeted by policy makers. The
following results are summarized in Table 2.1.
We find that economic growth is always statistically significant and so is national
unemployment. The sign of the coefficients is as expected positive in case of growth
and negative for the unemployment rate. Per capita income and inflation do not gain
significance. Without other macroeconomic controls except for per capita GDP one
the results from the binary case which we discuss in Section 2.4. Marginal effects are strongest for the
outcome ‘fairly satisfied’. See Appendix A.2, Table A.7.
12The significance of macroeconomic variables does not necessarily imply a collectivist motive.
Macroeceonomic variables may be solely important because they affect beliefs and expectations about
individual well-being. See discussion in Section 2.5.2.
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Table 2.1: Impact of Macroeconomic and Individual Level Variables on SWD (Individual Data)
dependent:
SWD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0066 0.0054 0.0056 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0045 0.0045
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
growth 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 0.0105*** 0.0116*** 0.0106*** 0.0060* 0.0060*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
f(inflation) -0.0054 -0.0188 -0.0200 -0.0218 -0.0324* -0.0326*
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
UE rate -0.0172*** -0.0187*** -0.0194*** -0.0170*** -0.0171***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
individual variables
unemployed -0.0512*** -0.0509*** -0.0511*** -0.0470*** -0.1122*** -0.1086*** -0.0399*** -0.0352***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
out of LF -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0053 -0.0042 -0.0013 0.0019
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
married -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0266*** 0.0257*** -0.0002 -0.0039
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
male 0.0069* 0.0068* 0.0068* 0.0067* 0.0031 0.0033 0.0061 0.0061
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
age -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0025*** -0.0052*** -0.0049*** -0.0025*** -0.0026***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age2 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
intermediate ed-
ucation
0.0092 0.0095 0.0095 0.0089 0.0219** 0.0222*** 0.0073 0.0042
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
higher education 0.0273* 0.0278* 0.0278* 0.0266* 0.0511*** 0.0512*** 0.0161 0.0098
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
still studying 0.0288* 0.0296* 0.0295* 0.0282* 0.0597*** 0.0602*** 0.0156 0.0093
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
not at all satis-
fied
-0.3419*** -0.3402*** -0.3401*** -0.3371*** -0.3536*** -0.3511***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.028) (0.029)
not very satisfied -0.2484*** -0.2479*** -0.2479*** -0.2456*** -0.2645*** -0.2626***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
very satisfied 0.0753*** 0.0750*** 0.0751*** 0.0745*** 0.0805*** 0.0791***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
poor -0.0097
(0.006)
rich 0.0142**
(0.005)
survey FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
nation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 606504 606504 606504 602545 602545 660546 353132 353132
R2 0.1373 0.1388 0.1388 0.1433 0.0961 0.0968 0.1501 0.1504
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(4) is the reference for robustness checks. In (5) we restrict attention to the subsample were life satisfaction is available but do
not include it. In (6) we exclude life satisfaction from the estimation. (7) is estimated on the reduced sample where income is
available, (8) controls for income groups.
The chosen order of inclusion of macroeconomic variables is irrelevant for our results (see Table A.4 in Appendix A.2).
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percentage point higher growth comes on average with a 1.3 percentage points higher
probability of satisfaction (Column 2). When all three macroeconomic variables are
included, growth obtains a smaller coefficient than before but remains significant at
the 1% level (Column 4).13 An increase by one percentage point in the unemployment
rate comes on average with a decrease of 1.7 percentage points in satisfaction with
democracy.
When we interpret the coefficients with respect to variation in the explanatory
variable, we find that unemployment is much more important than growth is. A one
standard deviation increase above the mean in growth rates implies an increase in SWD
of about 3 percentage points. An unemployment rate of one standard deviation above
the mean comes with a decrease of more than 7 percentage points in SWD, more than
twice as much.
When we compare our results to Halla et al. (2011), we observe important
differences.14 While they also report a significant and positive effect of growth, they
find a significant effect of inflation and GDP, two variables which are insignificant in our
study. From Table 2.1 it is clear that the difference cannot be due to their omitting
unemployment rates. Even if we omit unemployment rates, inflation does not gain
significance. Since we use a binary recode of SWD while Halla et al. (2011) use the four-
point scale, we suspected the differences result from this modeling choice. In Section
2.6.2 we therefore also discuss an ordered logit estimation. The results indicate that
differences to Halla et al. (2011) do not stem from using a binary model. In 2009, many
European countries have experienced deflationary episodes. We strongly suspect that
this is driving the differences in results. While we do not find a significantly negative
effect of inflation on SWD if we include the recent years, we do find a significant effect
for the period before 2009 (see Table A.8, Column 2 in Appendix A.2).
13The reduction in coefficient size is intuitive as unemployment and inflation are both negatively
correlated with growth in our dataset such that the coefficient on growth is upward biased if we omit
those. Still, the significance indicates that growth has an influence on attitudes in addition to what was
captured by inflation and unemployment. One explanation is that growth proxies for expectations of
income, inflation, and employment in the future. We discuss this hypothesis in more detail in Section
2.6.1.
14Since we are not interested in environmental policy measures, we compare our results to the
findings without environmental policy. It seems noteworthy, though, that most variables at the macro
level become insignificant once Halla et al. (2011) include environmental policy measures.
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2.4.2 Individual Characteristics
At the individual level we included dummies for being unemployed and not being part
of the labor force, as well as education, sex, age, and marital status.15 We expected
these variables to exhibit a similar relationship with SWD as they have with general
life satisfaction. We also controlled for personal life satisfaction. The inclusion of
individual characteristics shows that they in fact matter and are important to be taken
into account when we want to assess the implications of macroeconomic factors on
satisfaction with democracy.
In line with the hypotheses, individual unemployment, education, and age are
significant and have the expected signs. People being unemployed showed a 4.7
percentage points lower probability of being satisfied with democracy (Table 2.1,
Column 4). It is evident that individuals’ views on the democratic system were affected
by the national labor market as well as the individual situation at the same time.
National unemployment rates are an important factor beyond individual unemployment
and vice versa. Education was included in dummy categories. The results indicate
that those with higher education (higher education, finished school at the age of 20
or later) and those still studying (still studying) evaluate democracy more favorably
than those with only basic or no full-time education at all (omitted category). The
influence of age is u-shaped. Older people were less satisfied with democracy but the
relationship reverses at some point in life. In contrast to the expected negative sign,
the male dummy obtained a significant, positive coefficient. Those who were out of the
labor force did not evaluate democracy significantly differently than those who were
employed. Marital status did not reach significance either.
As expected, life satisfaction is strongly positively correlated with SWD. Being not
at all satisfied with one’s life translated into a probability of not being satisfied with
democracy that is 33 percentage points higher than for a person who was fairly satisfied
with her life. Those who stated to be ‘not very satisfied’ with their life in general were
still less likely to be satisfied with democracy (-25 percentage points) and those who
were very satisfied with their life had a 7.5 percentage point higher probability to also
15Income is not available for recent years and when it is available introduces a strong selection effect.
We therefore do not include it in our benchmark model but discuss reasons and consequences of this
decision under robustness (Section 2.6).
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express satisfaction with the way democracy works. This indicates a close link between
the perceived personal situation and the view on the democratic system.
Life satisfaction as well as SWD are subjective measures and we are aware of
concerns regarding the use of subjective variables as dependent and explanatory at
the same time (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). However, many studies indicate
that macroeconomic variables also affect individual life satisfaction and happiness (see
e.g. Di Tella et al. (2001, 2003); Deaton (2008); Dreher and Öhler (2011)) and ignoring
this will likely introduce a bias into the results, in particular since life satisfaction is
also known to be correlated with many of our individual level controls (see for instance
Frey and Stutzer (2002b)).
In our case, the inclusion of life satisfaction hardly affects the coefficients of macro
variables. In case of changes, omitting life satisfaction overstates the importance of the
macroeconomy. Specifically, comparing Columns 4 and 6 in Table 2.1, it is clear that
quantitative findings from the specification with life satisfaction are more conservative
than they are without it. The coefficients of unemployment and age become larger
when life satisfaction is omitted and the coefficient of married becomes significantly
positive. Furthermore, the effects of education appear stronger. The results imply
that the effects of unemployment, age, marital status, and education are overestimated
when life satisfaction is not included. The coefficients of macroeconomic variables
change very little; growth and unemployment slightly increase when life satisfaction
is not included. Also note that the changes in coefficients are not due to a selection
effect. In Column 5 we show results from the estimation model without life satisfaction
on the sample where the variable is available. There is hardly any difference between
Column 6 (full sample) and Column 5 (restricted sample).
With respect to individual characteristics our results are very similar to Halla et
al. (2011), qualitatively. The signs of all coefficients are the same with one exception:
In contrast to Halla et al. (2011), we do not find a significantly positive effect of being
married on SWD. In Section 2.6.2 we show that this difference is most likely due to
the omission of life satisfaction in their study. Life satisfaction should be included in
analyses of SWD since it is likely to provide a lower bound on the role of other factors.
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Table 2.2: Impact of Macroeconomic Variables on
Percentage SWD (Country Panel)
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per head 0.0044*** 0.0034** 0.0031** 0.0017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
growth 0.0118*** 0.0121*** 0.0076***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
f(inflation) 0.0013 -0.0030*
(0.002) (0.002)
UE rate -0.0190***
(0.002)
survey FE yes yes yes yes
country FE yes yes yes yes
N 483 483 482 476
R2 0.7421 0.7537 0.7540 0.8101
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is the average of the SWD dummy in a given
country.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
2.4.3 Aggregate Level Regressions
Analyses at the country level cannot inform about how individual satisfaction scores
are formed but have to collapse either the ordered data to an average or a binary recode
to a percentage measure of support. Changes in these national averages can come by
various channels and are less likely to be informative than an analysis with data at the
individual level. In this section, we report results from estimations where we ignored
the individual dimension of our data set and checked whether there is a relationship
between satisfaction with democracy and macroeconomic conditions at the aggregate
country level. These results can then also be compared with previous studies on SWD
that used country averages over time as observations. We used the year-wise country
averages of the SWD dummy as dependent variable, which represents the percentage
of people who are satisfied with democracy in a given year in a country.16
Comparing aggregate estimations (Table 2.2) with our individual-level approach
(Table 2.1), it becomes evident that coefficients have the same sign and a similar size.
In the aggregate estimations growth obtains a slightly smaller coefficient: With the
full set of macroeconomic controls the aggregate specification gives a coefficient of
0.0076 instead of 0.0105 with individual level data. The coefficient on unemployment
is slightly larger (in absolute terms) in the aggregate (-0.0190) than at the individual
16When we use average satisfaction scores instead of the average over SWD-dummies as dependent
variable, results are qualitatively the same. Results are presented in Table A.9 in Appendix A.2.
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level (-0.0172). In contrast to our results using individual level data, at the aggregate
level inflation is (weakly) significant.
Our results at the aggregate level are broadly consistent with studies by other
authors. Growth is significantly positive, unemployment and inflation are significantly
negative (compare for instance Wagner et al., 2009; Clarke et al., 1993). Looking at
Columns 2 to 3, a one percentage point increase in growth is associated with an increase
in the share of the population stating that they are satisfied with democracy of about
1.2 percentage points. In the full specification (Column 4), however, the coefficient
of growth decreases. Most likely the upward differential in the coefficient of growth
(Columns 3 to 4) comes from higher growth capturing also the impact of reduced
unemployment on democratic satisfaction.17 An increase in national unemployment
of 1 percentage point decreased satisfaction with democracy by almost 2 percentage
points on average.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Economic Relevance: Satisfaction Scores during the
Great Recession
Our results suggest that, on average, satisfaction with democracy should have decreased
by non-negligible numbers in the context of the Great Recession. We have estimated
our model on pre-2007 data and compute predicted changes in satisfaction with
democracy due to worsening economic conditions. Using data until 2006, growth
and unemployment are significant with coefficients of 0.0089 and -0.0167, respectively.
Individual unemployment is significant with -0.0444.18 Based on these coefficients we
expect that individuals experiencing developments of growth and unemployment rates
as were observed in Ireland, Spain, and Greece from 2006 to 2010 exhibited a decrease
17If unemployment rates change mainly because of changes in economic growth, then it is even
informative to look at regressions with growth only.
18We restricted our sample to the years 1973-2006 and estimated our baseline specification (see
Table 2.1 Column 4 for full sample results). Demographic controls obtain coefficients very similar to
the full estimation discussed before. Results for this estimation are provided in Table A.8 in Appendix
A.2.
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in SWD by about 21 (Ireland), 24 (Spain)and 14 (Greece) percentage points.19 In
fact, for these countries, we observe a substantial decrease of average SWD by about
20 percentage points as compared to the situation before the Great Recession. In
Ireland, satisfaction with democracy fell from 0.78 in 2006 to 0.58 in 2010 according
to Eurobarometer data; in Spain in the same period from 0.74 to 0.53, in Greece from
0.54 to 0.30.20
The above calculation is a rough estimate but matches surprisingly well with actual
developments. There are important caveats in that, in our prediction, we only consider
macroeconomic variables and the coefficients are based on annual data. The economic
downturn, however, stretches over more than one period and if macroeconomic
conditions are poor over longer horizons, the picture may change. It is possible that
people adapt to worsening economic conditions such that their satisfaction is on average
affected less than if there is only a short downturn. It is, however, also imaginable that
individuals become increasingly dissatisfied if the macroeconomy fails to recover for
several years. Our approach cannot speak to these hypotheses.
Some tentative implication for economic policies can be drawn from our results.
Economic policies that result in good economic performance can increase people’s
political support directly via national economic performance and indirectly when the
effects materialize at the individual level. Importantly, however, our results also reveal
the limitations of these policies. Crucial for political support is personal life satisfaction
which cannot be easily addressed by economic policy and might not be an appropriate
political target either.
2.5.2 Channels of Influence: Micro or Macro? Selfish Citizens
or Collectivists’ Concerns?
In principle, micro-level data allows us to assess how important are correlates of SWD
at the micro level relative to those at the national level. Unemployment manifests
19Changes in real growth rates between 2006 and 2010 were -5.7 percentage points for Ireland
and -4.2 for Spain. Greece experienced a decrease in its growth rate of 9 percentage points in 2010
(Eurostat, 2011a). Unemployment rates increased by 9.2 percentage points in Ireland, by 11.6 in
Spain, and by 3.7 in Greece between 2006 and 2010 (Eurostat, 2011b).
20Our prediction for Portugal is much lower with an expected decrease in SWD by 5.9 percentage
points. This compares well with the actually experienced drop in SWD by 4 percentage points from
0.31 to 0.27.
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itself directly at the individual level. A change in the national unemployment rate
leads to a change in employment status for some citizens. At the individual level,
being unemployed is associated with a 4.7 percentage point decrease in satisfaction
with democracy. To have the same effect the national unemployment rate would have
to increase by 2.7 percentage points. At the aggregate level the picture is different
though. To assess the effect of an increase in unemployment at the national level, we
aggregate the individual effects of being unemployed on SWD for those who become
unemployed and compare it with the direct effect of the change in the unemployment
rate on SWD. We find that the effect running through individual unemployment is
an order of magnitude smaller than the effect of the unemployment rate: Suppose
unemployment increases by 1 percentage point. Then, the direct effect is −0.0172.
The indirect effect from individuals becoming unemployed is 0.01·(−0.047) = −0.00047
and the total effect is the sum of the two, i.e. −0.01767.21 However, this comparison
of individual versus national level determinants takes into account only one period.
Taking a longer-term perspective the effect of individual unemployment is larger: Since
unemployed individuals are less satisfied with democracy than their employed peers, a
change in national unemployment implies a persistent level effect in SWD. Even when
unemployment rates do not worsen in subsequent periods, as long as unemployment is
not cut back again, those who became unemployed remain less satisfied and imply on
average lower SWD in every period after.
This comparison does not tell why national level variables seem to be relevant
for individuals’ satisfaction with democracy. National unemployment rates can be
influential due to pure self-interest since it is, for instance, indicative of the risk of
getting unemployed, of wage developments, or upcoming job opportunities. A similar
argument holds for growth rates: Their being significant does not imply that individuals
care about the performance of their country as a greater good. It can simply mean that
they value growth as an indicator of higher transfers, better public services, or lower
taxes; factors which all materialize at the individual level and highlight the self-interest
dimension of national performance. We show that the effects we find are unlikely to
be driven by narrow self-interest alone by looking at subgroups of the population. We
analyze separately the population with only basic or no education at all and elderly
21We take the estimated coefficients from Table 2.1, Column 4.
24
people (Table 2.3), as well as the unemployed and those who are not part of the labor
force (Table 2.4).
The first interesting finding is that the effects of growth and unemployment rates
are very stable across the subgroups we analyze. A second interesting finding is the
heterogeneity in the effect of inflation on SWD which we discuss in the next subsection.
National unemployment rates are significant for all subgroups and are not significantly
different in size. This means that unemployment rates are not more important for
the less-skilled even though they have arguably a higher risk of becoming unemployed.
Unemployment rates are relevant no matter whether an individual is still in work or
already unemployed, and they are significantly correlated with SWD for those in as
well as those out of the labor force. Most interestingly, unemployment rates are highly
significant also for those aged 60 or above, who to a large degree will not be directly
affected since they do not actively participate in the labor market anymore and will
never reenter. A potential explanation is that these individuals often have children
who are in working age and therefore they care more. Unfortunately, we cannot test
this hypothesis. The Eurobarometer does not contain information on parenthood but
only lists the number of children aged under 15.22
Our findings that unemployment plays an important role independent of being
directly affected are similar to the results by Falk et al. (2011) in the context of right-
wing extremist crimes. They analyze the effect of regional unemployment rates on
right-wing extremist crimes in German states. While the unemployment rate has a
positive and statistically significant effect on right-wing extremist crimes, the youth
unemployment rate does not have a statistically significant influence. So, given that
most right-wing extremist crimes are comitted by youg men, as in our analysis other
factors than personal experience of unemployment seem to explain the overall effect of
the unemployment rate.
We cannot conclude that individuals care about the performance of their country
per se, e.g., for collective welfare reasons. Still, the effects are unlikely to be driven by
pure self-interest. Low-skilled versus high-skilled, unemployed versus employed, and
22We included this information on children and found no effect. Elderly people living together with
children under 15 years do not react to unemployment rates any differently than elderly people not
living together with children. Neither do individuals with children according to this definition react
any differently than those without children.
25
Ta
bl
e
2.
3:
A
na
ly
si
s
of
Su
bg
ro
up
s:
E
du
ca
ti
on
an
d
E
ld
er
ly
P
eo
pl
e
de
pe
nd
en
t:
SW
D
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
G
D
P
pe
r
he
ad
0.
00
11
0.
00
63
0.
00
11
0.
00
12
0.
00
08
0.
00
10
0.
00
26
0.
00
10
0.
00
10
0.
00
10
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
04
)
gr
ow
th
0.
01
08
**
*
0.
01
09
**
*
0.
01
08
**
*
0.
01
02
**
*
0.
01
10
**
*
0.
01
14
**
*
0.
01
19
**
*
0.
01
05
**
*
0.
01
05
**
*
0.
01
05
**
*
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
f
(i
nfl
at
io
n)
-0
.0
20
5
-0
.0
23
9
-0
.0
20
9
-0
.0
20
6
-0
.0
29
6*
*
-0
.0
18
9
-0
.0
13
6
-0
.0
18
6
-0
.0
18
6
-0
.0
22
8*
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
U
E
ra
te
-0
.0
17
3*
**
-0
.0
18
8*
**
-0
.0
17
9*
**
-0
.0
17
3*
**
-0
.0
17
2*
**
-0
.0
17
0*
**
-0
.0
18
8*
**
-0
.0
17
6*
**
-0
.0
17
1*
**
-0
.0
17
1*
**
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
lo
w
ed
uc
.*
U
E
ra
te
0.
00
15
(0
.0
03
)
lo
w
ed
uc
.*
gr
ow
th
0.
00
17
(0
.0
03
)
lo
w
ed
uc
.*
f
(i
nfl
at
io
n)
0.
02
62
**
(0
.0
10
)
ol
d*
U
E
ra
te
0.
00
26
(0
.0
02
)
ol
d*
gr
ow
th
-0
.0
00
0
(0
.0
01
)
ol
d*
f
(i
nfl
at
io
n)
0.
02
07
**
*
(0
.0
06
)
un
em
pl
oy
ed
-0
.0
47
0*
**
-0
.0
38
9*
**
-0
.0
46
9*
**
-0
.0
47
0*
**
-0
.0
46
5*
**
-0
.0
44
8*
**
-0
.0
45
3*
**
-0
.0
45
6*
**
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
lo
w
ed
uc
at
io
n
-0
.0
18
4*
-0
.0
31
6
-0
.0
22
9*
-0
.0
51
3*
**
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
14
)
ol
d
0.
01
11
-0
.0
15
1
0.
00
69
-0
.0
17
0
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
10
)
ag
e,
ag
e2
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
no
no
no
no
no
ed
uc
at
io
n
du
m
m
ie
s
no
no
no
no
no
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
in
d.
co
nt
ro
ls
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
su
rv
ey
F
E
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
na
ti
on
F
E
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
N
54
75
15
20
30
33
54
75
15
54
75
15
54
75
15
61
30
61
13
42
30
60
25
45
60
25
45
60
25
45
R
2
0.
14
3
0.
15
29
0.
14
3
0.
14
3
0.
14
35
0.
14
18
0.
12
9
0.
14
32
0.
14
31
0.
14
34
*
p<
0.
10
,
**
p<
0.
05
,
**
*
p<
0.
01
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
is
a
du
m
m
y.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
co
rr
ec
te
d
fo
r
cl
us
te
ri
ng
at
na
ti
on
le
ve
l.
T
he
du
m
m
y
lo
w
ed
uc
at
io
n
ta
ke
s
a
va
lu
e
of
1
fo
r
ba
si
c
ed
uc
at
io
n
an
d
0
fo
r
hi
gh
er
ed
uc
at
io
n
or
st
ill
st
ud
yi
ng
.
T
he
du
m
m
y
ol
d
ta
ke
s
va
lu
e
1
fo
r
th
os
e
ag
ed
61
an
d
ab
ov
e,
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
In
(1
)
w
e
ad
ju
st
th
e
m
od
el
fr
om
C
ol
um
n
4
in
T
ab
le
2.
1,
an
d
co
nt
ro
l
fo
r
lo
w
ed
uc
at
io
n
in
st
ea
d
of
se
ve
ra
l
ed
uc
at
io
n
du
m
m
ie
s.
(1
)
to
(5
)
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
on
a
su
bs
am
pl
e
ex
cl
ud
in
g
th
os
e
w
ho
ar
e
st
ill
st
ud
yi
ng
.
(2
)
is
es
ti
m
at
ed
on
th
e
su
bs
am
pl
e
w
it
h
lo
w
ed
uc
at
io
n.
(6
)
is
es
ti
m
at
ed
fo
r
al
l
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
w
he
re
ag
e
is
no
t
m
is
si
ng
,
(7
)
is
es
ti
m
at
ed
on
th
e
su
bs
am
pl
e
be
in
g
ol
de
r
th
an
60
ye
ar
s
ol
d,
(8
)
to
(1
0)
us
e
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e.
26
Ta
bl
e
2.
4:
A
na
ly
si
s
of
Su
bg
ro
up
s:
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
St
at
us
an
d
La
bo
r
Fo
rc
e
P
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
on
de
pe
nd
en
t:
SW
D
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
G
D
P
pe
r
he
ad
0.
00
10
0.
00
14
0.
00
10
0.
00
10
0.
00
10
0.
00
10
0.
00
23
0.
00
10
0.
00
10
0.
00
10
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
gr
ow
th
0.
01
05
**
*
0.
00
99
**
*
0.
01
05
**
*
0.
01
05
**
*
0.
01
05
**
*
0.
01
05
**
*
0.
01
00
**
*
0.
01
05
**
*
0.
01
00
**
*
0.
01
06
**
*
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
f
(i
nfl
at
io
n)
-0
.0
18
8
-0
.0
11
0
-0
.0
18
8
-0
.0
18
8
-0
.0
19
4
-0
.0
26
3*
*
-0
.0
16
3
-0
.0
18
8
-0
.0
18
7
-0
.0
24
4*
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
U
E
ra
te
-0
.0
17
2*
**
-0
.0
17
4*
**
-0
.0
17
2*
**
-0
.0
17
2*
**
-0
.0
17
2*
**
-0
.0
17
1*
**
-0
.0
17
4*
**
-0
.0
17
6*
**
-0
.0
17
2*
**
-0
.0
17
1*
**
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
un
em
pl
.*
U
E
ra
te
0.
00
04
(0
.0
02
)
un
em
pl
.*
gr
ow
th
0.
00
06
(0
.0
01
)
un
em
pl
.*
f
(i
nfl
at
io
n)
0.
00
88
0.
01
55
**
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
ou
t
of
L
F
*U
E
ra
te
0.
00
10
(0
.0
01
)
ou
t
of
L
F
*g
ro
w
th
0.
00
11
(0
.0
01
)
ou
t
of
L
F
*f
(i
nfl
at
io
n)
f
0.
01
44
**
*
0.
01
27
**
*
in
di
vi
du
al
va
ri
ab
le
s
un
em
pl
oy
ed
-0
.0
47
0*
**
-0
.0
50
5*
**
-0
.0
48
6*
**
-0
.0
56
4*
**
-0
.0
64
3*
**
-0
.0
46
5*
**
-0
.0
47
1*
**
-0
.0
47
6*
**
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
ou
t
of
L
F
-0
.0
01
5
0.
00
00
-0
.0
01
5
-0
.0
01
5
-0
.0
01
4
-0
.0
18
8*
**
-0
.0
10
2
-0
.0
04
3
-0
.0
16
8*
**
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
in
d.
co
nt
ro
ls
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
su
rv
ey
F
E
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
na
ti
on
F
E
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
N
60
25
45
35
25
3
60
25
45
60
25
45
60
25
45
60
25
45
26
55
92
60
25
45
60
25
45
60
25
45
R
2
0.
14
33
0.
14
85
0.
14
33
0.
14
33
0.
14
33
0.
14
35
0.
13
56
0.
14
33
0.
14
33
0.
14
35
*
p<
0.
10
,
**
p<
0.
05
,
**
*
p<
0.
01
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
is
a
du
m
m
y.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
co
rr
ec
te
d
fo
r
cl
us
te
ri
ng
at
na
ti
on
le
ve
l.
(1
)
is
th
e
re
fe
re
nc
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
fr
om
T
ab
le
2.
1,
C
ol
um
n
4.
(2
)
is
es
ti
m
at
ed
on
th
e
su
bs
am
pl
e
of
th
e
un
em
pl
oy
ed
.
(7
)
is
es
ti
m
at
ed
on
th
e
su
bs
am
pl
e
no
t
be
in
g
pa
rt
of
th
e
la
bo
r
fo
rc
e.
(3
)
to
(6
)
an
d
(8
)
to
(1
0)
us
e
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e.
27
elderly versus younger people are very differently exposed to labor market conditions
such that we expect heterogeneous effects according to the self-interest model. Not
finding such differences implies other factors are at work.
One explanation for our findings are collectivist welfare concerns. Individuals may
have a ‘true preference’ for democracy because it is believed to be the system that is best
able to provide collective welfare. Growth and low unemployment are success indicators
of this system’s performance and can make individuals be satisfied with democracy
even when it does not directly maximize their expected personal income since their
true preference implies a concern for collective welfare (see Sen (1977) for a similar
argument). Another explanation is that individuals take general equilibrium effects and
their consequences at the individual level into account. For instance, they anticipate
cuts in transfers or increases in taxes when the economic situation is worsening.
2.5.3 Heterogeneous Effects and the Trade-Off between Unem-
ployment and Inflation
An enduring economic policy debate concerns a possible trade-off between inflation and
unemployment which societies may face. Assuming such a relationship, we would like to
know which is the trade-off between inflation and unemployment in terms of satisfaction
with democracy. In this section, we use our estimation results to analyze the relative
costs of inflation and unemployment in terms of changes in SWD. In the full sample,
however, inflation rates never gained significance preventing this type of analysis.23
We therefore analyze subgroups separately and find that in contrast to growth and
unemployment, inflation exhibits heterogeneous effects. In terms of satisfaction scores,
a trade-off between inflation and unemployment exists, but it is a different trade-off
for different parts of the population.
High inflation rates exhibit a significantly negative effect on the higher skilled
individuals, those younger than 60 years, and those in the labor force. In the analysis
using the full sample, this was blurred by inflation not affecting low skilled individuals,
23If we look at the subsample where information on income is available, inflation is significant.
From Table 2.1, Column 7 we read that the loss in satisfaction with democracy from a 1 percentage
point increase in unemployment equals the effect from an increase in f(inflation) by 0.537 percentage
point (the sum of the direct and indirect effect of unemployment divided by the effect of inflation:
(−0.0170− 0.01 · 0.0399)/(−0.0324) = 0.537).
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the elderly and those out of labor force. Inflation does not gain significance in the full
sample (Columns 1 and 6 in Table 2.3) and neither does it in the subsample of low
skilled (Column 2 in Table 2.3), in the subsample of the elderly (Column 7 in Table
2.3), in the subsample of unemployed (Column 2 in Table 2.4), or in the subsample of
those out of the labor force (Column 7 in Table 2.4). When we include an interaction
term between the subgroup and inflation, we however obtain a negatively significant
effect of inflation and a positively significant interaction term (Table 2.3, Column 5
with respect to education, Column 10 with respect to age and Table 2.4 Column 10
with respect to not being part of the labor force).
Inflation does not seem to affect employed and unemployed individuals differently
when we look at Column 5 in Table 2.4. However, the control group here is all
individuals who are not unemployed, including those who are not part of the labor
force. When we include an additional interaction term to allow for a differential effect
of inflation on those out of the labor force, we find that the interaction with inflation is
highly significant for both subgroups, the unemployed and those out of the labor force
(Table 2.4, Column 6). Inflation is found to be negatively associated with satisfaction
with democracy only for those who actively participate in the labor market and have
a job.
We now re-examine the inflation-unemployment trade-off accounting for the
heterogeneity in effects. On average, younger Europeans experience the same loss
in satisfaction with democracy for a 1% point increase in unemployment rates and
an increase by 0.77 in f(inflation)24.25 The elderly are much more concerned with
unemployment. Under the assumption of a linear effect, inflation being insignificant
would imply that the elderly preferred an arbitrarily large increase in inflation to
prevent unemployment from rising. If the effect we find for the elderly was significant,
the same decrease in satisfaction would be computed for an increase by 8.36 in
f(inflation) as compared to a 1% point increase in unemployment.26 A similar picture
24Since we use a transformation of inflation we cannot compute the trade-off in terms of percentage
points. For low inflation rates f(inflation) is linear (up to 1) or almost linear. A 1% point increase in
unemployment rates is associated with the same loss in SWD as a 0.77% point increase in inflation
when inflation is low.
25From Table 2.3, Column 10 we obtain 0.77 = (−0.0171 + 0.01 · (−0.0456))/(−0.0228).
268.36 = (−0.0171+0.01·(−0.0456))/(−0.0228+0.0207). With an average share of people aged sixty
and above of 21.89% the aggregate effect would then be 0.2189 · 8.36 + (1− 0.2189) · .77 = 2.43. Due
to the logarithmic transformation of inflation this relates to an extremely high tolerance (about the
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obtains when we split the population into those with low and high education. For
individuals with higher education, an increase by 0.6 in f(inflation) is associated with
the same satisfaction cost as a 1% point increase in unemployment.27 For those with
low education, inflation is insignificant.28
The derived numbers can be interpreted as marginal rates of substitution between
f(inflation) and unemployment. Our results indicate a very low importance of inflation
in the aggregate when we look at satisfaction with democracy. This is in contrast to
Di Tella et al. (2003) who analyze life satisfaction scores and find that the marginal rate
of substitution between inflation and unemployment is 1.66. Aggregate numbers hide
however, that there is an important heterogeneity across subgroups of the population
(not addressed in Di Tella et al. (2003)). Not everybody agrees on unemployment being
more costly than inflation. For instance, the higher educated and the younger seem to
accept relatively higher unemployment rates and desire lower inflation, as compared to
the less educated and elderly, respectively.
2.6 Robustness
In this section, we address important issues to demonstrate the robustness of our
findings. First, we investigate the importance of lagged macro variables for our results
and possible reverse causality issues. In this context we also discuss the possible role
of (growth) expectations. Secondly, we present results from alternative specifications
such as logit and ordered logit as well as a model where we control for income. Finally,
we argue why not controlling for institutional quality is without loss of generality.
2.6.1 Lagged Growth, Growth Expectations, and Endogeneity
Growth rates from previous periods may be influential in addition to contemporaneous
rates because real effects need time to materialize. Thus, we tested whether lagged
tenfold) for inflation as compared to unemployment rates. This is consistent with the insignificance
of inflation in the full sample.
27From Table 2.3, Column 5 we obtain 0.60 = (−0.0172 + 0.01 · (−0.0465))/(−0.0296).
28If the effect was significant at the size we find, an increase by 5.2 in inflation would be associated
with the same satisfaction cost as a 1% point increase in unemployment since from Table 2.3, Column
5 5.20 = (−0.0172 + 0.01 · (−0.0465))/(−0.0296 + 0.0262). With an average share of people with low
education of 38.27% the aggregate effect would be 0.3827 · 5.20 + (1− 0.3827) · 0.60 = 2.36.
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growth rates have an impact on SWD. Column 1 in Table 2.5 is our benchmark model
which we have discussed before (Section 2.4 and Table 2.1, Column 4). Column 2 shows
that lagged growth does not have a significant influence on SWD and including it in the
regression hardly affects the coefficients of the other macroeconomic variables. Growth
and unemployment rates remain significant, inflation is still insignificant. The result
is intuitive as the development of unemployment rates as well as inflation is at least
partly determined by economic development and thus lagging behind. If we omit lagged
growth and it has a positive influence on employment today and a positive influence
on satisfaction, then the coefficient on unemployment is downward biased because
unemployment has a negative effect on satisfaction. The argument for inflation is
analogous. Coefficients on individual controls are almost unaffected. As lagged growth
rates did not gain significance, we did not include them in any other regression.
Table 2.5: Lagged Growth and Endogeneity
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0010 0.0008 0.0018 0.0004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
growtht 0.0105*** 0.0095*** 0.0057** 0.0040*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
growtht−1 0.0028
(0.002)
growtht+1 0.0102*** 0.0062***
(0.002) (0.002)
f(inflation)t -0.0188 -0.0195 -0.0216* -0.0139
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
UE rate -0.0172*** -0.0168*** -0.0173*** -0.0061***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
SWDt−1 0.5549***
(0.063)
ind. controls yes yes yes yes
survey FE yes yes yes yes
country FE yes yes yes yes
N 602545 602545 592075 546239
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(1) is the reference estimation from table 2.1, Column 4.
An important objection to the results presented in Section 2.4 and Table 2.1 is that
not growth has an influence on SWD but instead higher satisfaction levels lead to better
economic performance. We undertake a robustness check regarding this endogeneity
issue and conclude that our results are not a pure artefact of endogenous growth rates.
First, we included future growth rates (Column 3 of Table 2.5). Future growth
obtains a coefficient even larger in size than the coefficient of contemporaneous growth.
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This might be due to reverse causality, i.e., satisfaction with democracy driving growth
rates, but could also be caused by serial correlation of growth rates. In both cases,
however, this is not the entire story since contemporaneous growth and unemployment
remain significant, in line with our hypothesis that growth has an effect on SWD. The
effect which remains when we include future growth can be considered a lower bound on
the effect of growth on SWD. A third explanation for why future growth is significant is
that it proxies for growth expectations. Growth expectations in turn are likely to have
a positive effect on satisfaction scores. These expectations may be influenced by growth
forecasts and media reports. In this case, the coefficient on future growth should not
be ignored and the full effect of growth on SWD, summing over contemporaneous and
future growth it is 1.82 percentage points, is even larger than the previously estimated
1.21 percentage points. Since our data does not allow to control for expectations, we
cannot distinguish these hypotheses.
Second, we also included the average lagged satisfaction with democracy at
the country level average of SWD (Column 4). By doing so, we control for the
link potentially running from SWD to growth in the next period. Furthermore,
the coefficient on future growth rates controls for correlation between SWD today
and growth tomorrow. Thus, the coefficient of growth in Column 4 reflects only
contemporaneous correlation between SWD and growth. This is more likely to
be an effect from growth on SWD than an effect from contemporaneous SWD on
contemporaneous growth. Since satisfaction with democracy on average does not
change very fast, this absorbs a large part of the variation and might make inference
less reliable. The effect of growth is still about 40% as large as in the main analysis
and marginally significant.
2.6.2 Alternative Specifications
In the following, we show that our results are robust to several alternative specifications.
We begin with discussing the relevance of personal income and accounting for time
trends. Furthermore, we check for the relevance of recoding our dependent variable
and of using a linear model. Satisfaction with democracy is originally available at a
scale with four categories which we chose to recode as a binary measure of democratic
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satisfaction. In all regressions so far we employed a linear probability model. In this
section, we compare our results to (i) a logit model and (ii) an ordered logit model
which makes use of the four categories of SWD.
Income
Income was not asked in every year and not at all in the years after 2004 such that
a substantial number of income observations is missing. Since we are particularly
interested in including the recent recessionary years and to avoid a selection effect, we
do not control for income in our main analysis. Our robustness check indicates that
income does not affect our results beyond a selection effect driven by the availability of
the income measure. We are therefore confident that our result would be robust to the
inclusion of income if it was fully available. Income is only recorded in country-specific
classes. To obtain a comparable measure across countries, we computed country-
specific income deciles and categorized individuals in three groups ‘rich’, ‘middle
income’, and ‘poor’ according to their decile and chose ‘middle income’ as the omitted
category.29
We illustrate in Table 2.1, Column 7 that the effects of inflation and growth
are indeed different in the subsample for which income information is available.
As compared to the benchmark in Column 4, the coefficient of growth decreases
substantially to .006 and inflation becomes marginally significant. The coefficient on
individual unemployment becomes smaller, and neither sex nor education are significant
anymore. Column 8 in the same table shows that beyond this selection effect the
inclusion of income seems to have little effect on the results. We do find a small effect
of income though. Rich people have a slightly increased probability to be satisfied
with democracy compared to middle income earners. There is no significant effect for
individuals with low income.
Time Trends
Sometimes it is argued that analyses as the one we undertake should include a time
trend to avoid spurious regression results due to underlying trends in the variables.
29Details on the variable definition can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A.1.
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To address this issue, we estimated a model including country specific time trends.
We find that our specification without time trends leads to more conservative results
with respect to growth. However, regarding unemployment rates, the inclusion of a
country-specific time trend leads to marginally lower coefficients (the coefficient goes
down from .0172 to .0155). The absolute size of the effect of unemployment rates on
SWD should therefore be taken with caution. For details see Table A.10 in Appendix
A.2.
Logit
Above, we only describe results from ordinary least squares regressions (linear
probability model) although our dependent variable is binary. In our opinion the
advantages in terms of interpretation and simplicity of the linear model outweigh
potential gains from the nonlinear model (for a discussion see also Angrist and Pischke
(2009)). However, we also estimated a logit model which explicitly restricts the
outcome variables to lie between zero and one. Results are qualitatively the same
and quantitatively close to those from the OLS. All marginal effects lie above the
coefficients estimated by OLS and therefore our model choice gives rather conservative
results. For details see Table A.5 and Table A.6 in Appendix A.2.
Ordered Logit
While we believe that the analysis is more rigorous when a binary recode is used,
we also analyzed determinants of SWD using the original, ordered outcome. This
exercise provides little additional insight. All variables which obtained significance in
the binary model are significant in the ordered logit and go in the same direction but,
in addition, inflation becomes significant. Higher inflation rates were associated with
lower probabilities of being very or fairly satisfied and higher probabilities of being not
very or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works. When we sum the marginal
effects for the two lower categories, we obtain a value by and large comparable in
size to the sum of the marginal effects for the two upper categories but with opposite
signs.30 This is consistent with the view that the results in the binary recode are
30The lower categories are answers ‘not at all satisfied’ and ‘not very satisfied’, the upper categories
are the answers ‘fairly satisfied’ and ‘very satisfied’ with the way democracy works.
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driven by individuals switching from being not satisfied to being satisfied with the way
democracy works. It indicates that the binary recode does not come with a substantial
loss of information. For details see Table A.7 in Appendix A.2.
We have shown before that inflation is insignificant in the binary model with and
without unemployment rates (see Section 2.4.1, Table 2.1). When we estimate an
ordered logit model with and without national unemployment rates, we find that
inflation is significant only when we include unemployment as well. This contrasts with
Halla et al. (2011) who omit unemployment rates but find inflation to be significant.
Since they include further macro variables, this might be driven by those.31 We
conclude that the decision which macro variables to include plays an important role
for the results. We argue in the following subsection 2.6.3 that our results do not seem
to be affected by the omission of policy variables similar to those included in Halla et
al. (2011). We therefore consider our results more robust.
2.6.3 Institutional Quality and Policy Measures
Our analysis assumes that democratic institutions in Western Europe did not change
over the relevant time horizon and we do not include a control for institutional quality.
We argue that this is not a restriction for several reasons. First, the binary Democracy-
Dictatorhsip measure as discussed in Cheibub et al. (2009) is constant at 1 for all
country-year pairs in our sample, indicating stable democracies. Consequently, our
results would remain the same if we controlled for institutional quality in this sense.
Secondly, our results are robust to the use of alternative indicators of institutional
quality, the Polity IV index (Marshall et al., 2011) and the Freedom House Index
(Freedom House, 2011). Both have often been used but are also criticized (see for
instance Cheibub et al. (2009)). Controlling for either of the two indicators does not
affect our findings and the indicators remain insignificant as shown in Table A.11 in
Appendix A.2. The Freedom House Index is only available until 2008. Omitting the
years 2009 and 2010 from the analysis does affect the results, in particular inflation
becomes significant. The effect comes only from the sample restriction, though, and is
31While they control for GDP and population and find both significant with opposite signs, we find
that GDP per head never gains significance. This is consistent with each other and we therefore do
not discuss it further.
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not related to institutional quality. We do not include elective fractionalization, which
is also sometimes included in analyses like ours, since it never gained significance in
a very related analysis of SWD by Halla et al. (2011). Thirdly, in an analysis of
political preferences in Central and Eastern European countries, Grosjean and Senik
(2011) find no significant effect of market liberalisation on support for democracy. This
supports our view that even though there have been major changes for example in the
organization of the European common market these changes are not of major concern.
Another possible objection to our analysis is that it is not the macroeconomic
outcomes that influence citizens’ satisfaction but instead policies implemented by
governments. We therefore test for the effects of debt and deficit levels and also include
two measures which proxy for social spending, (1) the population aged 65 and above
as a percentage of total population and (2) social security transfers as a percentage of
GDP. All four variables are taken from Armingeon et al. (2009). Unfortunately, we
have information on deficits and debt levels only until 2007, and information on social
transfers only until 2000 such that we cannot compare the results with policy variables
directly to those from the main analysis.32 To be able to assess the relevance of policy
measures, we estimate the main model on the subsample for which all policy variables
are available and then included the policy measures. The restriction to the subsample
changes results substantially, in particular inflation becomes significant due to the
omission of recent years with relatively low inflation rates. However, the inclusion of
policy measures does not lead to additional changes. In contrast to Halla et al. (2011),
none of the policy variables gains significance. Results are provided in Table A.12 in
the Appendix.
2.7 Conclusion
The European debt crisis has had a severe impact on European democracies. In
the five most heavily affected EU member countries, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain governments have been voted out office. More than that, demands by the
various protestors go beyond the deselection of governments. People’s perception of
32Moreover, these variables are missing for Luxembourg, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Norway, and
Austria in some years earlier than 2001. These drawbacks are the reasons why we only present this
as a robustness exercise and exclude it from the main analysis.
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the democratic system has changed in the course of the crisis, not only in Greece but
also in many other European countries.
This chapter shows that the changing attitudes towards democracy were to
be expected as a consequence of extremely poor national economic performance.
Lower growth rates and higher unemployment rates were both associated with fewer
respondents stating they were satisfied with the way democracy works. For drops in
growth rates and rise in unemployment rates as experienced for example by Spain or
Ireland, our simple annual estimate of a drop in satisfaction with democracy by 19 to 24
percentage points is close to actual changes in satisfaction with democracy which were
around -20 percentage points. Moreover, our analysis shows that the unemployment
rate is substantially more important than the inflation rate in shaping attitudes towards
the democratic system and also more important than the growth rate. From that
perspective any policy intended to improve peoples’ satisfaction with the democratic
system should prioritize job creation.
While not contradicting previous work, our analysis uncovered important new
aspects. First, growth and unemployment rates were found simultaneously significant
while, in contrast to previous research, inflation is insignificant. This difference is driven
by including the years 2009 and 2010.33 Moreover, while inflation is not significant
for the period we consider for the entire population, it has a significantly negative
effect on individuals who are higher skilled, younger than 60, or have a job. Secondly,
our results show that individual variables, in particular individual unemployment,
education and age, are an important driver of satisfaction with democracy. Moreover,
perceived life satisfaction has a strong effect and its inclusion increased explanatory
power substantially (with respect to R2). This last result is a challenge for policy-
makers and future research because it is not obvious whether economic policy should
indeed target individuals’ life satisfaction and if it should how it can do so.
Finally, while individual controls are important, they do not make macroeconomic
variables irrelevant. National aggregates like unemployment and growth have a
significant effect beyond what materializes at the individual level. It is beyond
33These years were markedly different: Some countries went through a phase of very low inflation
rates and some countries even experienced a period of deflation. When we restricted our sample to
the period before 2008, the significance of inflation was restored.
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the scope of our analysis to provide a clear-cut answer why national indicators are
significant. However, our results suggest that a collectivist perspective plays a role. If
peoples’ evaluation of democracy was driven by pure self-interest, we would expect a
differential effect of growth and unemployment across subgroups of the population (for
instance, skilled versus unskilled). The lack thereof suggests that collectivist concerns
for national economic performance play a role.
Chapter 3
Control and Group Identity
3.1 Introduction
An important premise in agency theory is the power of incentives: Without proper
incentives and control, agents would not put in enough effort and would shirk
substantially. As a consequence, principals need to use incentives and control systems
in order to make agents perform. While incentives do increase effort in certain settings
(e.g., Lazear, 2000), they can also have detrimental effects, i.e., individuals put in
less effort in the presence of monetary incentives than without (for reviews of the
literature, see Frey and Jegen, 2001; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles
and Polanía-Reyes, 2012). Control mechanisms can also be problematic as results by
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) indicate. The implementation of a control mechanism that
forces agents to put in at least some effort can have substantial “hidden costs” leading
to lower effort than if agents are not controlled by the principal. While there is growing
evidence that incentives and control can be detrimental in principal-agent situations,
the conditions when they turn detrimental are less understood.
In this chapter, we investigate whether “hidden costs of control” are particularly
relevant when the principal and the agent have a close relationship (as argued in Frey,
1993; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). Detrimental effects of control mechanisms might be
restricted to interactions among friends, family members, or in-group members as they
are more likely to be perceived by the agent as distrust and a violation of a psychological
contract (e.g. Fehr and Falk, 2002; Sliwka, 2007; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; von
Siemens, 2011).
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However, in many situations incentives and control are used not within-groups but
in between-group interactions. For example, many principal-agent relationships are
between firms, i.e., buyers and suppliers. Even within firms, the principal often belongs
to and identifies with a different and very salient team or group: The management
(white collar) controls the workers (blue collars) or provides incentives to the salesforce.
It is well known that in such between-group interactions, trust is lower to begin with
(e.g. Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Chen and Li, 2009; Falk and Zehnder, 2007) and
control might be less detrimental as agents do not expect their out-group principals
to be trusting. If the effect is less detrimental in between-group interactions, then it
might be less relevant in a situation in which agents do not identify with the same
group as the principals.
We test the impact of group identity on the effectiveness of a control mechanism
in an experiment à la Falk and Kosfeld (2006) in which all participants belong to
one of two different groups (the group manipulation is implemented similar to Chen
and Li, 2009). Principals have to decide whether or not they want to control their
agent by setting a minimum transfer level. Agents then decide on transfers. Our
experiment is able to replicate both that a) control can be detrimental and reduce
transfers and that b) group membership leads to substantial in-group bias, i.e., agents
provide higher transfers for in-group principals. More importantly, our setting allows
analyzing whether the hidden cost of control are group-specific, i.e., whether control is
perceived differently in within-group and between-group matchings.
The results show that hidden costs of control are as strong in between-group
matchings as in within-group matchings. But while the overall effectiveness of control
seems not to depend on the social distance between principals and agents through
joint group identity, the mechanisms for how control is perceived are group-specific.
In within-group interactions hidden costs of control occur because agents expect the
principal not to control. When principals control nevertheless, agents reduce their
transfers significantly as a reaction. If the agent and the principal do not share the
same group, however, the mechanism is different: Keeping agents’ beliefs about the
principal’s behavior constant, agents perceive control as more hostile in a between-
group matching. This “hostility effect” is consistent with previous findings (Chen and
Li 2009 and Götte et al. 2012a), who show that when minimal groups are artificially
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generated, punishment for misbehavior is stronger in between-group than in within-
group interactions.1
Hence, our results show that control can have a detrimental effect not only in
principal-agents relationship with close social ties. Control is perceived very differently
in between- vs. within-group matchings indicating that group membership in principal-
agent relationships is important. In the end, in both between- and in within-group
matchings the implementation of a control mechanism has “hidden costs” but for
different reasons.
This chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 3.2 we briefly discuss the related
literature. In Section 3.3 we present the experimental design. Section 3.4 discusses
our behavioral hypotheses based on a simple model that illustrates the different effects
group identity can have on control. Section 3.5 presents the results and Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Our experiment is related to two strands of the literature, the literature on group
identity and the literature on crowding out of incentives.
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) is one of the first papers in economics that stresses the
importance of group identity for organizational design – introducing a long research
tradition in social psychology to economics.2 Since then, there is a growing empirical
literature in economics on the effects of group identity on individual behavior.
There exist two approaches. One is to exploit existing natural groups and the other
one is to induce group identity artificially. A typical example of the former is Bernhard
et al. (2006) who implement a Dictator Game with third-party punishment in Papua
New Guinea.3 Subjects from two distinct indigenous tribes show significant in-group
bias as third parties punish more harshly when the victim belongs to the punisher’s
1When real groups are considered, however, as in Götte et al. (2006) and Bernhard et al. (2006),
individuals punish violators of social norms harsher in between-group interactions only if the victim
of the violation belongs to their own group.
2In the management literature, identification with a firm is also been argued to be an important
aspect of firms’ performance through improving coordination and cooperation (e.g., Kogut and Zander,
1996).
3See Chen and Li (2009) for an overview of earlier experiments relying on priming of existing
groups.
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group. The obvious problem with natural groups is that unobserved variables may
affect both group identity and behavior.
Artificially induced groups can be a solution to this problem. For instance, Götte
et al. (2006) conduct a field experiment using randomly assigned platoons in an officer
training program of the Swiss Army.4 Similar to Bernhard et al. (2006) they also find
an in-group bias with respect to punishments. Additionally, they find more cooperation
in a prisoner’s dilemma between in-group members.
Moreover, there are a number of laboratory experiments which introduce group
identity artificially. In the lab, a feeling of membership in a group can be artificially
induced using several procedures such as team tasks and tournaments (Eckel and
Grossman, 2005), artwork preferences (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Chen and Li, 2009),
communication (Chen and Li, 2009), or payoff commonalities for members of the group
(Charness et al. (2007)). Eckel and Grossman (2005) find higher cooperation rates
in a public good game within groups when identity is sufficiently strong. Similarily,
Charness et al. (2007) show an effect of group identity in the Battle of the Sexes as well
as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, the size of the effect depends on the salience of
groups. In an elaborate setting, Chen and Li (2009) implement variants of the Dicator
and the Ultimatum Game and compare different group identity treatments. The
authors find a significant effect of group identity on social preferences and reciprocity.
The second strand of literature to which our analysis is related is the growing
literature in economics on psychological effects of incentives. Besides the evidence by
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) that control can have hidden costs, a number of laboratory
experiments find similar effects for incentives. For instance, Fehr and Rockenbach
(2003) provide evidence that a fine reduces prosocial behavior in a Gift Exchange
Game (other examples include: Fehr and List, 2004; Fehr et al., 2007; Gächter et
al., 2010). Moreover, there is also evidence for a negative effect of incentives from
field experiments (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997).5
Lastly, hidden benefits of delegation, i.e., the flipside of control have also been observed
(Charness et al., 2011). Even though there is plenty of evidence that crowding out can
4See also Götte et al. (2012a) and Götte et al. (2012b) for similar experiments.
5For a review of the literature on crowding out see (Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and Polanía-Reyes,
2012)
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occur, relatively little is known about the conditions under which incentives or control
mechanisms are more likely to have detrimental effects.
To the best of our knowledge there is no paper that investigates the interaction
between group identity and crowding out. There are, however, a few papers which
analyze how social distance influences the efficacy of incentives and control schemes.
Bandiera et al. (2009, 2010) show how social connections among agents have impact
on the effectiveness of different incentive schemes. Dickinson and Villeval (2008)
generate interpersonal relationships between principals and agents by removing subject
anonymity, introducing subjects to one-another and allowing them to engage in five-
minutes of face-to-face interactions. They find that monitoring is no more efficient
when anonymity is lifted and social exchange between principal and agent is allowed.
Riener and Wiederhold (2012) investigate behavior in a modified design based on
Falk and Kosfeld (2006). They reduce social distance between a principal and an agent
using a “team building” task. As a task subjects play a Weakest-Link game.6 Given
their prior common experience, subjects then interact in two altered versions of the
design by Falk and Kosfeld (2006). The authors compare the behavior of this group to
a control group which had no prior common interaction. As in Falk and Kosfeld (2006)
they observe hidden costs of control. Moreover, the effect of control is particularly
negative for subjects who completed the team task and expect no or only a low level of
control. In contrast to their design, our group treatment is not limited to two persons
and more importantly is not based on the same two subjects interacting repeatedly
in the same constellation. Moreover, in our setting all subjects experience the same
type of interaction whereas in their setting the two team members interact before the
simplified Gift Exchange Game, but the control group only interacts in the simplified
Gift Exchange Game.
6Additionally, the two subjects can use a chat function where they discuss the Weakest-Link game
before they make a decision with the subject they are paired with. After the Weakest-Link Game they
rate the fairness of the subject they are paired with. Subjects are then informed about the evaluation
of their fairness.
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3.3 Experimental Design
To analyze how group identity affects the hidden cost of control, participants are,
first, assigned to different groups and, second, interact in a stylized principal-agent
relationship in which the principal can incentivize the agent by imposing a control
mechanism. The choice of the principal-agent interaction and the group treatment
were guided by the desire to create a setup in which control can be detrimental and in
which group identity is quickly established while still being artificially created.
3.3.1 Group Manipulation
We manipulate group identity in the lab using three steps similar to Chen and Li
(2009):7 First, each individual was presented a pair of five pictures by two artists
(Klee and Kandinsky). For each pair, subjects had to choose one painting. Subjects
were then ranked according to their choices and assigned to either the “Kandinsky” or
the “Klee” group. To guarantee equally large groups, there was a random draw that
assigned subjects such that groups were balanced in the case of an initially unbalanced
assignment.8 A subject knew that her own and the choices of the other subjects would
be used to assign two equally large groups. Subjects were not informed about the
details. After each subject had made a decision, participants learned to which group
they had been assigned.
Secondly, each subject participated in a quiz.9 Within their own group, subjects
could communicate via a chat program to discuss the questions. While subjects could
discuss with group members which answers were correct, each subject had to answer
individually and in private, i.e., decisions were not observed by other subjects.
Thirdly, to further strengthen group identity we introduced an incentivized group
competition using the outcome in the quiz as scores: The group with the highest
7We thank Yan Chen and Sherry Li for providing us with the original z-tree code and the original
instructions of Chen and Li (2009). Moreover, we thank James Tremewan for providing us with the
z-tree code for the chat treatment that was used in Tremewan (2010).
8Subjects from the initially larger group were reassigned to the smaller group by using the ranking
of choices. Among those subjects who had the same ranking and were closest in their choices to the
smaller group, a random variable was drawn which then determined which subject was reassigned.
9The quiz comprised five questions covering two more painting pairs and three political-economic
issues regarding Germany (the rate of inflation, the budget of the Department of Defense, and the
number of secretaries in the federal government).
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average of correct answers received a prize of 8 EUR per group member. Results by
Eckel and Grossman (2005), Charness et al. (2007), and Götte et al. (2012b) indicate
that competition among groups induced by financial rewards have a strong effect on
group identity. The prize was announced before the quiz started. The outcome of
the group competition, however, was only revealed at the end of the experiment when
subjects had already made all their decisions.
The groups are almost ‘minimal groups’ according to the standards in psychology
(e.g. Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and are not real groups as in, e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy
(2001); Bernhard et al. (2006). The advantage of using this approach is that the groups
are neither endogenously formed nor do they differ in any observable characteristics
like ethnicity which would make inference about the effect of group identity per se very
difficult.10 Another approach would have been to use randomly assigned real groups
(e.g., Götte et al., 2006). Our approach allows us to see whether a minimal identity
already has an effect.11
3.3.2 Principal-Agent Interaction
After we manipulated group identity, subjects played a principal-agent game based on
the design by Falk and Kosfeld (2006).12 The agent decides on whether to make a
transfer. The transfer is tripled by the experimenter and represents the payoff of the
principal. Before the agent decides, the principal can restrict the agent’s choice set to
an exogenously given lower bound (the minimum transfer the agent has to make) or
leave the agent’s set unrestricted.
An agent’s payoff is yA = 24− e. He can choose e from e ∈ {0, ..., 24} points if he
is not controlled by the principal and from e ∈ {1, ..., 24} points if he is controlled by
the principal. We explicitly choose parameters that are most likely to generate hidden
10Methodologically, we vary the social distance between principal and agents without lifting the
anonymity as other studies had to do. Previous approaches make it difficult to isolate anonymity
effects from effects of the closeness of the principal-agent relationship (e.g., Dufwenberg and Muren,
2006; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008).
11In half of the sessions we also added a Dictator Game stage to see whether it can further increase
group identity. The Dictator Game stage took place after the group manipulation and before the
simplified Gift Exchange Game stage described in this section. As it does not change the results
qualitatively, we analyze all the sessions together in the main text and relegate the results separated
for the condition with and without a Dictator Game to Appendix B.4 (see Tables B.4 and B.5).
12We thank Matteo Ploner and Anthony Ziegelmeyer (Ziegelmeyer et al., 2012) for providing us
with the original instructions and the original z-tree code of Falk and Kosfeld (2006).
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costs of control as we are interested in studying when these costs are most prevalent.
The principal’s payoff is yP = e · 3. Hence, the principal can secure himself a payoff
of at least 3 points if he controls the agent.
Subjects were randomly assigned to be either an agent or a principal for the whole
experiment. Subjects played two rounds of this principal-agent interaction. In the first
round, one half of principals and agents was randomly matched with a counterpart
from the same group, the other half was randomly matched with a counterpart from
the other group. In the second round, each subject was matched in the opposite
constellation. When we check whether there are any order effects by controlling for the
round, the results do not change.13
All interactions were anonymous. Subjects only knew the group membership of the
subject they interacted with, i.e., whether the counterpart belonged to the same or
to the other group. Subjects also knew that they would be matched with a different
participant in the second round.14
Subjects learned the outcome of the interactions only after the second round was
completed. Subjects were then paid one randomly drawn round.
As in Falk and Kosfeld (2006) we used the strategy method to elicit a response by
agents for the two possible cases, being controlled and not being controlled in each
round. While it is possible that the strategy method influences results, two points
have to be noted: First, the empiricial evidence that the strategy method leads to
a different behavior than the direct-response method is mixed. In a recent survey,
Brandts and Charness (2011) report on 29 studies investigating the differences between
the strategy and the direct-response method. Out of these twenty-nine studies, four
find differences, nine find mixed evidence, and sixteen find no differences. Secondly and
more importantly, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) conduct a control treatment (SR10) where
they do not find any significant differences between the two methods. As we are using
the same design, we are confident that our results are robust to the direct-response
method, too.15
13Results are not reported here. They are available upon request.
14Subjects did not know in advance that they would be matched with an in-group member in one
round and an out-group member in the other round.
15Falk and Kosfeld (2006) is also among the surveyed articles in Brandts and Charness (2011) which
do not find differences.
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In addition, we elicited beliefs from agents as well as from principals.16 After they
had made a decision in each round, we asked them what they believed the principal
(agent) would do.17
3.3.3 Procedural Details
The experiment was conducted in the experimental lab at Mannheim University in
September 2011. The experiment was computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects were students from the University of Mannheim from different fields. They
were recruited using the online system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
In total 128 subjects participated in 16 sessions. A session lasted between 35 and
45 minutes. One point in the experiment represents 0.5 EUR and average earnings
were 16.80 EUR (about $23).
3.4 Behavioral Predictions
We are interested in what influences the effect of control and how it depends on group
identity of the principal and the agent. We set pi(m, τ) for the effect of control, that
is, the transfer when an agent is not controlled (which we denote with t) minus the
transfer when an agent is controlled. pi(m, τ) depends on two factors: m, the matching
between an agent and a principal, and τ , the beliefs of an agent about the action
a principal will decide to undertake. The matching is m = w if the agent and the
principal belong to the same group (within-group matching), and m = b otherwise
(between-group matching); τ can take on only two values, τ = n if the agent expects
to be trusted by the principal and therefore not to be controlled by him, and τ = c if
he expects to be controlled.
Group identity of the principal and the agent can influence the effectiveness of
16As in Falk and Kosfeld (2006) belief elicitation was not incentivized. Subjects were informed that
their responses had no influence on their payoffs.
17The exact question for the agent was: “What do you think, will participant A constrain you to
transfer at least 1 point?”. For the principal it was: “What do you think, how many points will
participant A transfer if you allow him to decide freely?” and “What do you think, how many points
will participant A transfer if you constrain him to transfer at least 1 point?”.
Note, that the belief is binary and it does not allow to measure different intensities, i.e., how likely
subjects think a control decision is.
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incentives in several ways. Below, we outline three channels through which group
identity can impact how agents react to control. While the first channel is concerned
with the level of prosocial behavior in the absence of control, the other two deal with
how control is perceived by an agent.
1. “Prosocial effect”: In general, hidden costs of control can only be observed if
agents make positive transfers without control (prosocial behavior, t > 0). As
such, control is effective if agents do not transfer without control, i.e., if their
transfer is zero when not being controlled (t = 0).
It is typically observed that shared group identity substantially increases prosocial
behavior within-group (for a review of research on in-group bias, see Hewstone et
al. (2002)). As a result, control is going to be more effective in a between-group
matching because of two effects. First, more agents will be pushed from a zero
transfer to the minimum transfer of 1 in a between-group matching. Secondly, in
a between-group matching, there are fewer agents behaving prosocially and thus
fewer agents whose transfer can be crowded out by the incentive. If sm(t = 0) is
the fraction of agents that chooses a transfer t of zero in a matchingm and sm(t >
1) the fraction of agents that chooses a transfer t larger than 1 in a matching m,
we then expect both sw(t = 0) < sb(t = 0) and sw(t > 1) > sb(t > 1).
While control mechanically has a positive effect for those individuals who are selfish,
for individuals behaving prosocially and whose transfers thereby can be crowded out,
we discuss two channels through which control can have a negative effect.
2. “Trust effect”: Control as an incentive scheme can have ‘hidden costs’ as it signals
distrust of the principal towards the agent (e.g. Fehr and List, 2004; Falk and
Kosfeld, 2006). Agents punish principals more harshly if they do not expect
to be distrusted by the principal. In the above framework, we therefore expect
pi(m,n) − pi(m, c) ≡ γ > 0, for all m and conditional on a transfer larger than
1. Therefore, independent of the matching m, the crowding out will be stronger
when an agent does not expect to be controlled (τ = n).
Denote with bm the share of agents who believe to be controlled in a matching m
(conditional on transfers larger than 1). We expect that group membership will
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affect this share of agents, that is, in a between-group matching more agents will
expect to be controlled (bb > bw). As a result, the share of individuals that will be
disappointed by a principal’s decision to control will be higher in a within-group
matching.
3. “Hostility effect”: A violation of expected trust might be just one reason why
control can have hidden costs. Given an agent’s expectation about principals’
actions, an agent might perceive control as more or less ‘offensive’ as he or she will
interpret what control signals about a principal’s view on the agent or attribute
the action by the principal to his or her attitudes or traits. Group identity can
change this perception of actions from in- or out-group members substantially.
The famous ‘group attribution error’ (Allison and Messick, 1985) as one way
of group specific ‘social inference’ (Tajfel, 1982; Hastie, 1983) shows that the
same actions are perceived differently if taken by an in- or out-group member.
Holding expectations constant, control by an out-group principal is expected to
be perceived more negatively than control by an in-group member. That is, we
expect pi(b, τ) − pi(w, τ) ≡ δ > 0, for all τ and transfers larger than 1. So, for
given expectations about being controlled or not, control will increase crowding
out more strongly in a between-group matching than in a within-group matching.
As a last step we derive the formula for the difference between the average effect of
control in a within-group matching and the average effect of control in a between-group
matching. To simplify notation, we set pi(w, c) ≡ κ. Then, putting the three effects
from above together, we get as the difference-in-difference, Πw − Πb:18
Πw − Πb = (sb(t = 0)− sw(t = 0)) + [(sw(t > 1)− sb(t > 1)]κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prosocial Effect
(3.1)
+ [sw(t > 1)(1− bw)− sb(t > 1)(1− bb)] γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trust Effect
− sb(t > 1)δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hostility Effect
18For the details of the derivation see Appendix B.2
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The three different effects of group membership on the effect of incentives are
countervailing. While the ‘prosocial effect’ and the ‘trust effect’ predict more hidden
costs of control in within-group interactions, the ‘hostility effect’ predicts more hidden
costs in between-group matchings. The net effect in within-group compared to between-
group interactions is therefore unclear. We will show in the next section the net effect
first and then disentangle the different channels by using information collected during
the experimental stage on both the transfers provided by the agents and whether they
expect to be controlled by the principal.
3.5 Results
We present the results in two steps: First and most importantly, we discuss the behavior
of agents. This part presents the net effect of control on agents in within- and between-
group interactions and then shows whether some of the channels of crowding out are
matching-specific. Secondly, we discuss principals’ decision to control.
3.5.1 Agents’ Behavior
Our first result replicates the findings in Falk and Kosfeld (2006):
Result 1: We observe “hidden costs of control”: Control reduces average
transfers by agents.
Figure 3.5.1 depicts agents’ average transfers depending on matching (between-
group or within-group) and choice of the principal (to control or not to control). Across
the two treatments transfers are 4.8 points when agents are not being controlled and
decline to 3.7 points when agents are being controlled. The average transfer in a
between-group (within-group) matching when not being controlled is 3.4 (6.1) points.
When being controlled, the transfer decreases to 2.5 points, or 73% of the transfer
under no control, in a between-group matching (4.9 points, respectively 80%, in a
within-group matching). In Table 3.1 we report results from an OLS regression of
agents’ transfer choices in control and group matching. Column 1 shows that control
has a significantly negative effect on agents’ transfer choices. When comparing our
results to Falk and Kosfeld (2006), two points are evident. First, the average transfer
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Notes: The figure depicts average individual transfers by agents as
a function of control and matching.
Figure 3.1: Agents’ Average Transfer
by agents who are not controlled is 5.02 points and therefore in the range between our
within-group and between-group results.19 Secondly, however, the average crowding
out is stronger than in our case (average transfer when being controlled is 2.44 points,
respectively 48%).20
Result 2: Group identity affects agents’ transfers. Independent of control
decisions, agents transfer more in a within-group matching than in a between-
group matching.
In line with previous research we observe a clear effect of group identity. Agents
transfer more points when they are matched with a participant of their own group
independently of whether they are controlled or not. In a between-group matching
agents transfer 55% of the average transfer in a within-group matching. Table 3.1
shows that the effect is statistically highly significant. Our results are similar to Chen
and Li (2009, p.442). They find that distributional preferences are affected by group
19Taken from Table 1 (p. 1619) treatment C5. We transformed the numbers into our 24-point-scale
to make them comparable. Also note that in Falk and Kosfeld (2006) every transfer by the agent is
doubled and not tripled as in our design.
20Note that other experiments also report a smaller crowding out effect of control (Ziegelmeyer et
al., 2012; Kessler and Leider, 2012).
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Table 3.1: Agents’ Transfers Conditional on Control and Group Matching
Dependent Variable: Transfers (1) (2)
Control (=1) -1.094*** -0.953***
(0.242) (0.291)
Within-group matching (=1) 2.531*** 2.672***
(0.663) (0.699)
Control x Within-group -0.281
(0.314)
Constant 3.539*** 3.469***
(0.444) (0.474)
N 256 256
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All columns report
results of OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the individual
transfer. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Level of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
identity. In particular, charity towards in-group members increases by 47% compared
to out-group members.
Result 3: We observe no group identity effect on the average effect of control.
While group identity affects the transfers, it has no impact on how agents react when
being controlled. The average difference between the ‘effect of control’ between within-
and between-group matching (i.e., the diff-in-diff) is small (0.28) and not statistically
significant as shown in Table 3.1, Column 2.
While the net effect does not differ, in the following, we decompose the diff-in-diff
as described in section 3.4 into three effects: prosocial, trust, and hostility. We first
provide evidence for the existence of these three effects and show that they depend
on group matching. Then, we identify the parameters described in section 3.4 and
disentangle the effects within the diff-in-diff.
Result 4: Group identity affects the distribution of transfers under no control.
More agents transfer zero and fewer agents transfer more than 1 in a between-
group matching.
Panel A (Panel B) in Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of transfers when the agent
is not controlled (is controlled) by the principal. Panel A illustrates that group identity
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affects this distribution. The difference between the two distributions is statistically
significant (Mann-Whitney test, p<0.01). For the overall effect of control two points
are important: First, the share of agents who transfer zero is larger in a between-group
matching (sb(t = 0) = 0.28) than in a within-group matching (sw(t = 0) = 0.12) and
this difference is statistically significant (Fisher’s exact test, p<0.05). Therefore, for a
larger share of agents control is binding in between-group interactions. Secondly, the
share of agents who expend more than 1 under no control - whose transfers thereby
can be crowded out - is smaller in a between-group matching (sb(t > 1) = 0.66) than
in a within-group matching (sw(t > 1) = 0.86). This difference is also statistically
significant (Fisher’s exact test, p<0.05).
In the following, we discuss the two other channels outlined in Section 3.4, trust
and hostility. Since they are only relevant to individuals who transfer more than one
point when not being controlled, in the empirical analysis further on we only focus on
these subjects. In Appendix B.4, we provide results including all individuals and not
only subjects who exhibit a transfer greater than zero.
Result 5: Agents who expected to be trusted by principals, that is, agents who
do not expect to be controlled, reduce transfers more strongly.
The crowding out is mostly driven by agents who initially expected to be trusted
by the principal, that is, by agents who did not expect to be controlled by them. They
show the strongest negative reaction to control: On average, the crowding out, i.e., the
reduction of transfers when being controlled, is around 1 point for agents who expect
the principal to control. It more than doubles to 2.2 points when they expect not to
be controlled. The difference of distributions is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney
test, p<0.001). In our model, this “trust effect” corresponds to γ.
Result 6: Group identity affects agents’ beliefs about the principal’s behavior.
A larger fraction of agents expects the principal to control in a between-group
matching.
Figure 3.3 displays agents’ beliefs about the principal’s decision to control by
matching when we restrict the sample to agents that transfer more than 1 when not
being controlled, that is, we include only agents whose transfers can potentially be
crowded out. The share of agents who expects to be controlled in a between-group
matching, bb = 0.57, is significantly larger than in a within-group matching, bw = 0.21
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Notes: Panel A shows the distribution of agents’ transfers with no
control for between- and within-group interactions. Panel B shows
the respective distribution when the principal decides to control.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Agents’ Transfers
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Notes: The figure depicts average individual beliefs about being
controlled as a function of matching. We restrict the sample to
agents that transfer more than 1 when not being controlled.
Figure 3.3: Average Beliefs about Principal’s Decision to Control
(Fisher’s exact test, p<0.001).
Result 5 shows that agents’ transfers are crowded out more strongly if they expect
principals not to control them. As group identity influences the beliefs of the agents
(Result 6), combining these two findings leads crowding out to be stronger in situations
in which principals and agents identify with the same group. This result is supported
by the evidence Riener and Wiederhold (2012) provide. In their setting, where two
persons interact, those who have shared a common interaction before and experienced
the other as relatively fair, react more negatively towards control, in particular when
they expect that the principal uses no or only low levels of control. In our setting,
however, there is a countervailing effect:
Result 7: Agents exhibit a “hostility effect”. Keeping beliefs constant,
agents reduce transfers more strongly in between-group than in within-group
matchings.
Once we control for their beliefs we find that agents react more negatively to being
controlled in a between-group matching. Figure 3.4 shows the average crowding out,
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Notes: The figure depicts average crowding out, i.e., transfers under
no control - transfers under control, as a function of agents’s beliefs
and matching. We restrict the sample to agents that transfer more
than 1 when not being controlled.
Figure 3.4: Average Crowding Out Depending on Agents’ Beliefs and Matching
i.e., the transfer when not being controlled minus the transfer when being controlled,
for different matchings and different beliefs of agents (being controlled or not being
controlled). The figure again focuses on agents who transfer more than 1 when not being
controlled. When expecting that the principal controls, agents’ transfer is crowded out
by 1.3 points on average in a between-group matching, while it is only crowded out
by 0.43 points in a within-group matching (30% of crowding out in a between-group
matching). Similarly, when agents believe that principals will not control, crowding out
amounts to 2.6 points in a between-group matching but 1.9 points in a within-group
matching (73% of crowding out in the between-group matching).
Table 3.2 shows the hostility effect in an OLS regression in which the dependent
variable is the extent of crowding out. To capture the “hostility effect” we add as
independent variables, first, a dummy for whether the principal-agent interaction is
within-group and, second, we add agents’ beliefs about principal’s behavior. The
specification of main interest is Column 1 on which the estimation of our simple model
is based. Additionally, we include transfer when not being controlled (Column 2) and
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transfer when not being controlled squared (Column 3) as controls to demonstrate the
robustness of our results. Lastly, in Columns 4 to 6 we use an alternative measure of
crowding out as a dependent variable, the difference between transfers when not being
controlled and when being controlled divided by the transfer when not being controlled,
to show that results are also robust to alternative measurements of crowding out. The
results indicate that for all specifications the hostility effect (which is captured in
our model by δ) is significant, i.e., control has more “hidden costs” in between-group
interactions if beliefs about principals’ behavior are kept constant.
Table 3.2: Agents’ Crowding Out
Dependent Variable: Diff Diff Diff Fraction Fraction Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Within-group matching (=1) -0.806* -1.002* -1.008** -0.166*** -0.145** -0.145**
(0.460) (0.505) (0.489) (0.0530) (0.0581) (0.0585)
Agent’s Belief (Control=1) -1.419*** -1.414*** -1.228*** -0.186** -0.186** -0.186**
(0.500) (0.485) (0.445) (0.0723) (0.0718) (0.0717)
Transfer (Control=0) no yes yes no yes yes
[Transfer (Control=0)]2 no no yes no no yes
N 97 97 97 97 97 97
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All columns report results of OLS regressions. We restrict
the sample to agents that transfer more than 1 when not being controlled. Columns (1) - (3): dependent
variable is the individual difference between transfers under no control and under control. Columns (4) -
(6): dependent variable is the individual difference between transfers under no control and under control
divided by transfers under no control. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Level of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Using the three effects of group identity on the efficacy of incentives, (1) prosocial
effect, (2) trust effect, (3) and hostility effect, we can now decompose the diff-in-diff
and illustrate the relative importance of each of the three effects.21
Using these parameters, we get for the decomposition of the diff-in-diff:
21See Appendix B.3 for the details of the calculations.
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Πw − Πb = (sb(t = 0)− sw(t = 0)) + [sw(t > 1)− sb(t > 1)]κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prosocial Effect: 0.26
(3.2)
+ [sw(t > 1)(1− bw)− sb(t > 1)(1− bb)] γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trust Effect: 0.59
− sb(t > 1)δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hostility Effect: -0.52
= 0.33
These calculations show that the effects are countervailing: While the “prosocial”
and the “trust” effect make control more detrimental in a within-group setting, the
“hostility” that agents exhibit in a between-group matching has an influence in the
opposite direction. In total, the difference between the average effect of control in a
within-group matching and the average effect of control in a between-group matching
is close to zero.22
3.5.2 Principals’ Behavior
We now turn to principals’ decision to control:
Result 8: The majority of principals does not control.
On average, 28% of principals control the agent. So, similar to Falk and Kosfeld
(2006) we find that a substantial share of principals controls the agents even though
the majority of principals does not control.23
Result 9: Group identity affects principals’ decisions: More principals control
in a between-group matching.
Principals’ decision to control is influenced by group identity. The share of
principals who control is 37% in a between-group and 18% in a within-group interaction.
The difference is statistically significant (Fisher’s exact test, p<0.03).
From an income maximization perspective principals do not behave optimally as not
22Also note that the estimated diff-in-diff of 0.33 seems to match the actual diff-in-diff of 0.28 quite
well despite the set of simplifying assumptions used in Section 3.4.
23In treatment C5 (table 3, p. 1621) they observe that a fraction of 0.26 of principals controls the
agent.
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controlling is the best choice (on average). Note, however, that half of these subjects
who control (wrongly) believe that agents will transfer 1 point or less.24 Their behavior
therefore is consistent with income maximization given their (incorrect) beliefs about
agents’ behavior. Also note that group identity affects the distribution of principals
who expect low transfers. Around 18% (5%) of principals expect a transfer not larger
than 1 in a between-group (within-group) matching.
3.6 Conclusion
While we know that incentive systems and control mechanisms designed for selfish
individuals may not always be effective but can backfire, little is known about when
crowding out is particularly severe. In this experiment we test whether the social
relationship between the principal and agent, i.e., whether they share the same group
identity, affects the impact of control on the performance provided by the agents.
The results confirm that agents react negatively to control. While the overall effect
of control is the same when agent and principal belong to the same group and when they
belong to different groups, the mechanisms which trigger the hidden costs of control
are distinct and do depend on group identity. In general, agents react more negatively
when they expect principals not to control. If agent and principal share the same group
identity, agents are more likely to expect not to be controlled leading to crowding out.
If agent and principal belong to different groups, the hidden costs of control are due to
a different mechanism. Holding agents’ beliefs constant, they interpret controlling from
an out-group principal as more ‘hostile’ and as a consequence reduce their transfers to
the principals. In the end, control has ‘hidden costs’ in both in-group and out-group
matchings – but for different reasons.
The results have important implications. First, many principal-agent interactions
are between individuals from different ethnic, racial or religious groups, or between
different firms or, within the same firm, between workers belonging to different
departments or with different responsibilities and wages. Our findings suggest that
such group structures may interact with control schemes and potentially also with
24The other half of subjects who control expect on average 4.9 points. Note that their expectation
is substantially smaller than the average expectation for transfers larger than 1 point of subjects who
do not control (7.1 points).
59
incentive systems.
Secondly, we isolate two different mechanisms through which control devices have
detrimental effects on individual performance. We believe this may help further our
understanding of the general conditions under which control mechanisms or incentives
have the potential to be detrimental and of the factors that are likely to determine the
size of the hidden costs of control. Moreover, the group-specific mechanisms for how
control is perceived indicate that it is important to take group structures into account.
As suggested by Akerlof and Kranton (2005), group identity does affect principal-agent
relationships and the way incentives work. Whether the principal and the agent share
the same identity, i.e., are in-group members, changes in important ways how incentive
and control mechanisms are perceived.
Future work should extend this line of research to investigate the impact of group
identity on the efficacy of incentives, such as bonuses or penalities, but also on other
aspects of principal-agent relations, for example hold-up problems.
Chapter 4
Efficiency Concern under Asymmetric
Information
4.1 Introduction
In simple experiments such as the Ultimatum Game, the Trust Game, or the Dictator
Game subjects regularly deviate from a selfish maximization of payoffs and behave
prosocially (Camerer, 2003). To explain these deviations, it has been proposed to
extend individuals’ preferences by a social component while keeping the assumption
of utility maximization. Prominent examples of this approach are inequality aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), efficiency concern, and maximin
preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002).
If subjects’ behavior is guided by social preferences, these theories should help to
understand how individuals react to policy proposals as most policies not only involve
the individual’s own payoff but affect others’ payoffs as well. Moreover, for policy
makers a concern for efficiency is a particularly interesting motive because it could
allow to implement welfare increasing allocations even though standard theory based
on purely selfish agents will predict these policies to fail. For instance, an economic
reform may be implemented despite the fact that a majority incurs a loss: When the
gains for those who profit are sufficiently large and some individuals who are negatively
affected are concerned with efficiency, these individuals may tip the scales such that
the reform is implemented nevertheless.
Most policy questions such as reform proposals are notoriously plagued by
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information asymmetries. Individuals will be better informed about how a reform
affects themselves than how it affects others. The laboratory experiments providing
evidence for social preferences are conducted in an environment where agents have
full information about the costs and benefits of all agents. The question is whether
individuals whose behavior is in line with social preference theories if they are perfectly
informed about the effect of the reform, still behave prosocially when they are not
perfectly informed about the gains others have.
In this chapter, we investigate whether asymmetric information affects prosocial
behavior of subjects whose behavior is in line with an efficiency concern under
symmetric information. Furthermore, as any policy that affects the efficiency of an
allocation will also have distributional consequences (e.g., decrease inequality), we
also investigate how subjects, whose behavior is in line with inequality aversion under
symmetric information, behave under asymmetric information.
In the case of asymmetric information it is possible that subjects behave less
prosocially than they do under symmetric information for two reasons. First, subjects
with a concern for efficiency face the risk that their transfer produces only little value;
maybe too little to make them behave prosocially if they knew the value exactly.
Asymmetric information may thereby influence behavior: Instead of choosing the risky1
(and prosocial) option they may choose the safe (and selfish) one. Secondly, cognitive
dissonance theory (e.g., Konow, 2000), which has been proposed as an alternative to the
utility maximization paradigm, may provide another explanation why behavior may
change under asymmetric information. According to this theory, individuals experience
cognitive dissonance due to the internal conflict they are exposed to. On the one
hand, they want to keep their endowment, but on the other hand they feel obliged
to behave prosocially. Under asymmetric information where subjects do not know the
exact benefits, this dissonance may be partly resolved as they may perceive it as more
justified not to transfer and therefore behave less prosocially.
We conduct a laboratory experiment with the following design: Two subjects, A and
B, are matched; both subjects have an initial endowment; A makes a binary decision
about a money transfer to B. Accepting the transfer causes known costs for A and
benefits b for B, with the benefits being larger than the costs. As treatment we vary
1Risky with respect to the other’s payoff.
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the information A has about the benefit level b. While A is informed about the exact
level of b in the control setting, he does not know the exact level in the treatment.
We focus on this simple asymmetry for three reasons. First, it is natural to assume
that even if people do not know the exact effect of a policy on themselves, they still
can evaluate it much better than an effect on others. Hence, for simplicity we assume
that A knows the costs precisely. Secondly, with asymmetric information on both sides
the identification of effects becomes more complicated and to consider only one side
on its own is a necessary first step. Moreover, identification is also the reason why we
focus on a simple non-strategic interaction. It is clear that once B can influence the
outcome, A′s behavior under asymmetric information may change; and obviously it
becomes even more complicated once we allow for group decision-making (i.e., voting).
Thirdly, we think that the above setting has applications. Consider, for instance,
donations. While people will have a more or less clear idea of the costs of a donation,
they will not be perfectly certain about the benefits their transfers generate, whereas
the recipient will have a clear idea. Depending on the information available, the
willingness to donate will vary. Similarly, if several options are available, a preference
for a particular one may reflect that it produces a more certain effect. For instance,
Jacobsson et al. (2007) find evidence that subjects donate more to smoking diabetes
patients when they can do so in the form of nicotine patches instead of monetary
transfers. While the authors interpret this finding as evidence for a paternalistic
nature of giving, a complementary explanation is that subjects want to maximize
social surplus. The nicotine patches are socially valuable (as supporting others to
quit smoking and thereby reducing a negative externality) and at the same time the
more certain option than giving money where it is unclear whether it is not spent in
a socially less valuable way (e.g., on tobacco or sweets). The results by Eckel and
Grossman (1996) point in a similar direction. They find that dictators are more willing
to donate if they know that the Red Cross receives the money and not an anonymous
person in the laboratory. Again, one can interpret the Red Cross alternative as less
risky with respect to its social value.
Besides the information asymmetry, we introduce a monetary reward for prosocial
behavior as a further treatment variable. There is substantial experimental evidence
that incentives can “crowd out” prosocial behavior (see Bowles and Polanía-Reyes
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(2012); Gneezy et al. (2011) for surveys of the literature). We want to test whether
the incentive has the same effect under symmetric and asymmetric information. Under
asymmetric information the incentive could interact with the uncertainty. Subjects
could “perceive” the reward level as being related to the unknown benefit level and
interpret the reward as a signal (Bolle and Otto, 2010).
In previous laboratory experiments finding crowding out, this effect cannot occur
by design because there is no uncertainty. With evidence from the field this is different
(e.g., Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000): Subjects do not
know exactly the benefits/costs they impose on others and hence could interpret the
reward as a signal of them.
Our main results are that under symmetric information (i) a substantial share
of individuals (36%) behaves prosocially, (ii) 18% of subjects make a choice that is
consistent with a concern for efficiency, 7% of subjects make a choice that is consistent
with inequality aversion, and 11% transfer independently of the value of b, their
transfers are in line with an efficiency concern or maximin preferences.
Moreover, subjects on average behave more prosocially when the exact benefit level
is unknown compared to a situation where the level is known. More subjects transfer
under asymmetric information than for any level of b under symmetric information.
Furthermore, we do not find substantial evidence for crowding out. The monetary
reward has a positive though not statistically significant effect.
At the individual level, behavior under asymmetric information is consistent
with predictions based on prominent examples of social preference theories (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002), and we do not find evidence that
information asymmetries have a negative effect.
As a consequence and given the parameters chosen in our experiment, the
information asymmetry actually improves the efficiency of the allocation. Under
symmetric information, where A knows the exact degree of efficiency, subjects, whose
choices are consistent with inequality aversion, only transfer when the efficiency gain is
not too large, whereas subjects, whose choices are consistent with an efficiency concern,
only transfer when the degree of efficiency is sufficiently large. Under asymmetric
information, however, both types tend to transfer.
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To the best of our knowledge we provide the first experimental design in which
an information asymmetry regarding the degree of efficiency is introduced in a basic
non-strategic setting. In contrast to existing experiments, only the information which
the dictator A has available varies while B is fully informed. A′s decision does neither
make his payoff nor B′s payoff more risky. Moreover, this is the first experiment
that investigates whether a financial incentive can have a negative effect under both
asymmetric and symmetric information in order to distinguish different channels of
crowding out. However, in our experiment we do not find substantial evidence for
crowding out at all. Furthermore, our findings also confirm previous results (e.g.,
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004): A concern for efficiency plays a crucial role in explaining
prosocial behavior. Lastly, our experiment provides evidence that simple information
asymmetries do not reduce prosocial behavior.
The chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, we discuss the related
literature. In Section 4.3, we present the experimental design followed by a discussion
of behavioral hypotheses in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the results and Section
4.6 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
The experimental evidence regarding prosocial behavior in simple two-person exper-
iments such as the Trust Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Dictator Game is
extensive. The central and robust finding is that subjects regularly deviate from purely
selfish behavior though to varying degree.2 One motive to explain deviations from the
selfish benchmark that received particular attention has been inequality aversion (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000): Subjects are not only guided by their
own payoff but experience disutility when payoffs differ between participants. More
recently, the explanatory power of these theories has been questioned.3
The experiments by Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004)
discriminate between alternative theories of social preferences (inequality aversion,
maximin preferences, and efficiency concern) and evaluate their explanatory power
2For reviews of the literature see Camerer (2003) and specifically for the Dictator Game see Engel
(2011).
3See for example Engelmann and Strobel (2002) for a discussion.
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for subjects’ behavior in simple distribution games. In Charness and Rabin (2002),
two to three players are involved; in some of the games one subject decides alone (e.g.,
variants of the Dictator Game) and in some games two subjects together influence the
allocation (e.g., variants of the Ultimatum Game). In Engelmann and Strobel (2004),
one subject has to choose among three alternatives where each alternative allocates
transfers to him and to two other subjects. Both articles report a substantial share
of subjects who are willing to accept private costs when they can thereby increase
the total sum of payoffs. Moreover, maximin preferences play an important role for
explaining subjects’ behavior whereas - in contrast to previous experiments - inequality
aversion has less explanatory power.4
A few papers (e.g., Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; Rapoport and Sundali, 1996; Huck,
1999; Güth et al., 1996) introduce asymmetric information regarding the outcome in
simple two-person games. In contrast to our experiment, however, the asymmetric
information is on the other side: The proposer of a bargaining outcome is aware of the
exact amount of money to be distributed while the recipient is not. Only in Klempt
and Pull (2009), the information asymmetry is on the side of the proposer. They find
that dictators demand a higher share of the pie compared to a situation where they
know the size of the pie. As in their setting uninformed dictators run a risk that a high
proposal leads to a zero transfer when the actual pie is small, it is not clear what drives
the effect: information or risk attitudes.5 In contrast to their approach, we are not
concerned with a fixed pie that can be distributed but with a decision that increases
the pie. In our setting, asymmetric information concerns the increase of efficiency a
dictator can create by behaving prosocially.
The paper which is closest to our design with regard to the information asymmetry
is the first treatment in Dana and Weber (2007). In their setting, a dictator has to make
a choice between two allocations where he initially only observes his own payoff but not
the payoff for the recipient. Subjects can choose to be informed about the other’s payoff
before they make a decision while the recipient is neither informed about the dictator’s
choice to reveal nor about his transfer decision. The recipient only observes his own
4Other experiments also find evidence that individuals’ choices are in line with an efficiency concern
(e.g., Kritikos and Bolle, 2001).
5In their setting, the pie can take on two values, 8 and 20. When a dictator is not informed about
the value and, for instance, proposes 9 for himself but the actual pie is 8, then he receives nothing.
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payoff. Hence, he cannot distinguish whether the dictator behaved selfishly or chose
to stay uninformed and decided without knowing what would be the prosocial choice.
They find that a significant share of dictators prefers to be uninformed and decides
more often to behave selfishly compared to a benchmark where dictators are informed
about the other’s payoff right from the beginning. Hence, they provide evidence that
subjects want to appear as prosocial instead of “truly” being altruistic.6
In our experiment, the information asymmetry differs. Player B is perfectly
informed about the level of benefit and about A′s decision. A in contrast, does not
know the benefit level and he has no possibility of learning the value. Moreover, in
Dana and Weber (2007) the equal and the efficient choice are the same (versus a more
selfish and inequality increasing outcome). In contrast, in our case the benefit can take
on different values. While the choice is always efficiency increasing, its distributional
consequences vary over different values of b.
A recent strand of literature (Brennan et al., 2008; Güth et al., 2008; Bradler, 2009)
investigates how risk regarding other subjects’ payoffs affects prosocial behavior. In
these experiments, a dictator has to make choices among lotteries instead of outcomes.
Hereby, attitudes towards private and collective risks can be evaluated. The paper
which is closest to ours is Brennan et al. (2008).7 In their experiment, each dictator is
required to evaluate four different allocations. Each allocation assigns a payoff to the
dictator and to the recipient either in a probabilistic or in a deterministic way. The
experiment shows that dictators’ behavior is significantly different when they face risks
regarding their own payoff compared to a situation with no risk. Yet, the authors do
not find evidence that the risk recipients are exposed to affects dictators’ decisions.8
6There are several papers that investigate whether subjects are more selfish when the actions of
dictators are not fully observable (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) and the “multiple dictator”
treatment as well as the “plausible deniability” treatment in Dana and Weber (2007)). They find a
significantly less generous behavior of dictators relative to the standard game thus also supporting the
view that subjects are not truly prosocial but want to appear as if. In contrast to these papers, we are
not concerned with uncertainty about the decision. In our setting, subjects know exactly whether the
other subject behaved prosocially or not; asymmetric information only concerns the possible allocation
outcomes.
7Güth et al. (2008) conducted a similar experiment where they added another dimension: time
preferences. Regarding risk, with which our analysis is concerned, they obtain similar results.
8Rohde and Rohde (2011) similarly find only weak evidence that the risk recipients’ are exposed
to influences dictators. Results by Bradler (2009) indicate that subjects are willing to risk parts of
their own payoff when they can thereby increase the payoff of the recipient from zero (respectively,
from a very small amount).
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In our setting, under asymmetric information A has to make a decision when he
does not know the exact efficiency parameter. The main difference between our analysis
and the latter strand of literature is that dictators affect the risks of others while in our
setting they do not. In these papers two different kind of risk concerns regarding the
others’ payoff are intertwined. First, as those papers posit, it may be that dictators put
themselves in the shoes of others and do not want to expose recipients to risk. Secondly,
however, if subjects exhibit social preferences based on outcomes, then they face a risk
themselves: When choosing a lottery, they face an uncertain outcome regarding the
others’ payoff directly affecting their own utility. In the above designs, both effects
are mixed and not distinguishable. Moreover, A is exposed to direct risks that affect
his own payoff as well, which can influence his attitude towards the risk of B. In our
approach, these effects are disentangled. Subject A is not exposed to risks regarding
his own payoff. We also do not consider a situation in which A affects the risk of B:
In our setting, the gain B receives when A transfers is determined before A makes a
decision.
Lastly, our experiment is related to the literature on crowding out.9 For instance,
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) find that a financial punishment for late-comers actually
increases late-coming by parents in an Israeli kindergarden. Similarly, Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee (1997) conducted a study in Switzerland where subjects were offered a
compensation for the willingness to accept a nuclear waste facility in their community.
The willingness to accept the facility decreased from 50% to 25% when a financial
compensation was offered. Besides, numerous laboratory experiments exist which find
a similar effect, typically in simple 2-persons-interactions such as the Gift Exchange
Game (e.g., Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003) or even simpler interactions regarding control
mechanisms (e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006).
4.3 Experimental Design
We implement the following experimental design: There are two agents, A and B. A
has an endowment, eA, of 100 points (100 points are equivalent to 10 EUR), B has
an endowment, eB, of 50 points. Only A makes a (binary) decision. He can decide
9For surveys of the literature see Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012) and Gneezy et al. (2011).
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Part 1 b is not known to A
Part 2 b is not known to A. A receives a reward if he transfers.
Part 3 b is known to A. A receives a reward if he transfers.
Part 4 b is known to A.
Table 4.1: Overview over Parameters in the 4 Parts of the Experiment
whether he wants to transfer 20 points. If A transfers, B receives a benefit b, with
b ∈ {25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70}. The decision reflects a situation where an efficiency gain
is possible. We chose the initial endowments such that a transfer will result in an
efficiency gain and a decrease in inequality for low values of b (b ≤ 30). For values of
b > 30 inequality increases in b. Hence, depending on the exact value of b a decision
to transfer can be motivated by a concern for efficiency or by a concern for equality.10
The experiment consisted of 4 parts. Table 4.1 provides an overview over the
parameters that change in each part.
4.3.1 Treatments
The main treatment variable in our experiment is whether A knows the exact benefit b
when he makes a decision or whether his knowledge about b is limited to the distribution
from which b is drawn.
In part 1, participants in the role of A have to make a decision under asymmetric
information with respect to b. The exact value of b is determined in the following way:
Participants are presented an urn from which a value for b is drawn before subjects
make a decision. The urn contains the following balls each representing one value of
b: 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70. Agent A is not informed about the ball which is drawn while
it is disclosed to agent B. Moreover, it is public information that B knows the exact
benefit. Subjects make only one decision whether to transfer or not.
In part 4, participants in the role of A make decisions under symmetric information.
That is, A knows the exact value of b. We use the strategy method for a complete
response by subject A for each value of b (25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70). This is crucial because
it allows us to describe the values of b for which subjects are willing to transfer under
symmetric information and whether their behavior is consistent with their decision
10If endowments were such that A had an endowment smaller than or equal to B, any transfer
would always increase inequality. Then, we could only focus on the efficiency motive.
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under asymmetric information. Subjects had to make one decision (transfer yes/no)
for each level of b. After they had made their decisions, one ball from the urn was
drawn which determined which decision was payoff-relevant for part 4.
Part 2 (3) is identical to part 1 (4), but as an additional treatment we introduce a
reward for A if he transfers the 20 points. The goal is to investigate whether a reward
has a differential effect under asymmetric and symmetric information. In part 2, the
reward r could take on two values, rL = 5 and rH = 10. The subjects only knew that
it holds that r ∈ [5, 10] and that the exact value of r was determined after b had been
drawn, but they did not know how the reward was chosen. In fact, the reward was
determined by a lottery after b had been drawn and in all cases r = 5 was drawn.11
After the reward was determined, all subjects were informed about the exact value of
r. In part 3, the reward was fixed with r = 5. Before making a decision, subjects knew
the exact value of r.
At the end of the experiment, one of the four parts was randomly drawn. This part
determined the final payoff of participants.
4.3.2 Procedural Details
Subjects were randomly assigned to either role A or role B at the beginning of the
experiment.12 They kept this role over the course of the experiment. Subjects knew
that the experiment comprised four parts, but they did not know the content of each
part in advance. Subjects received separate instructions at the beginning of each part
with the information that instructions for subsequent parts would follow.
As we are interested in whether crowding out could occur under asymmetric
information due to a signaling effect of the reward, we let subjects choose under
asymmetric information first. Symmetric information followed afterwards because
we wanted to avoid that the randomly determined benefit level would influence
subjects’ beliefs under asymmetric information. Since we similarly cannot exclude
the possibility that behavior under asymmetric information affects behavior under
symmetric information, we also did a robustness check where we changed the sequence
11The probability is 1/10 for the high reward and 9/10 for the low reward.
12Subjects in the role of B had no decision to make in the experiment, but we elicited their beliefs
about what they thought subjects A would do.
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of parts. Subjects then first decided under symmetric information (see Section 4.5.4).
So, in addition to analyzing behavior from four subsequent parts one can also compare
the first decisions from our baseline sessions and the robustness sessions without the
problem that they may have been affected by previous actions or parameters.
We ran five sessions with 90 subjects in the sequence of parts described above and
three more robustness sessions with 60 subjects. The experiments were conducted
at the experimental laboratory at the University of Mannheim in March to May
2012 (baseline sessions) and November 2012 (robustness sessions). The experiment
was computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were students from the
University of Mannheim from different fields. They were recruited using the online
system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each session took between 35 and 40 minutes and
comprised 16-20 subjects. The average earnings were 7.80 EUR.
4.4 Behavioral Predictions
Under asymmetric information subjects make one choice: Whether they want to
transfer or not. To understand whether the information asymmetry has an effect
on behavior, it is crucial to put it into context with behavior when subjects
know the benefit level. For instance, suppose subject i does not transfer under
asymmetric information. Without further information it is not clear whether the
subject behaves generally selfishly (independently of the asymmetric information) or
whether asymmetric information has an effect on his behavior. Suppose, as an extreme
example, that the same subject, who did not transfer under asymmetric information,
transfers for all benefit levels when he knows b exactly. Then, we can argue that
asymmetric information had an effect on his behavior. The information what subjects
do under symmetric information is necessary to evaluate the effect of the information
asymmetry. Hence, we begin with a discussion how subjects in the role of A behave
under symmetric information (part 4). To understand what behavior we can expect, we
follow the literature and base our predictions on prominent social preference theories.
Next, we extrapolate these theories to the asymmetric information case and discuss
what behavior these theories predict when subjects do not know the exact benefit level
b (part 1) conditioning on their behavior under symmetric information. Moreover,
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we will argue why we may observe a deviation from these predictions when subjects
react to the risk they are exposed to and we will also contrast the predictions with an
alternative explanation of why behavior may change under asymmetric information,
a cognitive dissonance approach. Lastly, we will discuss how the introduction of the
reward (parts 2 and 3) can affect behavior.
4.4.1 Symmetric Information
We focus on three possible motives for prosocial behavior that are prominent in the
literature: efficiency concern, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion. We will
first discuss the simple utility specification of Charness and Rabin (2002) modeling a
concern for efficiency and maximin preferences. Secondly, we will discuss inequality
aversion as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In both cases we will briefly describe
the utility functions and state which transfer patterns are predicted. All derivations
can be found in Appendix C.2.
Efficiency Concern and Maximin Preferences
Following Charness and Rabin (2002), the utility of an individual i in the role of A is:
U iA(piA, piB) = (1− λi)piA + λi
[
δi ·min [piA, piB] +
(
1− δi) (piA + piB)]
where piA and piB are the monetary payoffs of A and B, respectively. Parameter
λi = 0 corresponds to purely selfish preferences. For 0 < λi < 1, δi = 0 means that
prosocial behavior is only driven by an efficiency concern, i.e., a desire to maximize
total payoffs, and δi = 1 means that prosocial behavior is only driven by maximin
preferences, i.e., a desire to maximize both players’ minimal payoff.
Applied to our setting, subject i has to compare two levels of utility. The utility
U iA(100, 50) if i does not transfer:
U iA(100, 50) = (1− λi)100 + λi
[
δi50 +
(
1− δi) (100 + 50)] (4.1)
and for a given value of b the utility U iA(80, 50 + b) if i transfers.
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U iA(80, 50 + b) = (1− λi)80 + λi
[
δi ·min [80, 50 + b] + (1− δi) (80 + 50 + b)] (4.2)
Given the utility function, when do subjects transfer? For the sake of exposition,
we focus on two discrete cases: Subjects either have a pure efficiency concern (δi = 0)
or have pure maximin preferences (δi = 1).
Efficiency Concern When subjects have a concern for efficiency, they will trade-off
their costs with the benefits and the consequent efficiency gain. Given their individual
parameter λi and the value of b, they will transfer if
U iA(80, 50 + b) > U
i
A(100, 50)⇔ λi >
20
b
. (4.3)
Hence, the more an individual i cares for efficiency (the higher λi) the lower the
minimal value of b for which i would transfer. Thus, subjects with an efficiency concern
should exhibit the following transfer pattern: Either they do not transfer at all or they
transfer for a particular value of b∗ and all values b > b∗.
Maximin Preferences Subjects with maximin preferences will transfer the 20 points
if it holds that:
U iA(80, 50 + b) > U
i
A(100, 50)⇔ (1− λi)80 + λi min [80, 50 + b] > 100− λi50 (4.4)
The transfer pattern of subjects with maximin preferences is similar to the transfer
patterns of efficiency concern: Either they do not transfer at all, or they transfer for a
particular value of b∗ and all values b > b∗. In contrast to efficiency concern, there are
only two thresholds: either b = 30 or b = 25.13
13In the case where prosocial behavior is not solely driven by an efficiency concern, respectively
maximin preferences, (δi ∈ (0, 1)) the transfer pattern is analogous: Either subjects do not transfer
at all, or they transfer for a particular value of b∗ and all values b > b∗.
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Inequality Aversion
In contrast to maximin preferences, the specification of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can
lead to behavior that is consistent with transfers for low values of b but no transfers
once the benefit level is above 50. The utility function by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for
the two-player case is as follows,
U iA(piA, piB) = piA − αi max [0, piB − piA]− βi max [0, piA − piB]
with the assumption that βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi < 1. Based on this utility function,
the following transfer patterns are possible: Individual i either never transfers or he
transfers for b = 30 alone, or for b = 30 and b = 25, or for b = 30, b = 25, and b = 40,
or for b = 30, b = 25, b = 40, and b = 50. However, he will never transfer for values of
b = 60 or b = 70.14
The social preference theories which we discuss share that - depending on
the unobserved utility parameters λi, δi, αi, βi - subjects behave either selfishly or
prosocially. The theories, however, differ with regard to the transfer patterns they
predict over the range of possible values of b if subjects are sufficiently prosocial. In
particular, inequality aversion and efficiency concern predict differing patterns. As
indicated in the theoretical discussion above and supported by the empiricial evidence
(cf. Engelmann and Strobel (2007)), we do not expect that behavior will only follow
one type of preferences. Instead, we expect heterogeneity with respect to selfishness as
well as with respect to the type of social preferences.
To summarize our discussion, social preference theories predict the following
14See Appendix C.2 for the details.
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patterns:
Hypothesis 1:
a) Efficiency concern: Subjects either will transfer for a certain level of b∗ and
for all values of b above this threshold or will not transfer at all.
b) Maximin preferences: Subjects either will transfer for a certain level of b∗
and for all values of b above this threshold or will not transfer at all. The
threshold is either b = 25 or b = 30.
c) Inequality aversion: Subjects either will transfer for b = 30, or for b = 30
and b = 25, or for b = 30, b = 25, and b = 40, or for b = 30, b = 25,
b = 40, and b = 50, or will not transfer at all.
4.4.2 Asymmetric Information
Under asymmetric information A does not know the value of b. Given the lottery
which determines the value of b, the expected value is roughly 45. We will discuss
first how subjects should behave according to the social preference theories presented
above. As before, for details of the derivations see Appendix C.2. Then, we will outline
explanations why they could deviate from these predictions.
Social Preferences
Charness and Rabin (2002) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) Predictions What
behavior can we expect for different types of social preferences under asymmetric
information? For an individual i who behaves according to inequality aversion one
can show that the expected utility from transferring under asymmetric information
is smaller than the utility from transferring for b = 40 under symmetric information
but larger than the utility from transferring for b = 50 under symmetric information.
Hence, if i transfers for b = 50, he should transfer under asymmetric information.
If, however, i does not transfer for b = 40, he should not transfer under asymmetric
information.
For an individual whose behavior is in line with an efficiency concern the situation is
analogous. One can show that the expected utility from transferring under asymmetric
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information is smaller than the utility from transferring for b = 50 under symmetric
information but larger than the utility from transferring for b = 40 under symmetric
information. Hence, if i transfers for b = 40, he should transfer under asymmetric
information. If, however, i does not transfer for b = 50, he should not transfer under
asymmetric information.
Thus, we can formulate the following hypothesis for efficiency concern and inequality
aversion:
Hypothesis 2: CR/FS Asymmetric Information
a) Efficiency concern: Subjects will not transfer under asymmetric informa-
tion if they do not transfer for b = 50 under symmetric information.
b) Efficiency concern: Subjects will transfer under asymmetric information if
they transfer for b = 40 under symmetric information.
c) Inequality aversion: Subjects will not transfer under asymmetric
information if they do not transfer for b = 40 under symmetric information.
d) Inequality aversion: Subjects will transfer under asymmetric information if
they transfer for b = 50 under symmetric information.
For maximin preferences, the hypotheses one can derive are weaker as one can only
observe three patterns under symmetric information: Subjects either do not transfer
at all, or they transfer for all values of b, or they transfer for all values of b larger
than 25. In the case that subjects do not transfer at all, they should obviously not
transfer under asymmetric information. Similarly, if subjects transfer for all values
of b, obviously they should transfer under asymmetric information. If subjects only
transfer for b > 25, there exists a narrow parameter range of λi such that they should
not transfer under asymmetric information whereas otherwise they should.15 In our
experiment, however, the last case does not play a role because we do not observe
15More precisely, when 2460 < λ
i < 2459 , then the utility from not transferring (100− 50λi) is smaller
than the utility from a transfer with 30, 40, 50, 60, or 70 but larger than the expected utility (80− 56λi).
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subjects who do not transfer for b = 25 but for all values above 25.
Hypothesis 3: CR Asymmetric Information II
a) Maximin preferences: Subjects will not transfer under asymmetric
information if they do not transfer for any value of b under symmetric
information.
b) Maximin preferences: Subjects will transfer under asymmetric information
if they transfer for all values of b under symmetric information.
Deviations from CR/FS Asymmetric Information Prediction The utility
functions we consider are not linear, but given our parameters they imply that under
asymmetric information subjects behave as under symmetric information when the
benefit is equal to the expected value. In contrast to the decision under symmetric
information however, under asymmetric information subjects face a risk: If subjects
transfer, a value of b can realize for which they would not transfer if they knew it for
certain. Alternatively, they can behave selfishly and do not transfer. Then, they risk
that they choose not to transfer for a value of b under which they would transfer if they
had the information available. As it is the case with decisions in other settings where
solely their own payoff is at risk, in our design subjects may be affected by the risk
regarding the other’s payoff and deviate from the CR/FS predictions.16 In this case,
we will observe a more selfish behavior at the individual level when they are negatively
affected by risk: Subjects who transfer for both b = 40 and b = 50 may not transfer
under asymmetric information.17
Cognitive Dissonance Approach
So far we assumed that behavior follows the standard approach: maximization of utility
functions with the additional ingredient of social preferences. There is, however, an
alternative approach based on cognitive dissonance theory (Konow, 2000) which has
been used to explain behavior in the dictator game and which could become relevant
16Note that neither Fehr and Schmidt (1999) nor Charness and Rabin (2002) discuss the possibility
of risk regarding the others’ payoffs and it is not obvious how to implement it within their framework.
17Alternatively, we can also observe a more prosocial behavior when subjects react positively to the
risk: Subjects who do neither transfer for b = 40 nor for b = 50 under symmetric information, will
then transfer under asymmetric information.
77
in particular under asymmetric information. According to this theory, subjects want
to achieve a high payoff for themselves and to behave fair at the same time. They
experience dissonance when decisions have to be made where these two objectives are
in conflict. Moreover, “[t]he agent is motivated to reduce dissonance and may, generally
speaking, do so by altering behavior, e.g., when the dictator takes less, and/or by
changing beliefs, e.g., when the dictator believes it is fair to take more than the fair
amount.” (Konow, 2000, p. 1076). The experiment by Dana and Weber (2007) provides
evidence for such a mechanism as a substantial share of dictators decides not to get
informed about the consequences of their decision and also behaves less prosocially.18
Under symmetric information subjects are exposed to dissonance of being nice and
keeping the money for themselves. Under asymmetric information the dissonance
may be partly resolved by the uncertainty about b. Subjects have some “moral
wiggle room” to justify selfish behavior, because values of b may realize under which
they feel less compelled to transfer. Hence, they may reduce transfers compared
to the symmetric information situation and behave less prosocially than the CR/FS
predictions. Summarizing the alternatives to the CR/FS predictions:
Hypothesis 4: Subjects deviate from the CR/FS predictions and behave less
prosocially: Subjects who transfer under both b = 40 and b = 50 may not
transfer under asymmetric information.
4.4.3 Effect of Reward
In part 2, we introduce a reward for prosocial behavior. The reward r can take on two
values, rL = 5 and rH = 10. The introduction of the reward can affect behavior in two
ways. First, the reward alters the price of transferring money: The prosocial action
costs less, it may thereby shift thresholds at which subjects are willing to transfer
downwards in the case of an efficiency concern and in the case of maximin preferences.
In the case of inequality aversion it may increase the set of values under which an
18More supportive evidence can be found in Haisley and Weber (2010). In their experiments
dictators form self-serving beliefs about the likelihood that a positive payoff of the recipient realizes
under ambiguity. Subjects also behave more selfishly compared to a situation where the likelihood is
known.
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individual is willing to transfer. Thus, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The reward decreases the costs of behaving prosocially under
asymmetric and symmetric information and will have two effects: The number
of subjects who transfer weakly increases as some subjects who did not transfer
before may be willing to transfer with reward. Moreover, under symmetric
information for subjects whose behavior is in line with social preferences and
who transferred without the reward, the set of values of b for which they transfer
weakly increases.
Instead of merely changing the cost parameter - which would have the same effect on
payoffs as the reward - we introduce this change as a reward to test whether an incentive
can lead to crowding out in our setting. Under asymmetric information the incentive
could interact with the uncertainty. Subjects may “perceive” the reward level as being
related to the unknown benefit level and interpret the reward as a signal (Bolle and
Otto, 2010) (a low reward level as a signal for low values of b). In previous laboratory
experiments that find crowding out, this effect is ruled out because by design there is
no uncertainty. Looking at the evidence from the field (e.g., Frey and Oberholzer-Gee,
1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000), however, where subjects have private information
about the benefits/costs they impose on others, a signal effect can play a role. We
also introduced a fixed reward in part 3, where information is symmetric, as a control.
On the one hand, we want to check whether there is a price effect under symmetric
information and on the other hand we want to rule out that crowding out - so we
observed it under asymmetric information - is driven by factors which occur under
symmetric information as well, for instance framing effects (see Bowles and Polanía-
Reyes, 2012). Hence, our alternative hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 6: The reward crowds out subjects’ willingness to transfer, i.
e., the number of subjects who transfer weakly decreases and the set of values
under which a subject is willing to transfer will weakly shrink under symmetric
information. If crowding out is driven by a signaling effect, it should be limited
to transfers under asymmetric information.
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of Transfers - Symmetric Information
Notes: The figure depicts the share of individuals who transfer for
each level of benefit in part 4. The exact level of b is known. N =
45.
4.5 Results
We begin our discussion with behavior under symmetric information, then we discuss
behavior under asymmetric information and the effect of the reward. Finally, we will
compare results from our baseline sessions to the robustness sessions.
4.5.1 Symmetric Information
In part 4, where participants A had to make a decision for different known levels of
benefits, between 17% and 31% of subjects transfer 20 points. As depicted in Figure
4.1 the share of individuals behaving prosocially depends on the benefit level. The
first bar represents the share of individuals transferring when b = 25, the second bar
when b = 30, and so on. The rate of transfers is highest when the benefit level is at its
maximum and lowest for benefit levels below 50 points.
We observe transfer patterns as predicted by social preferences (Hypothesis 1):
We can assign each dictator to one of four patterns.19 Subjects who do not transfer
19The assignment is based on behavior in part 4. As we will discuss in section 4.5.3 below, we
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Figure 4.2: Transfer Patterns for Different Values of b
Notes: The sample is restricted to those subjects whose behavior
follows the prediction by either efficiency concern or inequality
aversion. The exact level of b is known. The percentage indicates
the frequency in the overall population. N = 11. One subject only
transferred at b smaller than 40 but also for the value of b = 70 in
part 4. We assigned this subject to pattern “inequality aversion”.
independently of the benefit level (64% of all subjects), subjects who transfer for all
values of b and whose behavior is thereby in accordance with a concern for efficiency
as well as maximin preferences (11%). Moreover, we observe subjects whose behavior
is in line with an efficiency concern (18%) and subjects whose behavior is in line with
inequality aversion (7%).20
In Figure 4.2 we depict the behavior of these last two subgroups for all values of
thereby have an upper bound on selfish behavior. Some subjects behave prosocially when they are
given a reward in part 3.
20We have 90 pairs and thereby 45 dictators. 29 are selfish, 8 behave according to efficiency concern,
5 to either efficiency concern or maximin preferences, and 3 acccording to inequality aversion.
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Figure 4.3: Percentage of Transfers - Symmetric vs Asymmetric Information
Notes: The figure depicts the share of individuals in the role of
A who transfer. The first bar refers to transfers in part 1 under
asymmetric information. Bars 2-7 depict transfers for each level of
benefit in part 4. N = 45.
b.21
Result 1: Without reward 18% of subjects show a behavior which is in line
with an efficiency concern; 7% behave in a way that is predicted by inequality
aversion; 11 % behave in a way that is both in line with an efficiency concern
and maximin preferences; and 64% behave selfishly.
4.5.2 Asymmetric Information
Turning to behavior under asymmetric information, it becomes evident that the share of
subjects transferring is larger than under each value of b under symmetric information.
The first bar in Figure 4.3 depicts the fraction of individuals transferring in part 1 under
asymmetric information. Comparing it to behavior under symmetric information (part
4, represented by bars 2 to 7), in particular when the benefit level is low, subjects are
more likely to transfer money.
21By definition the patterns for the other groups are degenerate. Either subjects transfer for all
values of b or for none.
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Table 4.2: Dictators’ Transfer Decision
Dependent Variable: Individual Transfer (=1)
Transfer when benefit=25 (=1) -0.178**
(0.0665)
Transfer when benefit=30 (=1) -0.178**
(0.0665)
Transfer when benefit=40 (=1) -0.178**
(0.0665)
Transfer when benefit=50 (=1) -0.111*
(0.0659)
Transfer when benefit=60 (=1) -0.0889
(0.0627)
Transfer when benefit=70 (=1) -0.0444
(0.0638)
Constant 0.356***
(0.0729)
N 315
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Table reports results
from an OLS regression. Dependent variable is the individual
transfer decision. Explanatory variables are the benefit levels under
symmetric information. The omitted category is the asymmetric
information case. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
Level of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
When the benefit level is between 25 and 40 points, only 17% of subjects are
willing to transfer compared to 36% under asymmetric information. Table 4.2 depicts
results of an OLS regression with the individual transfer decision as dependent variable.
As regressors we include the benefit levels under symmetric information, the omitted
category is the decision under asymmetric information. The regression confirms what
the graph already pointed out: Fewer prosocial decisions are made under symmetric
information compared to the case of asymmetric information. The differences for
benefit levels below 60 are statistically significant.22
22We also estimated a random effects model. The results are very similar. Furthermore, we did a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. For benefit levels 25, 30, and 40 the null-hypothesis can be rejected at the
5% level, for b = 50 at the 10% level.
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Result 2: Under asymmetric information more subjects transfer than under
each single value of b under symmetric information. For b < 60 the effect is
statistically significant.
From Figure 4.3 it is clear, that in the aggregate subjects do not behave less
prosocially under asymmetric information. On the contrary, on average they are more
willing to transfer when they do not know the exact value of b.
The reason why we observe this is a combination of two effects: First, as is clear from
the previous section, when b is known, different subjects transfer for different values
of b. For low values of b subjects whose behavior is consistent with inequality aversion
transfer. They do not transfer, though, when the benefit reaches a certain threshold.
In contrast, subjects whose behavior is in line with an efficiency concern transfer from
a certain threshold on but not when the value is low. Secondly, individual transfers
are not reduced by asymmetric information. We observe six subjects who, given their
choices under symmetric information, should transfer under asymmetric information
according to social preferences. All of them transfer. Hence, no subject who should
behave prosocially according to social preferences chooses not do so. Moreover, we
observe seven subjects for whom, given their behavior under symmetric information,
both a transfer and no transfer under asymmetric information would be in line with
social preferences. In fact, four out of these seven transfer. Lastly, we find 32 subjects
who transfer neither for b = 40 nor for b = 50. Five of them transfer nevertheless. So,
if at all, we find some evidence for increased prosocial behavior and therefore evidence
against Hypothesis 4.
Result 3: For most subjects behavior is consistent with social preference
theories and their choices under symmetric information. There is no evidence
for a negative effect of asymmetric information.
Combining that subjects are not negatively affected by asymmetric information
and that we observe different types which separate when information is symmetric
but both transfer when information is asymmetric, results in higher transfers under
asymmetric information in the aggregate. As a consequence, earnings for subjects in
the role of B are substantially higher when A decides under asymmetric information.
Each value of b is equally likely and the unconditional decision to transfer (0.36) is
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Figure 4.4: The Effect of Reward on Transfers
Notes: Bar 1 depicts the difference between the shares of individuals
who transfer in part 2 and the share of individuals who transfer
in part 1. Bars 2-7 depict the differences between the shares of
individuals who transfer in part 3 and the share of individuals who
transfer in part 4 for each level of benefit. N = 45.
the same for all values of b. Under symmetric information, each value of b is also
equally likely as before. Yet, as subjects make a transfer decision for each value of b,
the conditional probability may vary over b and is smaller than the probability under
asymmetric information. Hence, players B have a higher chance to obtain a transfer:
36% under asymmetric information versus 22% under symmetric information.23 And
their expected transfer is 45% higher: 11 points under symmetric information versus
16 points under asymmetric information.24
4.5.3 Reward
In the second and third part of our experiment, we introduce a reward for participant
A if he chooses the prosocial action. In all cases, the reward was 5 points.
Figure 4.4 depicts the difference between shares of subjects who transfer with and
23Probability to obtain a transfer is equal to 16 (17 + 17 + 17 + 24 + 26 + 31)% = 22% < 36%
24E [b] = 16 (0.17 · 25 + 0.17 · 30 + 0.17 · 40 + 0.24 · 50 + 0.26 · 60 + 0.31 · 70) = 11 < 0.36 · 45 = 16
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Table 4.3: Dictators’ Transfer Decision - Reward
Dependent Variable: Individual Transfer (=1)
Transfer when benefit=25 (=1) -0.167***
(0.0505)
Transfer when benefit=30 (=1) -0.178***
(0.0484)
Transfer when benefit=40 (=1) -0.178***
(0.0427)
Transfer when benefit=50 (=1) -0.122**
(0.0534)
Transfer when benefit=60 (=1) -0.0778
(0.0504)
Transfer when benefit=70 (=1) -0.0556
(0.0535)
Reward (=1) 0.0444
(0.0350)
Constant 0.356***
(0.0615)
N 630
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Table reports results
from an OLS regression. Dependent variable is the individual
transfer decision. Explanatory variables are the benefit levels under
symmetric information. The omitted category is the asymmetric
information case. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
Level of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
without reward. The first bar depicts the comparison of transfers under asymmetric
information (part 2 versus part 1) and bars 2-7 represent the comparison of transfers
under symmetric information (part 4 versus part 3) for each level of benefit.
The reward has a positive effect but it is small: More subjects choose to transfer
money in part 2 compared to part 1. Mirroring the positive effect, when the reward
is withdrawn, we observe a negative effect: The willingness to transfer decreases. For
each value of b we observe fewer transfers in part 4 than in part 3. On the one hand,
the effect is driven by individuals who transfer in part 3 but stop transferring in part 4.
On the other hand, for subjects, who still transfer in part 4, the set of values for which
they transfer decreases. In Table 4.3 we depict results of an OLS regression similar to
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Part 1 [4] b is known to A.
Part 2 [1] b is not known to A
Part 3 [3] b is known to A. A receives a reward if he transfers.
Part 4 [2] b is not known to A. A receives a reward if he transfers.
Table 4.4: Overview over Parameters in the Robustness Sessions
the baseline in Table 4.2. We include the reward as a dummy variable. It confirms
that the reward has a positive effect but also shows that the effect is not statistically
significant.25
Hence, we do not find significant evidence that a reward has a negative effect on
prosocial behavior in our experiment (Hypothesis 6), the incentive works as standard
price theory would predict (Hypothesis 5) and we also do not observe a differential
effect of the price under symmetric and asymmetric information (when comparing part
2 with 3 versus 1 with 4).
Result 4: The reward increases the number of subjects who transfer and the
set of values of b for which subjects are willing to transfer under both symmetric
and asymmetric information.
4.5.4 Robustness Check - Sequence of Parts
As in our experiment subjects participate in the different treatments in a sequence,
it may be possible that subjects’ behavior is influenced by the order of treatments.
For instance, there may be a decay of prosocial behavior over time and the difference
which we observe between part 1 and 4 merely an artefact of the design. To check
the robustness of our results, we ran three more sessions with 60 participants where
we changed the order of the parts. Table 4.4 provides an overview of the new order
(the old order is depicted in “[]”). Most importantly, we let subjects decide first under
symmetric information. So, we can compare this decision to the baseline sessions where
subjects decided under asymmetric information in part 1 to see whether it still holds
that in the aggregate subjects behave less prosocially under symmetric information.
In Figure 4.5 we depict only part 1 for both the baseline as well as the robustness
25As before we also estimated a random effects model (cf. Footnote 4.5.2). We also did a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test. There was no significant difference. Also note that, besides finding no evidence for
crowding out on average, we do not observe substantial and statistically significant crowding out at
the individual level. Overall, only few subjects react to the reward at all.
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of Transfers under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information -
1st Part only
Notes: The figure depicts the share of individuals in the role of A
who transfer for the baseline sessions and the robustness sessions
in part 1. The first bar refers to transfers under asymmetric
information in the baseline sessions. Bars 2-7 depict transfers for
each level of benefit under symmetric information in the robustness
sessions.
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Figure 4.6: Percentage of Transfers - Baseline versus Robustness Sessions
Notes: The figure depicts the share of individuals in the role of A
who transfer for the baseline sessions and the robustness sessions.
The first bar refers to transfers under asymmetric information.
Bars 2-7 depict transfers for each level of benefit under symmetric
information.
sessions. A direct comparison between transfer levels reveals that under asymmetric
information subjects transfer more than for each level of benefit b under symmetric
information. In fact, the difference is even more pronounced than in the comparison of
part 1 and 4 within the baseline sessions. For b = 30, b = 50, and b = 60 the difference
is statistically significant (Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.07) and for b = 40 as well (Fisher’s
exact test, p < 0.02).
In Figure 4.6 we depict the decision to transfer under asymmetric information (bar
1) and the decisions to transfer under symmetric information for different values of b
(bars 2 - 7). In the robustness sessions, subjects transfer under asymmetric information
at least as much as for each level of b under symmetric information; for b = 40 the
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level (Wilcoxon signed-rank test). So,
as before the expected income for subjects in the role of B is higher under asymmetric
information. However, in general there are lower transfers and smaller differences in
the robustness sessions than in the baseline sessions.
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What is the reason for this difference? If we look at what happens under symmetric
information, it becomes apparent that there is a further difference. Relative to the
baseline sessions more subjects transfer for low levels of b. What is different is the
composition of types: In contrast to the baseline sessions, we observe more inequality
averse subjects and no subject who always transfers (independently of the exact value
of b). At the individual level, the behavior under asymmetric information is very
similar to what we observe in the baseline sessions. We observe two subjects who,
given their choices under symmetric information, should transfer under asymmetric
information. Both of them transfer. Hence, no subject who should behave prosocially
according to social preferences chooses not do so. Moreover, we observe five subjects
who conditional on their transfer decision under symmetric information may either
transfer or not transfer. Four out of these five subjects transfer. Lastly, we find
23 subjects who transfer neither for b = 40 nor for b = 50. Two of them transfer
nevertheless under asymmetric information.
So, regarding individual behavior, the reaction to asymmetric information is very
close to the baseline sessions. Yet, as we observe a different composition of types and
thereby a different behavior under symmetric information, it is not surprising that
there is also a difference under asymmetric information.
In Figure 4.7 the effect of the reward is depicted. There are slight differences
between the robustness and the baseline sessions. Under symmetric information
the effect of the reward is positive in both experiments even though the effect is
stronger in the robustness sessions. Under asymmetric information, the effect actually
has a negative effect in the robustness sessions. However, the overall magnitude of
the reward’s effect is small. Moreover, the difference is far from being statistically
significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
4.6 Conclusion
Economic experiments indicate that people regularly deviate from purely selfish
behavior; they care not only about their own payoff but also about the payoff of others.
When individuals face the decision to support a policy proposal, they find themselves
in a similar situation: The proposal will have consequences for themselves but at the
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Figure 4.7: The Effect of Reward on Transfers - Baseline Sessions versus Robustness
Sessions
Notes: Bar 1 depicts the difference between the shares of individuals
who transfer with reward and the share of individuals who transfer
without reward under asymmetric information. Bars 2-7 depict the
difference between the shares of individuals who transfer with reward
and the share of individuals who transfer without reward for each
level of benefit under symmetric information.
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same time for others. Hence, when we observe in the laboratory that subjects behave
prosocially and transfer patterns follow predictions by social preference theories, these
theories can help to understand individual support for certain policies. Moreover, they
can allow to implement policies that would fail under purely selfish behavior.
In this chapter, we investigate one aspect which plays a role in decisions in the
field and has not yet been addressed in the context of laboratory experiments that try
to measure social preferences: asymmetric information. In the field, decisions have
to be made under a different information setting than in the laboratory. The gains
and costs a person will realize when a policy is implemented will often be private
information. In contrast, in most laboratory experiments subjects have plenty of
information about the exact outcomes available. With this experiment we take a
first step to investigate whether information asymmetries influence prosocial behavior
of individuals. We compare transfers when a dictator has perfect information about
the benefit he generates for the recipient with a situation where he only knows the
distribution of benefits that may realize. The recipient, however, is fully informed
about the benefit he receives.
We find that (i) in this setting 36% of subjects behave prosocially and transfer,
(ii) 18% of subjects make choices that are consistent with a concern for efficiency,
7% make choices which are consistent with inequality aversion, and 11% transfer
independently of the value of b, whose choices are therefore in line with an efficiency
concern or maximin preferences, and (iii) under asymmetric information transfers do
not decline. Even though subjects face the risk of transferring at a benefit level which
they would not choose if they knew the level for sure, the level of transfers is stable
and in fact even slightly higher than the highest level under symmetric information.
Lastly, the introduction of a reward weakly increases transfers. Only under asymmetric
information in the robustness sessions there is a negative effect of the reward. However,
as it is the case when the reward has a positive influence, the overall effect of the reward
is small and not statistically significant.
Our results suggest that individual behavior is not negatively affected by asym-
metric information. In the aggregate, subjects, whose behavior is either in line
with inequality aversion or with an efficiency concern, both tend to transfer under
asymmetric information. Consequently, more subjects transfer under asymmetric
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information than for any single value of b under symmetric information.
What are possible next steps and what are potential items on an agenda for
future research? First, we think it would be interesting to experiment with different
information asymmetries than the one we provide. In our setting, asymmetric
information leads to convergent choices and thereby increased prosocial behavior for
subjects with different types of social preferences. However, one can also think of
situations where this will not happen, for instance with individuals who exhibit different
thresholds than the ones observed in our experiment, with allocations that have a
larger range of possible benefits, or with different lotteries. Then, under asymmetric
information overall support may not be larger than for each value of b. In general,
it would be interesting to see under which conditions asymmetric information has a
positive, neutral, or even negative effect on efficiency.
Secondly, in our setting subjects knew the lottery that determined the benefit
level. In many decisions in the field this is not very plausible; subjects will rather
face ambiguity. Therefore, it could also be interesting to investigate how subjects
behave when the outcomes or its likelihood are ambiguous.
Another direction would be to explore how asymmetric information affects prosocial
behavior in settings closer to actual reform situations. In our experiment, for instance,
a next step would be to include strategic interaction, where not only A makes a decision
but also B and eventually groups of subjects that will vote on the transfer. First, it
could be interesting to analyze the role of different majority thresholds on individual
behavior and whether subjects behave more or less prosocially compared to the dictator
case. Secondly, one could also test whether the efficiency concern is affected by the game
itself and whether other distributional (or selfish) concerns become more important.
Thirdly, in contrast to the present setting where there is no interaction, with strategic
interaction intentions of behavior may become more important.
Social preference theories can help to understand when people support certain
reform proposals and when they do not. In experimental but also in theoretical work
the focus has been on providing evidence and finding explanations for the observed
deviations from selfish behavior. If we want to take these valuable insights further,
there are important questions which need to be addressed.
One fundamental problem is how social preferences should be taken into consider-
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ation when designing public policy. How do we evaluate allocations when individuals
care not only about their own but also about others’ payoffs? As Bergstrom (2006)26
points out, even under complete information and in very simple examples regarding the
implementation of a public project the aggregation of social preferences is not trivial.
And this issue becomes even more problematic once we allow for alternative motives
of prosocial behavior, such as paternalistic preferences or image concerns, or, as we
emphasized throughout this chapter, when we allow for private information.
26See also the references therein.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics
Figure A.1: Percentage of Individuals Satisfied with Democracy over Time (Weighted)
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A.2 Additional Results
Table A.4: Order of Inclusion of Macro Variables Does Not Matter
dependent:
SWD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0054 0.0068 0.0013 0.0056 0.0006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
growth 0.0141*** 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 0.0106*** 0.0106***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
f(inflation) 0.0001 -0.0049 -0.0054 -0.0184
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.012)
UE rate -0.0175*** -0.0171*** -0.0162*** -0.0175***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ind. controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
survey FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
nation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 607486 607486 602545 606504 606504 602545 606504 602545 602545
R2 0.1382 0.1364 0.142 0.1388 0.1373 0.1421 0.1388 0.143 0.1433
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
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Table A.5: Impact of Macroeconomic and Individual Level Variables on SWD (Individual Data)
- Logit
dependent:
SWD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0092* 0.0076 0.0078 0.0014 0.0014 0.0016 0.0057 0.0057
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
growth 0.0145*** 0.0145*** 0.0121*** 0.0116*** 0.0126*** 0.0069* 0.0069*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
f(inflation) -0.0056 -0.0214 -0.0235 -0.0214 -0.0384 -0.0385
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024)
UE rate -0.0199*** -0.0215*** -0.0208*** -0.0197*** -0.0198***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
individual variables
unemployed -0.0589*** -0.0587*** -0.0589*** -0.0551*** -0.1178*** -0.1216*** -0.0476*** -0.0420***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
out of LF -0.0020 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0046 -0.0057 -0.0017 0.0020
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
married 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0011 0.0286*** 0.0295*** -0.0003 -0.0047
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
male 0.0081* 0.0080* 0.0080* 0.0080* 0.0038 0.0036 0.0074 0.0074
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
age -0.0027*** -0.0027*** -0.0027*** -0.0028*** -0.0054*** -0.0057*** -0.0029*** -0.0030***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age2 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
intermediate ed-
ucation
0.0104 0.0107 0.0107 0.0100 0.0233*** 0.0235*** -0.0188 -0.0113
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.018)
higher education 0.0312* 0.0317* 0.0317* 0.0306* 0.0557*** 0.0556*** -0.0104 -0.0067
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
still studying 0.0331** 0.0339** 0.0338** 0.0327** 0.0649*** 0.0652*** -0.0005 -0.0004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007)
not at all satis-
fied
-0.3680*** -0.3669*** -0.3669*** -0.3652*** -0.3823*** -0.3802***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
not very satisfied -0.2650*** -0.2649*** -0.2649*** -0.2637*** -0.2868*** -0.2849***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
very satisfied 0.0855*** 0.0854*** 0.0854*** 0.0853*** 0.0911*** 0.0896***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
poor -0.0116*
(0.007)
rich 0.0166***
(0.006)
survey FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
nation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 606504 606504 606504 602545 660546 602545 353132 353132
Pseudo R2 0.1057 0.1069 0.1069 0.1106 0.0737 0.0732 0.1159 0.1161
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Marginal effects. When independent variable is a dummy, discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(4) is the reference for robustness checks. In (5) we restrict attention to the subsample were life satisfaction is available but do
not include it. In (6) we exclude life satisfaction from the estimation. (7) is estimated on the reduced sample where income is
available, (8) controls for income groups.
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Table A.6: Lagged Growth and Endogeneity - Logit
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0014 0.0011 0.0026 0.0023 0.0009 0.0010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
growtht 0.0121*** 0.0110*** 0.0064** 0.0053* 0.0046* 0.0048**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
growtht−1 0.0030 0.0029 -0.0006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
growtht+1 0.0118*** 0.0116*** 0.0068*** 0.0068***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
f(inflation) -0.0214 -0.0221 -0.0249* -0.0255* -0.0163 -0.0162
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
UE rate -0.0199*** -0.0195*** -0.0201*** -0.0197*** -0.0068*** -0.0068***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
SWDc,t−1 0.6426*** 0.6436***
(0.069) (0.069)
ind. controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
survey FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 602545 602545 592075 592075 546239 546239
Pseudo R2 0.1106 0.1106 0.1111 0.1111 0.1158 0.1158
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Marginal effects. When independent variable is a dummy, discrete change of dummy variable from
0 to 1.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(1) is the reference estimation from table A.5, column (4).
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Table A.8: Sample Restrictions:
(1) 1973-2006, (2) 1973-2008
dependent: SWD (1) (2)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0029 0.0023
(0.003) (0.003)
growth 0.0089** 0.0091**
(0.004) (0.004)
f(inflation) -0.0322* -0.0313*
(0.017) (0.017)
UE rate -0.0167*** -0.0169***
(0.002) (0.002)
ind. controls yes yes
survey FE yes yes
nation FE yes yes
N 561582 576656
R2 0.1438 0.01442
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering
at nation level.
Table A.9: Impact of Macroeconomic Variables on
Average SWD Scores (Country Panel)
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per head 0.0060** 0.0042* 0.0043* 0.0021
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
growth 0.0214*** 0.0215*** 0.0136***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
f(inflation) -0.0001 -0.0076***
(0.003) (0.003)
UE rate -0.0331***
(0.003)
survey FE yes yes yes yes
country FE yes yes yes yes
N 483 483 482 476
R2 0.7596 0.7716 0.7716 0.8220
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is the average of the SWD scores in a given
country.
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Table A.10: Results Including Time Trends
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0010 -0.0053 0.0010 0.0011
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
growth 0.0105*** 0.0108*** 0.0105*** 0.0063***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
f(inflation) -0.0188 -0.0232* -0.0188 -0.0173
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
UE rate -0.0172*** -0.0155*** -0.0172*** -0.0145***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
time - time trend - survey year FE
time 0.0030
(0.002)
country specific time trend no yes no no
ind. controls yes yes yes yes
survey FE yes yes yes yes
nation FE yes yes yes yes
N 602545 602545 602545 602545
R2 0.1433 0.1486 0.1433 0.1397
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(1) is the reference estimation from table 2.1, column (4).
Table A.11: Influence of Institutional Quality: Polity IV Index and Freedomhouse
Data
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (2) (4) (5) (6)
gdphead 0.0010 0.0001 0.0006 0.0023 0.0023 0.0022 0.0023
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
growth 0.0105*** 0.0121*** 0.0109*** 0.0091** 0.0091** 0.0092** 0.0091**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
loginf -0.0188 -0.0156 -0.0182 -0.0313* -0.0313* -0.0321* -0.0313*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
uerate -0.0172*** -0.0164*** -0.0164*** -0.0169*** -0.0169*** -0.0167*** -0.0169***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
institutional quality
polity4 -0.0284
(0.035)
freedomstatus 0.0000
(0.000)
polrights 0.0245
(0.058)
civillib -0.0021
(0.016)
ind. controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
survey FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
nation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 602545 546751 602545 576656 576656 576656 576656
R2 0.1433 0.1433 0.1435 0.1443 0.1443 0.1443 0.1443
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(1) is the reference estimation from Table 2.1, column 4. (2) is estimated on the reduced sample for which the
polity IV index is equal to its highest value 10. (3) is estimated on the subsample where the freedomhouse data
is available, i.e., years 2009 and 2010 are dropped. (4), (5), and (6) control for the indicators ‘freedom status’
(1=free, .5=partly free, 0=not free), ‘political rights’, and ‘civil liberties’ respectively. ‘Political rights’ and ‘civil
liberties’ are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of Freedom and seven the
lowest.
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Table A.12: Impact of Policy Variables
dependent: SWD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
macroeconomic variables
GDP per head 0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0038 -0.0013 -0.0002 0.0045 0.0038
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
growth 0.0105*** 0.0070* 0.0079*** 0.0070** 0.0068* 0.0062 0.0054
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
f(inflation) -0.0188 -0.0460*** -0.0468*** -0.0462*** -0.0456*** -0.0508** -0.0536**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019)
UE rate -0.0172*** -0.0184*** -0.0159*** -0.0186*** -0.0189*** -0.0184*** -0.0162***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
policy variables
debt -0.0007
(0.001)
deficit -0.0008
(0.003)
elderly 0.0060
(0.012)
sstran -0.0043
(0.003)
ind. controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
survey FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
nation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 602545 522403 522403 522403 522403 395936 395936
R2 0.1433 0.1496 0.1498 0.1497 0.1497 0.1553 0.1554
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at nation level.
(1) is the reference estimation from table 2.1, column (4). (2) is estimated on reduced sample where debt, deficit,
and elderly is available. (6) is estimated on reduced sample where debt, deficit, elderly, and sstran is available.
The variables debt, deficit and elderly are available until 2008, sstran only until 2000.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.1: Agents’ Behavior by Matching
Within-Group Matching
mean sd median min max N
Transfer if Control=0 6.140625 5.811503 6 0 24 64
Transfer if Control=1 4.90625 5.764475 4 1 24 64
Agent’s Belief (Control=1) .265625 .4451569 0 0 1 64
Between-Group Matching
mean sd median min max
Transfer if Control=0 3.46875 3.771105 2 0 18 64
Transfer if Control=1 2.515625 2.63669 1 1 15 64
Agent’s Belief (Control=1) .671875 .4732424 1 0 1 64
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Table B.2: Principals’ Behavior by Matching
Within-Group Matching
mean sd median min max N
Decision (Control=1) .1875 .3933979 0 0 1 64
Between-Group Matching
mean sd median min max N
Decision (Control=1) .375 .48795 0 0 1 64
B.2 Derivation of Equation 3.1
The crowding out effect for matching m is:
Πm = −sm(t = 0) + sm(t > 1) [bmpi(m, c) + (1− bm)pi(m,n)] (B.1)
Using pi(w, c) = κ and pi(w, n) = κ+ γ, we get in a within group matching:
Πw = −sw(t = 0) + sw(t > 1) [bwpi(w, c) + (1− bw)pi(w, n)]
= −sw(t = 0) + sw(t > 1) [bwκ+ (1− bw)(κ+ γ)]
= −sw(t = 0) + sw(t > 1) [κ+ (1− bw)γ] (B.2)
Using pi(b, c) = κ+ δ and pi(b, n) = κ+ γ+ δ, we can derive the crowding out effect
in a between group matching:
Πb = −sb(t = 0) + sb(t > 1) [bbpi(b, c) + (1− bb)pi(b, n)]
= −sb(t = 0) + sb(t > 1) [bb(κ+ δ) + (1− bb)(κ+ δ + γ)]
= −sb(t = 0) + sb(t > 1) [κ+ δ + (1− bb)γ] (B.3)
Lastly, substracting B.3 from B.2 yields
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Πw − Πb = (sb(t = 0)− sw(t = 0)) + [sw(t > 1)− sb(t > 1)]κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prosocial Effect
(B.4)
+ [sw(t > 1)(1− bw)− sb(t > 1)(1− bb)] γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trust Effect
− sb(t > 1)δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hostility Effect
B.3 Calibration of the Model
We now turn to the decomposition of the diff-in-diff as described in section 3.4. In
Table B.3, we regressed the individual crowding out on agent’s beliefs and matching
for agents who transfer more than 1 under no control. This allows us to identify κ, γ,
and δ. The regression (see Table B.3) delivers the following parameter values:
• pi(w, c) = κ=2.71-1.41-0.8=0.5
• pi(w, n) = κ+ γ =2.71-0.8=1.91
• pi(b, c) = κ+ δ =2.71-1.41=1.3
• pi(b, n) = κ+ δ + γ =2.71
Hence, γ = 1.41 and δ = 0.8. From above we already have sb(t = 0) = 0.28, sb(t >
1) = 0.66, sw(t = 0) = 0.12, sw(t > 1) = 0.86, bb = 0.57 bw = 0.18. Using these
parameters, we get for the decomposition of the diff-in-diff:
Πw − Πb = (sb(t = 0)− sw(t = 0)) + [sw(t > 1)− sb(t > 1)]κ+
[sw(t > 1)(1− bw)− sb(t > 1)(1− bb)] γ − sb(t > 1)δ
= 0.16 + (0.86− 0.66) · 0.5 + (0.86 · 0.82− 0.66 · 0.43) · 1.4− 0.66 · 0.8
=0.26 (Prosocial Effect) + 0.59 (Trust Effect) - 0.52 (Hostility Effect)
= 0.33
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Table B.3: Crowding Out of Agents’ Transfers
Dependent Variable: Diff (1)
Within-group matching (=1) -0.806*
(0.460)
Agent’s Belief (Control=1) -1.419***
(0.500)
Constant 2.716***
(0.558)
N 97
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Table
reports results of OLS regression. Dependent
variable is the individual difference between transfers
under control and under no control. We restrict the
sample to agents that transfer more than 1 when not
being controlled. Standard errors are clustered at
the individual level.
Level of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
B.4 Robustness
Dictator Game In this section, we provide regression results of our baseline
estimations (see Table 3.1 and Table 3.2) separately for No-Dictator and Dictator
Treatments.
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Table B.5: Agents’ Crowding Out - No-Dictator and Dictator Treatment
Dependent Variable: Diff (1) (2) (3)
Within-group matching (=1) -0.806* -0.807* -0.893
(0.460) (0.409) (0.842)
Agent’s Belief (Control=1) -1.419*** -0.907* -2.040**
(0.500) (0.478) (0.840)
Constant 2.716*** 2.086*** 3.474***
(0.558) (0.455) (1.007)
Transfer (Control=0) no no no
[Transfer (Control=0)]2 no no no
N 97 48 49
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All columns report results of
OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the individual difference between
transfers under no control and under control. We restrict the sample
to agents that transfer more than 1 point when not being controlled.
Column 1 is the baseline estimation including the full sample. Column
2 is the estimation restricted to the No-Dictator sample and Column 3
is the estimation restricted to the Dictator sample. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level.
Level of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Notes: The figure depicts average individual beliefs about being
controlled as a function of matching.
Figure B.1: Average Beliefs about Principal’s Decision to Control - Full Sample
Full Sample In this section, we reproduce our estimation of Table 3.2 including the
full sample. That is, also subjects who exhibit a transfer of zero or one when not
being controlled are now included in the estimation. Clearly, from our discussion of
the behavioral model in Section 3.4 this inclusion is not adequate in the light of our
proposed explanation of crowding out. By definition, we can only observe crowding out
when subjects transfer more than 1 point.1 Moreover, trust as well as hostility can only
play a role for subjects for whom we observe crowding out. Nevertheless, we present
these results here to show the robustness of our estimations and graphs presented in
the main text.
Comparing Table B.6 to Table 3.2, it becomes evident that results are very similar.
The only difference appears in specification (1): When the full sample is included, the
coefficient of the matching dummy (Within-group matching (=1)) changes to -0.4 and is
not significant anymore. Once we control for the transfer, the size as well as significance
1For subjects who transfer zero when not being controlled crowding out can actually be negative
as those subjects are pushed to a transfer of at least one. That is also why, when we control for agents
who believe to be controlled in a within-group matching, we observe aggregate crowding out of zero
(Figure B.2).
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Notes: The figure depicts average crowding out, i.e., transfers under
no control - transfers under control, as a function of agents’s beliefs
and matching.
Figure B.2: Average Crowding Out Depending on Agents’ Beliefs and Matching - Full
Sample
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of this coefficient is restored. The difference is to be expected as in a between-group
matching a disproportional share of subjects transfers zero or one thereby exhibiting
no or even negative crowding out. This obviously upwards biases the estimator of the
matching dummy.
Table B.6: Agents’ Crowding Out - All Subjects
Dependent Variable: Diff Diff Diff Fraction Fraction Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Within-group matching (=1) -0.421 -0.773* -0.801** -0.153*** -0.145** -0.148**
(0.396) (0.395) (0.393) (0.0530) (0.0596) (0.0594)
Agent’s Belief (Control=1) -1.729*** -1.467*** -0.965*** -0.214** -0.215*** -0.195**
(0.454) (0.397) (0.352) (0.0804) (0.0804) (0.0796)
Transfer (Control=0) no yes yes no yes yes
[Transfer (Control=0)]2 no no yes no no yes
N 128 128 128 102 102 102
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All columns report results
of OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the individual difference
between transfers under control and under no control. Standard errors
are clustered at the individual level.
Level of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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B.5 Instructions
p 1 
This is the English translation of the instructions (original in German). Instructions of part I were 
displayed directly on screen; instructions of part II were handed out. Beginning at the 11
th
 screen, 
the participant had a banner displaying the group she belonged to at the top of every screen, which 
is not displayed here. The instructions of part I are based on the instructions of Chen and Li (2009). 
The instructions of part II are based on the instructions of Falk and Kosfeld (2006).  
 
Part I  
 
[1
st
 screen] 
 
You are now participating in an economic experiment. The income you can earn in the course 
of this experiment depends on your decisions and the other participants‘ decisions. The 
experiment consists of two parts and <no of participants> persons take part. 
 
During the experiment, your income will be denoted in points. Your final income consists of 
the income you earn in the two parts of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will 
be paid out in cash. Please note that: 
 
2 points = 1 € . 
 
All decisions will be made anonymously. At the end of the experiment, each participant will 
be paid out in private. 
 
If you have any questions, please ask for assistance. Your question will be answered at your 
workplace. Please do not talk to any of the other participants during the experiment.  
 
[2
nd
 screen] 
 
In Part 1 everyone will be shown 5 pairs of paintings by two artists. The paintings were 
created by two distinct painters. Each pair of paintings consists of one painting being made by 
each artist. For each pair, please choose the painting you prefer. According to the paintings 
you and the other participants choose, you (and the other participants) will be classified into 
two equally large groups.  
 
The participants you are grouped with will be the same for the rest of the experiment. 
 
After Part 1 has finished, you will be given further instructions.  
 
[3
rd
 screen] 
 
Now, please choose which painting you prefer by clicking on one of the buttons.  
 
After everyone has submitted answers, you will be privately informed of which group you are 
in.  
 
[4
th
 to 9
th
 screen] 
 
Pair #: Please select which painting you prefer 
 
<Picture 1>  <Picture 2> 
 
I prefer this painting      I prefer this painting 
[10
th
 screen] 
p 2 
 
You are assigned to the < "Kandinsky" - "Klee" >  group. 
 
The number of people in your own group is  <Number of Group Members> .  
 
[11
th
 screen] 
 
You will now receive two more paintings (painting #6 and #7) and 3 skill questions.  Please 
select the artist who you think created the paintings and answer the skill questions as best as 
you can, respectively. The correct answers of a group will be summed up and divided by the 
number of group members. The group which achieves the highest average will receive a prize 
of 16 points per group member. That is, each member of this group will receive an additional 
payment of 16 points at the end of the experiment. The other group obtains no payment.  
 
In the case of a tie, the computer will randomly determine one group which receives the prize. 
 
You will be informed of which group received the prize at the end of the experiment. 
 
 
Meanwhile, you can use a group chat program to get help from or offer help to other members 
in your own group.  Except for the following restrictions, you can type whatever you want in 
the lower box of the chat program. Messages will be shared among all the members from your 
own group. You will not be able to see the messages exchanged among the other group.  
People in the other group will not see the messages from your own group either.      
 
Restrictions on messages  
  1. Please do not identify yourself or send any information that could be used to identify you 
(e.g. age, subject, sex, etc.).   
  2. Please refrain from using obscene or offensive language.  
 
[12
th
 screen] 
 
<Picture 6> This painting is by <“Klee“> is by <“Kandinsky“> 
<Picture 7> This painting is by <“Klee“> is by <“Kandinsky“> 
 
Type your comments below then press Enter 
 
 
<Chat Box> 
 
[13
th
 screen] 
 
Question 1: What was the inflation rate in Germany in 2010 (in %)?  
Question 2: What was the budget of the German Department of Defense in 2007 (in Million 
EUR)? 
Question 3: How many members does the current federal cabinet of Germany (as of June 
2011) have?  
 
Answer 1: The inflation in Germany in 2010 was a) 1.1 %  b) 1.8 % c)  2.1 % 
Answer 2: The federal budget was a) 24 519  b) 27 578  c) 31 560 
Answer 3: The current cabinet comprises (June 2011) the following number of members  
a) 13  b) 16 c)  17 
p 3 
 
 
Type your comments below then press Enter 
 
<Chat Box> 
 
[14
th
 screen] 
 
You have finished part I of the experiment. As soon as all participants have completed part I, 
the experiment continues. 
 
p 1 
Part II 
 
This part of the experiment comprises two rounds. You can earn points in both rounds. As 
before it holds that:  
 
 
 
2 points = 1 Euro 
 
 
 
Your final income in part II will be determined by one of these rounds.  The round 
determining your income will be randomly drawn by the computer at the end of the 
experiment. It is the same round for each participant.  
 
 
At the beginning of part II, the computer will randomly draw each participant either as 
participant A or as participant B. This assignment will be kept the same during part II. 
That is, a participant is either participant A or participant B during the two rounds. 
 
In both rounds, two participants A and B are randomly associated.  
 
In the second round, each participant A will be associated with another participant B than in 
the first round. 
 
Hence, the association is such that the same participants A and B will never be associated 
twice.  
 
No participant knows with whom he is associated meaning that all decisions are made 
anonymously. Yet, each participant knows the group membership of the participant he is 
associated with. 
 
 
At the beginning of each round, participant A receives an amount of 24 points. Participant B 
receives no points. 
 
 
Participant A's decision: 
Participant A can decide how many points he wants to transfer to participant B. The 
experimenter triples each point which A transfers to B. Thus, each point which A transfers to 
B reduces A's income by one point and increases B's income by three points. 
 
The formula for calculating income is as follows: 
 
 
Participant A's income: 24 - transfer  
 
 
Participant B's income: 0 + 3*transfer 
 
 
p 2 
 
 
The following examples will clarify the income formulas: 
 
Example 1: A transfers 0 points to B. The incomes are then 24 for A and 0 for B. 
Example 2: A transfers 4 points to B. The incomes are then 20 for A and 12 for B. 
Example 3: A transfers 16 points to B. The incomes are then 8 for A and 48 for B. 
 
 
 
Participant B's decision: 
 
Before A decides how many points he wishes to transfer to B, B can determine a minimum 
transfer. In particular, B can constrain his associated participant A to transfer him at least 1 
point. However, he can also decide not to limit participant A and thus leave his transfer 
decision completely free. 
 
Therefore, there are two cases: 
Case 1: Participant B constrains participant A to transfer at least 1 point to him. In this case, 
participant A can transfer any (integer) amount between 1 and 24 to B. 
Case 2: Participant B allows participant A to decide on his transfer freely and does not 
constrain him to transfer at least 1 point to him. In this case, participant A can transfer any 
(integer) amount between 0 and 24 to B. 
 
Therefore, the experiment consists of two stages: 
 
Stage 1: 
In stage 1, B decides if he will constrain A to transfer at least 1 point to him, or if he will 
allow A to decide freely. 
Stage 2: 
In stage 2, A decides which amount he will transfer to B. This amount lies 
 between 1 and 24, if B constrains A to transfer at least 1 point; 
or 
 between 0 and 24, if B does not constrain A to transfer at least 1 point. 
 
The round is completed as soon as A has decided how many points he will transfer to B. 
 
 
 
A and B will make their entries with the help of a computer monitor. 
 
p 3 
Please note: Participant A must decide which amount he will transfer to B before he knows 
whether or not B will constrain him to transfer at least 1 point. This means that A has to 
make two decisions. A can make his entries with the help of this monitor: 
 
 
 
Therefore, A indicates how many points he transfers to B when B constrains him to transfer at 
least 1 point (case 1) and how many points he will transfer when he is free to decide (case 2). 
 
Which of the decisions is relevant for A depends on what B decides. If he constrains A to 
transfer at least 1 point, the decision A gives under case 1 applies. If he leaves A free in his 
decision, the point amount which A indicates under case 2 applies. 
 
 
A final income monitor will inform you of the randomly drawn round and the resulting 
incomes. 
 
At the end of the experiment, your point income of the randomly drawn round will be 
converted to EUR.  This amount will be paid out to you in cash. If you belong to the group 
which won the prize in the first part of the experiment, you will be paid out this prize in 
addition.  
 
 
Do you have any questions?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please solve the following control questions. They have no consequence on your income and 
only serve to check if all participants in the experiment have understood the rules. 
p 4 
 
Question 1: Assume that participant B allows A to decide freely. A transfers 4 points. What 
are the incomes? 
 Income for A: 
 Income for B: 
  
Question 2: Assume that participant B constrains A to transfer at least 1 point. A transfers 1 
point. What are the incomes? 
 Income for A: 
 Income for B: 
 
Question 3: Assume that participant B allows A to decide freely. A transfers 0 points. What 
are the incomes? 
      Income for A: 
      Income for B: 
 
Please raise your hand when you have solved the control questions. 
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Descriptive Statistics
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Table C.1: Dictators’ Transfer Decisions - Summary Statistics Baseline Sessions
Mean Standard Deviation Median
1st Part
Transfer (=1) .3555556 .4840903 0
2nd Part (with reward)
Transfer (=1) .4 .4954337 0
3rd Part (with reward)
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .2444444 .4346135 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .2222222 .4204375 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .2222222 .4204375 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .2666667 .4472136 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .3333333 .4767313 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .3333333 .4767313 0
4th Part
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .1777778 .3866458 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .1777778 .3866458 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .1777778 .3866458 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .2444444 .4346135 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .2666667 .4472136 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .3111111 .4681794 0
N = 45
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Table C.2: Dictators’ Transfer Decisions - Summary Statistics Robustness Sessions
Mean Standard Deviation Median
2nd Part
Transfer (=1) .2333333 .4301831 0
4th Part (with reward)
Transfer (=1) .2 .4068381 0
1st Part
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .2666667 .4497764 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .2333333 .4301831 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .2 .4068381 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .2666667 .4497764 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .2666667 .4497764 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .2333333 .4301831 0
3rd Part (with reward)
Benefit=25: Transfer (=1) .2333333 .4301831 0
Benefit=30: Transfer (=1) .1666667 .379049 0
Benefit=40: Transfer (=1) .1 .3051286 0
Benefit=50: Transfer (=1) .1666667 .379049 0
Benefit=60: Transfer (=1) .1666667 .379049 0
Benefit=70: Transfer (=1) .2333333 .4301831 0
N = 30
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C.2 Derivations Section 4.4
In this section, we show under which parameter constellations individuals are willing
to transfer with efficiency concern, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion.
Moreover, we derive the conditions that allow us to formulate Hypotheses 2 and 3.
C.2.1 Symmetric Information - Efficiency Concern and
Maximin Preferences
Efficiency Concern Given his individual parameter λi and the value of b, player i
will transfer if
U iA(80, 50 + b) > U
i
A(100, 50)⇔ λi >
20
b
. (C.1)
Given λi, i will transfer at least for b = 70 if λi > 2
7
. If λi > 4
5
holds, then individual i
will transfer for all values of b in our experiment. For 2
7
< λi < 4
5
let b∗ denote the
lowest value of b for which i is willing to transfer. Individual i will transfer for b∗ and
all values of b with b > b∗. If, however, λi < 2
7
holds, then i does not weight the
efficiency gain highly enough for any b in the experiment that the possible values of b
suffice to compensate individual i for his own payoff loss. In that case i will never
transfer. Hence, subjects with an efficiency concern should exhibit the following
transfer pattern: Either they do not transfer at all, or they transfer for a particular
value of b∗ and all values b > b∗.
Maximin Preferences Subjects with maximin preferences will transfer the 20
points if it holds that:
U iA(80, 50 + b) > U
i
A(100, 50)
(1− λi)80 + λi min [80, 50 + b] > 100− λi50
λi(min [80, 50 + b]− 30) > 20
λi >
20
(min [80, 50 + b]− 30)
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If λi > 2
5
, i will transfer to achieve a more equal allocation for values of b ≥ 30. If
λi > 20
45
, i will also transfer for b = 25. If, however, λi < 2
5
, i will not transfer as
selfishness motives dominate.
C.2.2 Symmetric Information - Inequality Aversion
In this section, we derive what transfer patterns we should observe for inequality
aversion. To begin with, note that it holds that
UA(80, 80) > UA(80, 75) > UA(80, 90) > UA(80, 100) for all parameters as one can
directly see from the following equations (and using that αi ≥ βi):
UA(80, 80) = 80
UA(80, 75) = 80− 5βi
UA(80, 90) = 80− 10αi
UA(80, 100) = 80− 20αi
Hence, whenever an individual is willing to transfer for b = 50, he will be willing to
transfer for values of b < 50 as well. Next, we show that there actually exist
parameters such that subjects may transfer for b = 50.
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UA(80, 100) > UA(100, 50)⇔
80− 20αi > 100− 50βi ⇔
50βi − 20αi > 20⇔
50βi − 20 > 20αi ⇔
5
2
βi − 1 > αi ⇒
5
2
βi − 1 > αi ≥ βi ⇒
5
2
βi − 1 > βi ⇔
3
2
βi > 1⇔
βi >
2
3
For values of b > 50, however, no parameters exist such that individuals will transfer.
Suppose UA(80, 110) > UA(100, 50) held, then
UA(80, 110) > UA(100, 50)⇔
80− 30αi > 100− 50βi ⇔
50βi − 30αi > 20⇔
50βi − 20 > 30αi ⇔
5
3
βi − 2
3
> αi ⇒
5
3
βi − 2
3
> αi ≥ βi ⇒
2
3
βi >
2
3
⇔
βi > 1
Yet, by assumption βi < 1. Thus, for b = 60 no admissible parameters exists, such
that a transfer makes an individual better off.
128
C.2.3 Asymmetric Information
Inequality Aversion We will proceed as follows. We will show it always holds that
the utility from transferring under asymmetric information
E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) is smaller than the utility from transferring for
b = 40 but larger than for b = 50 under symmetric information, that is, it holds that
UA(80, 90) > E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) > UA(80, 100). Hence, if it holds that
player i transfers for b = 50, i.e., UA(80, 100) > UA(100, 50), then it also holds that
E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) > UA(100, 50). Thus, a transfer for b = 50 then
implies that a player should transfer under asymmetric information. On the other
hand, if player i does not transfer for b = 40, i.e., UA(80, 90) < UA(100, 50), it implies
that E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) < UA(100, 50) and therefore a player will also
not transfer under asymmetric information.
For αi, βi > 0 consider:
UA(80, 90)− E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) =
80− 10αi −
(
80− 1
6
[
5βi + 100αi
])
=
−10αi + 5
6
βi +
100
6
αi =
40
6
αi +
5
6
βi > 0
And lastly, as βi ≤ αi:
E(UA(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES)− UA(80, 100) =
80− 1
6
[
5βi + 100αi
]− [80− 20αi] =
−5
6
βi +
20
6
αi > 0
Efficiency Concern For efficiency concern, it holds that an individual i who
transfers for b = 40 should transfer under asymmetric information. However, an
individual who does not transfer for b = 50, should not transfer under asymmetric
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information. The argument is analogous to the inequality aversion case. First, note
that it holds that U(80, 100) > E(U(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES) > U(80, 90) (for
λi > 0).
E(U(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES)− U(80, 90) =
(1− λi)80 + 1
6
λi [155 + 160 + 170 + 180 + 190 + 200]− [(1− λi)80 + λi(170)] =
80− 80λi + 1055
6
λi − [80 + 90λi] =
80 +
575
6
λi − [80 + 90λi] =
35
6
λi > 0
E(U(piA, piB)|transfer = Y ES)− U(80, 100) =
80 +
575
6
λi − [80 + 100λi] =
−25
6
λi < 0
So, if it holds that i transfers for b = 40, i.e., U(80, 90) > U(100, 50) which is fulfilled
for λi > 1
2
, then i will also transfer under asymmetric information. On the other
hand, if it holds that i does not transfer for b = 50, i.e., U(80, 100) < U(100, 50)
which holds for λi < 2
5
, i will not transfer under asymmetric information.
C.3 Instructions
The original instructions were in German. In the following, we provide an English
version.
  
 
 
 
 
General Instructions for Participants 
 
 
You are now participating in an economic experiment. Please, read the following instruction 
carefully. It explains everything what you need to know for the participation in the 
experiment. If you have any question, please, just raise your hand. Your question will be 
answered at your workplace. Apart from that, any sort of communication during the 
experiment is forbidden. If you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the experiment 
and will not receive any payment. 
 
The experiment consists of four parts. You obtain a separate instruction for each part. 
 
In all four parts you can earn points. It holds that:  
 
 
10 Points = 1 Euro 
 
 
 
Your final payment will be determined by the payment earned in one out of the four parts 
comprising the experiment. At the end of the experiment, the experimenter draws from an 
urn. The draw will determine one out of the four parts for all participants. You will receive 
the payment which you earned for this part in cash. 
 
After each part you will be informed how many points you earned for this part. You obtain no 
information concerning the earnings of other participants. 
 
The Experiment 
 
 
The computer randomly assigns either the role of Participant A or Participant B to each 
participant. At the beginning of the experiment, your computer will inform you whether you 
are Participant A or Participant B. 
 
 
This assignment does not change during the experiment. Each participant will stay 
either Participant A or Participant B during all four parts of the experiment. 
 
In all four parts two participants, A and B, are randomly assigned to each other. 
 
In each part of the experiment, another Participant B is assigned to a participant A. As a 
result, the same two participants will never be assigned to each other more than once.  
 
No participant knows whom he is assigned to. That means all decisions are anonymous. 
 
 
 
Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. The experimenter will answer your 
question at your workplace. 
 
Please, read the instruction for part 1 of the experiment on the next pages. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
You obtain the instructions for parts 2 to 4 at the beginning of the respective part. 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 1 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
 
The exact value of b is determined before the start of the actual experiment: the experimenter 
draws one ball from an urn.  
The urn contains the following balls, each represents one value of b: 
1 ball with b=25, 1 ball with b=30, 1 ball with b=40,  
1 ball with b=50, 1 ball with b=60, 1 ball with b=70 
Participant B will be informed on his screen which ball has been drawn. Participant A 
however, will not be informed about the exact value of b. 
 
 
 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
 
In contrast to Participant A, Participant B is informed about the exact value of b at the 
beginning of part 1. 
 
Participant B makes no decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Please, answer the following control questions. These question do not influence your 
payments and only serve to check if all participants understood the rules of the experiment 
correctly. 
 
 
Question 1. Assume that Participant A decides to spend 20 points. What will be the payoffs if 
the ball with b = 30 is drawn? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
Question 2. Assume that Participant A decides not to spend 20 points. What will be the 
payoffs if the ball with b = 50 is drawn? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
 
After you have answered the questions, please, raise your hand. The experimenter will check 
your answers at your workplace. When all the participants are ready, we start with the actual 
experiment. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 2 
 
 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
 
The exact value of b is determined before the start of the actual experiment: the experimenter 
draws one ball from an urn.  
The urn contains the following balls, each represents one value of b: 
1 ball with b=25, 1 ball with b=30, 1 ball with b=40,  
1 ball with b=50, 1 ball with b=60, 1 ball with b=70 
Participant B will be informed on his screen which ball has been drawn. Participant A 
however, will not be informed about the exact value of b. 
 
If A decides to spend 20 points, he obtains a reward - r points. It holds that 5 points ≤ r ≤ 10 
points. The exact value of r will be determined after b is determined. Participant A will be 
informed about the value of r on his display. 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
 
In contrast to Participant A, Participant B is informed about the exact value of b at the 
beginning of part 1. Participant B will be informed about the value of r on his display. 
 
Participant B makes no decisions. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 3 
 
 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
b can obtain different values. A has to make a decision for each of the following cases: 
 
1. b = 25 
2. b = 30 
3. b = 40 
4. b = 50 
5. b = 60 
6. b = 70 
In the end of part 3, the experimentator draws one ball from the urn, which will determine the 
decision problem, relevant for the payoff in this part of the experiment. 
If A decides to spend 20 points, he obtains a reward - r points. It holds that 5 points ≤ r ≤ 10 
points. Participant A will be informed about the value of r on his display. 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
Participant B makes no decisions. Participant B will be informed about the value of r on his 
display. 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Please, answer the following control questions. These question do not influence your 
payments and only serve to check if all participants understood the rules of the experiment 
correctly. 
 
 
Question 1. Assume that Participant A decides to spend 20 points. What will be the payoffs in 
the case (1)? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
Question 2. Assume that Participant A decides not to spend 20 points. What will be the 
payoffs in the case (4)? 
Payoff for A: 
Payoff for B: 
 
 
After you have answered the questions, please, raise your hand. The experimenter will check 
your answers at your workplace.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 4 
 
 
 
Participant A obtains an amount of 100 points. Participant B obtains an amount of 50 points.  
 
 
The Decision of Participant A 
A has to decide if he is ready to spend 20 points in order to increase the payment of B by b 
points. That means instead of the amount of 50 points B obtains the payoff of 50 + b. A can 
spend either 20 points or nothing. 
If A decides not to spend 20 points, both participants obtain their original payoffs: A receives 
100 and B 50 points. 
b can obtain different values. A has to make a decision for each of the following cases: 
1. b = 25 
2. b = 30 
3. b = 40 
4. b = 50 
5. b = 60 
6. b = 70 
In the end of part 3, the experimentator draws one ball from the urn, which will determine the 
decision problem, relevant for the payoff in this part of the experiment. 
 
The Decision of Participant B 
 
Participant B makes no decisions.  
 
 
 
  
Bibliography
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy, 1st ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Akerlof, George and Rachel Kranton, “Identity and the Economics of
Organizations,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2005, 19, 9 – 32.
Allison, Scott T. and David M. Messick, “The Group Attribution Error,” Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 1985, 21 (6), 563–579.
Andreoni, James and B. Douglas Bernheim, “Social Image and the 50-50 Norm:
A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects,” Econometrica, 2009,
77 (5), 1607–1636.
Angrist, Joshua D. and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics.
An Empiricist’s Companion, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2009.
Armingeon, Klaus, Panajotis Potolidis, Marlène Gerber, and Philipp
Leimgruber, “Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2007,” Technical Report,
Institute of Political Science, University of Berne 2009.
Bandiera, Oriana, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul, “Social Connections and
Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data,” Econometrica, 2009,
77 (4), 1047–1094.
, , and , “Social Incentives in the Workplace,” Review of Economic Studies, 04
2010, 77 (2), 417–458.
Bergstrom, Theodore C., “Benefit-Cost in a Benevolent Society,” American
Economic Review, September 2006, 96 (1), 339–351.
138
139
Bernhard, Helen, Ernst Fehr, and Urs Fischbacher, “Group Affiliation and
Altruistic Norm Enforcement,” American Economic Review, 2006, 96 (2), 217–221.
Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Do People Mean What They
Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data,” American Economic Review, Papers
and Proceedings, 2001, 91 (2), 67–72.
Bohnet, Iris and Bruno S. Frey, “Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior
in Dictator Games: Comment,” American Economic Review, 1999, 89 (1), 335–339.
Bolle, Friedel and Philipp E. Otto, “A Price Is a Signal: On Intrinsic Motivation,
Crowding-out, and Crowding-in,” Kyklos, 2010, 63 (1), 9–22.
Bolton, Gary E. and Axel Ockenfels, “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and
Competition,” The American Economic Review, 2000, 90 (1), 166–193.
Bowles, Samuel and Sandra Polanía-Reyes, “Economic Incentives and Social
Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?,” Journal of Economic Literature, June
2012, 50 (2), 368–425.
Bradler, Christiane, “Social Preferences under Risk - An Experimental Analysis,”
Working Paper 09, ZEW Discussion Papers 2009.
Brandts, Jordi and Gary Charness, “The Strategy versus the Direct-Response
Method: A First Survey of Experimental Comparisons,” Experimental Economics,
January 2011, 14 (3), 375–398.
Brennan, Geoffrey, Luis G. González, Werner Güth, and M. Vittoria Levati,
“Attitudes Toward Private and Collective Risk in Individual and Strategic Choice
Situations,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, July 2008, 67 (1), 253–
262.
Brückner, Markus and Hans Peter Grüner, “Economic Growth and the Rise of
Political Extremism: Theory and Evidence,” CEPR Discussion Paper, 2010, (No.
DP7723).
Camerer, Colin, Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press, 2003.
140
Charness, Gary and Matthew Rabin, “Understanding Social Preferences with
Simple Tests,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117 (3), 817–869.
, Luca Rigotti, and Aldo Rustichini, “Individual Behavior and Group
Membership,” American Economic Review, 2007, 97 (4), 1340–52.
, Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Natalia Jiménez, Juan Lacomba, and Francisco
Lagos, “The Hidden Advantages of Delegation: Pareto-Improvements in a Gift-
Exchange Game,” American Economics Review, May 2011, 102 (5), 2358–79.
Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland,
“Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited,” Public Choice, August 2009, 143 (1-2),
67–101.
Chen, Yan and Sherry Xin Li, “Group Identity and Social Preferences,” American
Economic Review, 2009, 99 (1), 431–457.
Clarke, Harold D., Nitish Dutt, and Allan Kornberg, “The Political Economy
of Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies,” The
Journal of Politics, 1993, 55 (4), 998–1021.
Dalton, Russell J., “Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies,” in Pippa
Norris, ed., Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 57–77.
Dana, Jason and Roberto A Weber, “Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room:
Experiments Demonstrating an Illusory Preference,” Economic Theory, 2007, pp. 67–
80.
Deaton, Angus, “Income, Health, and Well-Being Around the World: Evidence from
the Gallup World Poll,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2008, 22 (2), 53–72.
Di Tella, Rafael, Robert J. MacCulloch, and Andrew J. Oswald, “Preferences
Over Inflation and Unemployment: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness,” American
Economic Review, 2001, 91 (1), 335–341.
, , and , “The Macroeconomics of Happiness,” The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 2003, 85 (4), 809–827.
141
Dickinson, David and Marie-Claire Villeval, “Does Monitoring Decrease Work
Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories,” Games
and Economic Behavior, 2008, 63 (1), 56–76.
Donadio, Rachel and Scott Sayare, “Violent Clashes in the Streets of Athens,” The
New York Times (June 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/world/
europe/30athens.html (accessed: July 29, 2011) 2011.
Dreher, Axel and Hannes Öhler, “Does Government Ideology Affect Personal
Happiness? A Test,” Economics Letters, 2011, 111 (2), 161–165.
Dufwenberg, Martin and Astrid Muren, “Generosity, Anonymity, Gender,”
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2006, 61 (1), 42–49.
Easton, David, “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,” World Politics,
1957, 9 (3), 383–400.
Eckel, Catherine C. and Philip J. Grossman, “Altruism in Anonymous Dictator
Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, October 1996, 16 (2), 181–191.
and , “Managing Diversity by Creating Team Identity,” Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 2005, 58 (3), 371–392.
Ellingsen, Tore and Magnus Johannesson, “Pride and Prejudice: The Human
Side of Incentive Theory,” American Economic Review, 2008, 98 (3), 990–1008.
Engel, Christoph, “Dictator Games: A Meta Study,” Experimental Economics,
November 2011, 14 (4), 583–610.
Engelmann, Dirk and Martin Strobel, “Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and
Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments,” Working Paper 2002.
and , “Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple
Distribution Experiments,” American Economic Review, September 2004, 94 (4),
857–869.
and , “Preferences over Income Distributions: Experimental Evidence,” Public
Finance Review, 2007, 35 (2), 285–310.
142
European Commission, Brussels, “Eurobarometer 58.1: The Euro, European
Enlargement, and Financial Services,” GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences:
ZA3693, data et version 1.0.0, GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences,
Cologne, doi:10.4232/1.3693 2002.
, “Eurobarometer 60.1 Citizenship and Sense of Belonging, Fraud, and the European
Parliament,” GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences: ZA3938, data set version
1.0.0, GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Cologne, doi:10.4232/1.
3938 2003.
, “Eurobarometer 62.0 Standard European Union Trend Questions and Sport,”
GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences: ZA4229, data set version, GESIS -
Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Cologne, doi:10.4232/1.4229 2004.
, “Eurobarometer 62.2 Agricultural Policy, Development Aid, Social Capital, and
Information and Communication Technology,” GESIS Data Archive for the Social
Sciences: ZA4231, data set version 1.0.0, GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social
Sciences, Cologne, doi:10.4232/1.4231 2004.
, “Eurobarometer 65.2: The European Constitution, Social and Economic Quality
of Life, Avian Influenza, and Energy Issues,” TNS Opinion & Social, Brussels
[Producer]; GESIS, Cologne [Publisher]: ZA4506, data set version 1.0.0, GESIS
pre-release edition, doi:10.4232/1.4506 2006.
, “Eurobarometer 68.1: The European Parliament and Media Usage, September-
November 2007,” TNS Opinion & Social, Brussels [Producer]; GESIS, Cologne
[Publisher]: ZA4565, data set version 1.0.0, GESIS pre-release edition, doi:10.
4232/1.10126 2007.
, “The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-2002,” Computer file, GESIS
Study ZA3521, 2nd ed. (2.91), Cologne, Germany, doi:10.4232/1.10074 2008.
, “Eurobarometer 72.4 Globalization, Financial and Economic Crisis, Social Change
and Values, EU Policies and Decision Making, and Global Challenges: October-
November 2009,” TNS Opinion & Social, Brussels [Producer]; GESIS, Cologne
143
[Publisher]: ZA4994, data set version 1.0.0, GESIS pre-release edition, doi:10.
4232/1.10236 2009.
, “Eurobarometer 73.4: May 2010,” TNS Opinion & Social, Brussels [Producer];
GESIS, Cologne [Publisher]: ZA5234, data set version 1.0.0, GESIS pre-release
edition, doi:10.4232/1.10197 2010.
Eurostat, “Real GDP growth rate,” http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=de&pcode=tsieb020 (ac-
cessed: August 26, 2011) 2011.
, “Unemployment rate, annual average, by sex and age groups (%),” http://
appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en (ac-
cessed: December 20, 2011) 2011.
Falk, Armin and Christian Zehnder, “Discrimination and In-Group Favoritism in
a Citywide Trust Experiment,” Mimeo, 2007.
and Michael Kosfeld, “The Hidden Cost of Control,” American Economic Review,
2006, 96 (5), 1611–30.
, Andreas Kuhn, and Josef Zweimüller, “Unemployment and Right-wing
Extremist Crime,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2011, 113 (2), 260–285.
Fehr, Ernst, Alexander Klein, and Klaus Schmidt, “Fairness and Contract
Design,” Econometrica, 2007, 75 (1), 121–154.
and Armin Falk, “Psychological Foundations of Incentives,” European Economic
Review, 2002, 46, 287–324.
and Bettina Rockenbach, “Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human Altruism,”
Nature, 2003, 422 (6928), 137.
and John A. List, “The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and
Trustworthiness among CEOs,” Journal of the European Economic Association,
2004, 2 (5), 743–71.
144
and Klaus M Schmidt, “A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114 (3), 817–868.
Fershtman, Chaim and Uri Gneezy, “Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An
Experimental Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116 (1), 351–377.
Fischbacher, Urs, “z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Economic Experiments,”
Experimental Economics, February 2007, 10 (2), 171–178.
Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data,” http:
//www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 (accessed: August 25, 2011)
2011.
Frey, Bruno S., “Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and
Loyalty,” Economic Inquiry, 1993, 31 (4), 663–670.
and Alois Stutzer, “The Economics of Happiness,” World Economics, 2002, 3 (1),
1–17.
and , “What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?,” Journal of
Economic Literature, February 2002, 151 (3712), 867–8.
and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, “The Cost of Price Incentives: An empirical Analysis
of Motivation Crowding-Out,” American Economic Review, 1997, 87 (4), 746–755.
and Reto Jegen, “Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence,”
Journal of Economic Surveys, 2001, 5 (5), 589–611.
Gächter, Simon, Esther Kessler, and Manfred Königstein, “Do Incentives
Destroy Voluntary Cooperation?,” Mimeo, 2010.
Gneezy, Uri and Aldo Rustichini, “A Fine Is a Price,” Journal of Legal Studies,
2000, 29 (1), 1–18.
, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel, “When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work
to Modify Behavior,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2011, 25 (4).
145
Götte, Lorenz, David Huffman, and Stephan Meier, “The Impact of Group
Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random
Assignment to Real Social Groups,” American Economic Review, 2006, 96 (2), 212
– 216.
, , and , “The Impact of Social Ties on Group Interactions: Evidence
from Minimal Groups and Randomly Assigned Real Groups,” American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics, 2012, 4 (1), 101–15.
, , , and Matthias Sutter, “Competition Between Organizational Groups: Its
Impact on Altruistic and Anti-Social Motivations,” Management Science, 2012, 58
(5), 948–960.
Greiner, Ben, “The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 - A Guide for the
Organization of Experiments in Economics,” Working Paper Series in Economics 10,
University of Cologne, Department of Economics June 2004.
Grosjean, Pauline and Claudia Senik, “Democracy, Market Liberalization, and
Political Preferences,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 2011, 93 (1), 365–381.
Groves, Jason, “Nightmare Vision for Europe As EU Chief
Warns ’Democracy Could Disappear’ in Greece, Spain and
Portugal,” MailOnline, Associated Newspapers Ltd, (June 15, 2010)
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1286480/
EU-chief-warns-democracy-disappear-Greece-Spain-Portugal.html (acessed:
June 17, 2010) 2010.
Güth, Werner, M. Vittoria Levati, and Matteo Ploner, “On the Social
Dimension of Time and Risk Preferences: An Experimental Study,” Economic
Inquiry, April 2008, 46 (2), 261–272.
, Steffen Huck, and Peter Ockenfels, “Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with
Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study,” Economic Journal, 1996, 106
(436), 593–604.
146
Haisley, Emily C. and Roberto A. Weber, “Self-Serving Interpretations of
Ambiguity in Other-Regarding Behavior,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2010,
68 (2), 614 – 625.
Halla, Martin, Friedrich Schneider, and Alexander Wagner, “Satisfaction with
Democracy and Collective Action Problems: The Case of the Environment,” Public
Choice, 2011, pp. 1–29.
Hastie, Reid, “Social Inference,” Annual Review of Psychology, 1983, 34 (1), 511–542.
Hewstone, Miles, Mark Rubin, and Hazel Willis, “Intergroup Bias,” Annual
Review of Psychology, 2002, 53, 575 – 604.
Hibbs, Douglas A., “Chapter 31. Voting and the Macroeconomy,” in Barry R.
Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 565–586.
Huck, Steffen, “Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Offer Games with Incomplete
Information,” Journal of Economic Psychology, April 1999, 20 (2), 183–206.
Jacobsson, Fredric, Magnus Johannesson, and Lars Borgquist, “Is Altruism
Paternalistic?,” Economic Journal, 04 2007, 117 (520), 761–781.
Kessler, Judd and Stephen Leider, “Finding the Hidden Cost of Control,” Mimeo,
2012.
Khan, Mohsin S. and Abdelhak S. Senhadji, “Threshold Effects in the
Relationship between Inflation and Growth,” IMF Staff Papers, 2001, 48 (1), 1–21.
Klempt, Charlotte and Kerstin Pull, “Generosity, Greed and Gambling: What
Difference Does Asymmetric Information in Bargaining Make?,” Jena Economic
Research Papers, 2009.
Knigge, Pia, “The Ecological Correlates of Right-Wing Extremism in Western
Europe,” European Journal of Political Research, 1998, 34, 249–279.
Kogut, Bruce and Udo Zander, “What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and
Learning,” Organization Science, 1996, 7 (5), 502–518.
147
Konow, James, “Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation
Decisions,” American Economic Review, September 2000, 90 (4), 1072–1091.
Kritikos, Alexander and Friedel Bolle, “Distributional Concerns: Equity- or
Efficiency-Oriented?,” Economics Letters, December 2001, 73 (3), 333–338.
Lazear, Edward P., “Performance Pay and Productivity,” American Economic
Review, December 2000, 90 (5), 1346–1361.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Martin Paldam, “Economic Voting: An
Introduction,” Electoral Studies, 2000, (19), 113–121.
Lubbers, Marcel, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers, “Extreme Right-
Wing Voting in Western Europe,” European Journal of Political Research, 2002, 41
(3), 345–378.
MacCulloch, Robert and Silvia Pezzini, “Money, Religion and Revolution,”
Economics of Governance, 2007, 8 (1), 1–16.
Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr, “Polity IV
Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010,” http://www.
systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed: July 8, 2011) 2011.
Mitzkewitz, Michael and Rosemarie Nagel, “Experimental Results on Ultimatum
Games with Incomplete Information,” International Journal of Game Theory, June
1993, 22 (2), 171–198.
Nannestad, Peter and Martin Paldam, “The VP-function: A Survey of the
Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years,” Public Choice, 1994,
(79), 213–245.
Norris, Pippa, Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999.
, “Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?,” in Pippa Norris, ed., Critical
Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999, pp. 1–27.
148
OECD, “OECD.StatExtracts,” http://stats.oecd.org (accessed: June 02, 2011)
2011.
Przeworski, Adam, ed., Democracy and Development Cambridge Studies in the
Theory of Democracy, 1. publ. ed., Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge University Press,
2000.
Rapoport, Amnon and James A Sundali, “Ultimatums in Two-Person Bargaining
with One-Sided Uncertainty: Offer Games,” International Journal of Game Theory,
1996, 25 (4), 475–94.
Riener, Gerhard and Simon Wiederhold, “Team Building and Hidden Costs
of Control,” DICE Discussion Papers 66, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf,
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) September 2012.
Rohde, Ingrid M. T. and Kirsten I. M. Rohde, “Risk Attitudes in a Social
Context,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, October 2011, 43 (3), 205–225.
Sen, Amartya, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1977, 6 (4), 317–344.
Sliwka, Dirk, “Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive
Schemes,” American Economics Review, 2007, 97 (3), 999–1012.
Tajfel, Henri, “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations,” Annual Review of
Psychology, 1982, 33 (1), 1–39.
and J. C. Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in W. G. Austin
and S. Worchel, eds., The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Brooks/Cole,
1979, pp. 34–47.
Tremewan, James, “Group Identity and Coalition Formation: Experiments in a
Three-Player Divide the Dollar Game,” CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb)
1020, CEPREMAP June 2010.
Tremlett, Giles and John Hooper, “Protest in the Med: Rallies Against Cuts and
Corruption Spread,” The Guardian (May 19, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
149
world/2011/may/19/protest-med-cuts-corruption-spain (accessed: July 29,
2011) 2011.
von Siemens, Ferdinand, “Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of
Control,” CESifo Working Paper Series 3553, CESifo Group Munich August 2011.
Wagner, Alexander F., Friedrich Schneider, and Martin Halla, “The Quality of
Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy in Western Europe: A Panel Analysis,”
European Journal of Political Economy, 2009, 25 (1), 30–41.
Wells, Jason M. and Jonathan Krieckhaus, “Does National Context Influence
Democratic Satisfaction? A Multi-Level Analysis,” Political Research Quarterly,
2006, 59 (4), 569.
Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, Katrin Schmelz, and Matteo Ploner, “Hidden Costs of
Control: Four Repetitions and an Extension,” Experimental Economics, June 2012,
15 (2), 323–340.
150
Eidesstattliche Erklärung
Hiermit erkläre ich, die vorliegende Dissertation selbständig angefertigt und mich
keiner anderen als der in ihr angegebenen Hilfsmittel bedient zu haben. Insbesondere
sind sämtliche Zitate aus anderen Quellen als solche gekennzeichnet und mit Quel-
lenangaben versehen.
Mannheim, 10.12.2012 Philipp Zahn
151
Curriculum Vitae
Name: Philipp Martin Zahn
2008 – 2013 PhD Studies in Economics, Center of Doctoral Studies, University
of Mannheim. Research and Teaching Assistant at the Chair for
Economic Policy, University of Mannheim.
July 2012 –
Oct 2012
Chazen Visiting Scholar, Columbia Business School New York.
Oct 2011 –
Dec 2011
Visiting PhD-Student, Toulouse School of Economics.
2003 – 2008 M.Sc. (German Diploma) Economics, University of Mannheim.
Oct 2002 –
Mar 2003
Studies in Physics and Economics, Freie Universität Berlin.
1993 – 2002 Wilhelmi-Gymnasium, Sinsheim.
